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ABSTRACT 
 
The concept of “global learning” has become a pervasive buzzword in higher education 
in the United States. While the term is well-known, its meanings are multiple. In some instances, 
global learning refers to a modernization of liberal education initiatives, while in others it refers 
to the implementation of global experiences abroad. In developing my account of cosmopolitan 
moral education for adults, I construct a framework for thinking about global learning that 
emphasizes the process of adult re-learning. Using the ethical and aesthetic thought of Immanuel 
Kant as a resource, I put forward an account of global learning focused on the development of 
autonomy, self-identity, and vocation, within the context of re-learning processes adults undergo, 
and aided by moral and aesthetic examples. Kantian adult moral education is an underutilized 
aspect of Kant’s philosophy, a philosophical understanding critical to articulating global learning 
in its fullest capacity.  
This philosophical examination is aided by an empirical examination of the 2014-2015 
Global Perspectives Collaborative Pilot at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
Through interviews and in-classroom observations, I collected data on the first semester of the 
social studies methods course in the Global Perspectives cohort. I utilized the data collection and 
analysis technique of Public Reflective Equilibrium to bring empirical data into conversation 
with philosophical analysis. In doing so, the empirical data challenged and strengthened my 
philosophical account.  
I argue that it is the form of the example that is critical to aiding the process of re-
learning. In particular, I use Kantian aesthetics to argue that non-narrative examples enable the 
learner to lay his/her understandings alongside those provided in the example and thus deepen 
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their ability for reflective judgment and further their own re-learning. Evidence from the 
empirical data is presented in the form of poems in order to provide one concrete representation 
of the form of the example for which I argue philosophically. In concluding this study, I suggest 
that my account of global learning be used by faculty, programs, and institutions seeking to 
“globalize” the curriculum. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
FROM GLOBAL EXPERIENCE TO GLOBAL LEARNING 
As a supposedly “hot button” issue in higher education, why does the idea of global 
learning seem to lack critical examination by philosophers of education?1 As formulated and 
popularized by the Association of American Colleges and Universities (AAC&U), global 
learning is a useful, yet somewhat ambiguous, term that broadly focuses upon the impacts of a 
globally connected world on higher education, and more precisely, upon undergraduate liberal 
education. According to a recent AAC&U publication, the movement for global learning  
is not about national borders and protecting sovereignty and national security. It is about 
sharing problems, knowing that many challenges ultimately affect everyone because of 
the way the world is now, and with the hope that we can share solutions. For this 
cooperation, we must understand one another as people based on an awareness of what 
our own sense of self is.2 
 
For the purposes of supporting or opposing global learning and its aims, an analytic philosopher 
of education might proceed in one of the following ways: (1) seek to conceptually uphold global 
learning as a unique idea within higher education, distinct from but related to other ideas like 
liberal education; or, (2) seek to conceptually deflate global learning, either by locating it within 
liberal education or by unmasking it as a meaningless buzzword. Unfortunately, either purely 
analytic way of proceeding would likely strike most everyday practitioners in global higher 
education, not to mention most residents of the modern world, as an eccentric or pointless 
philosophical exercise.  
                                                
1 One notable exception, though focusing on “globalizing” higher education more generally, is Yvonne Raley and 
Gerhard Preyer, eds., Philosophy of Education in the Era of Globalization (New York, NY: Routledge), 2009. 
2 Indira Nair and Margaret Henning, Models of Global Learning (Washington, DC: Association of American 
Colleges and Universities, 2017): 4. 
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After all, what is ostensibly called “global” higher education has been an extremely 
complex, ever-expanding industry for decades. There is little doubt that our globally connected 
world has become firmly embedded in the orientation, educational thinking, and lifeworlds of 
students, faculty members, student development professionals, educational leaders – in essence, 
everyone involved in higher education. Why should philosophers of education attempt to analyze 
it now? It hardly seems necessary to step back and examine what “global” means, or does not 
mean, in today’s climate.  
The simple answer is that – for disciplinary or other mysterious reasons – there has just 
not been much written on “globalizing” higher education from a philosophical lens. As a result, 
the industry of global higher education and “new” pedagogical approaches like global learning 
continue to be promulgated under obscure agendas without sufficient justification. As Carol 
Geary Schneider, President Emerita of the AAC&U, relates, the global learning-focused Shared 
Futures initiative was established, in part, to get at what institutions mean when they say 
“global” in their mission statements and strategic plans. She discovered a “profound disconnect 
between those rhetorical commitments and actual campus practice.”3 As one stated purpose of 
philosophy is to clear muddy water, and another purpose is to provide a rationally positive way 
of envisioning the future, I think that a philosophically informed and publicly viable account of 
global learning might usefully afford greater reflection for practitioners who worry about (a) the 
philosophical grounding of the move to “globalize” education or (b) what impact their policies 
have upon the supposed beneficiaries, college students. This study does not attempt to provide a 
“comprehensive” look at global learning – such an account would surely be as ethnocentric as 
                                                
3 Carol Geary Schneider, “Deepening the Connections: Liberal Education and Global Learning.” Liberal Education 
97 (2011): 1. 
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they come – but merely offers one concentrated look through the prism of global higher 
education in the United States.  
Terence McLaughlin has suggested that philosophy of education may lend more analytic 
clarity to educational concepts commonly referred to in comparative education as well as 
contribute a greater understanding of the normative dimensions of educational practice.4 As the 
field that focuses, by definition, on global higher education, comparative and international 
education is an established interdisciplinary area of educational theory and research that includes 
scholars in the social sciences and humanities who study international education systems, 
policies, and movements. For a philosopher to address inherently comparative questions, 
according to McLaughlin, he or she must simultaneously adopt a comparative perspective toward 
his or her overall philosophical orientation and methods employed – in order to develop concepts 
that are more open to public adjudication.  
Unfortunately, philosophy still tends to have a reputation among the public for being a 
hermetic academic discipline that deals solely with ideas and not their practical application. 
Harry Brighouse and Michael McPherson have recently observed that “[c]areful philosophical 
work on the purposes and aims of higher education is sparse.”5 By “careful philosophical work,” 
Brighouse and McPherson argue that theoretical work ought not to derive merely from normative 
issues in higher education as an idea, but also from the empirical concerns and realities of higher 
education practice. Moreover, J.B. Schneewind portrays philosophers as “on the whole […] not 
curious about the etiology of changes in the problems they take to matter,” to which he urges 
                                                
4 Terence H. McLaughlin, “Education, Philosophy and the Comparative Perspective,” in Liberalism, Education and 
Schooling, edited by David Carr, Mark Halstead, and Richard Pring (Edinburgh, UK: Imprint Academic, 2008): 
471-83.  
5 Harry Brighouse and Michael McPherson, eds. The Aims of Higher Education: Problems of Morality and Justice 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015): 156. 
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them to take greater heed of the “particular social and political developments outside of 
academe.”6  
Within a globally connected environment of seeming imbalance, incoherence and 
inexplicable conflict, the ideals of critical rationality and considered judgment that are calling 
cards of philosophy may be put to effective use in dialogue with comparative education and 
policymaking perspectives, both within the U.S. and internationally, to address our shared 
problems.  
Contexts of Cosmopolitanism 
Globalization has undoubtedly transformed how higher education and those within its 
provenance conceive of their identities and purposes within society. According to Fazal Rizvi 
and Bob Lingard, globalization is a “highly contested notion … used not only to describe a set of 
empirical changes, but also to prescribe desired interpretations of and responses to these changes 
… globalization affects the ways in which we both interpret and imagine the possibilities of our 
lives.”7 The fact of transnational global mobility has changed attitudes and identities, which 
sometimes run counter to individual, familial, religious, or national imperatives. As Rizvi and 
Lingard note, “…the lives of [the nation-state’s] citizens are now inextricably linked to cultural 
formations that are produced in faraway places, and the dispersion of people implies multiple 
senses of belonging and loyalty.”8 Paradoxically, the exposure to different forms of life has 
triggered an ugly backlash and thirst for nationalistic, patriotic, and “pure” cultural symbols.  
The desire of philosophers to theorize higher education as an intrinsically global 
endeavor is in part a moral response to these trends. The exclusive focus on national boundaries 
                                                
6 J.B. Schneewind, “Autonomy after Kant,” in Kant and Moral Autonomy, edited by Oliver Sensen (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 155-6. 
7 Fazal Rizvi and Bob Lingard, Globalizing Education Policy (London: Routledge, 2010): 23. 
8 Ibid., 30. 
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to define individual identity and contain ethical responsibilities is, according to Martha 
Nussbaum, to make a “morally questionable move of self-definition by a morally irrelevant 
characteristic.”9 According to Nussbaum, it is not that nationalism, or patriotism, is prima facie 
bad – only that, if we are assuming a liberal perspective on the equal respect for persons, it 
should not be used to justify according less responsibility for the rights of distant others. A 
cosmopolitan perspective is appealed to in the critique of citizenship education that inculcates 
patriotism and requires political participation, including Amy Gutmann’s prescriptive account of 
democratic civic education,10 which as Harry Brighouse contends, “aims to teach children the 
beliefs and habits which help to stabilize the, presumably just, state. … [and] to maintain the 
state in some prescribed form.”11 Nussbaum’s defense of cosmopolitanism – world or global 
citizenship – as a theoretical framework for liberal education has fueled much debate about the 
purposes of global learning in higher education.12 Her ideas have directly influenced how the 
AAC&U thinks about global learning, evidenced by her prominent role on the Global Learning 
Leadership Council for the Shared Futures initiative, a major bellwether of change in globalizing 
the undergraduate curriculum.13  
How exactly global learning relates to liberal education is an important question for an 
association entrusted with keeping liberal education current and vital. This question turns on how 
liberal education is defined – as preserving tradition and keeping out change, or as 
accommodating and preparing for change. The AAC&U’s project for liberal education is to 
                                                
9 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” in For Love of Country? Edited by Joshua Cohen 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2002): 5. 
10 Amy Gutmann, “Democratic Citizenship,” in For Love of Country? Edited by Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2002): 66-71. 
11 Harry Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000): 71. Cf. Harry 
Brighouse, “Civic Education and Liberal Legitimacy,” Ethics 108 (1998): 722-3.  
12 Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Liberal Education (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press), 1998. 
13 AAC&U, “Shared Futures: Global Learning Leadership Council.” AAC&U.org. https://www.aacu.org/shared-
futures/leadership-council. Accessed on March 18, 2018. 
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retain the liberal arts’ focus on critical thinking and moral reasoning, but to transform liberal 
education from a “Great Books,” disciplinary model to an outcomes and skills-based model that 
prepares students for global challenges.14 Similarly, Peter Stearns seeks to portray an outcomes-
resistant, humanities-exclusive liberal education “devoted to … the special beauties and 
intricacies of the Western canon” as distinguished from an outcomes-embracing, global-friendly 
liberal education.15 According to Stearns, both global education and liberal education (in the 
latter conception), “promote the capacity to identify and evaluate student assumptions; both 
encourage critical thinking. One of the strengths of the global approach, in fact, is that it offers 
new vantage points for students’ exploration of their own values and their own society, as part of 
the broader global understanding.”16 On what can be called Stearns’ “minimal” reading of liberal 
education, global learning and liberal education are one and the same thing; global learning is 
liberal education updated for the 21st century. Stearns notes, but does not elaborate upon, the 
student experience of reflection upon values – a key concern in the present study.17 
Experience and the In-Forming of Global Learning 
One promising approach for developing an account of global learning is to positively 
locate and elucidate a concept shared by all prospective global learners: namely, the nature of 
global experience. Individuals often experience the interconnections engendered by globalization 
as an active engagement – toward increasing one’s total experience and self-knowledge spanning 
borders. However, as William Gaudelli and Megan Laverty contend, for global experience to 
have a positive impact upon education, it must be conceived as something more than just having 
                                                
14 Kevin Hovland and Carol Geary Schneider, “Deepening the Connections: Liberal Education and Global Learning 
in College,” About College (November-December 2011): 2-8. 
15 Peter N. Stearns, “Global Education and Liberal Education,” Liberal Education (Summer 2010): 18-23. 
16 Ibid., 22.  
17 While I am sympathetic to the AAC&U’s approach to global learning and its modified definition of liberal 
education, I depart from their skills/outcomes-based focus of measuring global learning, which I argue later 
instrumentalizes the global learner and delimits their possible experiences with global learning. See Chapter Two. 
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an experience in another country, which risks “making a fetish of what’s new since it refers 
dually to the practice of ‘going abroad’ and to the current global moment in which universities 
are engaged beyond their borders.”18 I contend that coming to terms with how global experience 
in-forms global learning creates a connecting tissue between diverse perspectives in global 
higher education.  
By experience, we may derive a wide array of meanings, but for the purposes of this 
study, I categorize experience into two senses: pre-reflective experience and reflective 
experience. Pre-reflective experience is experience of objects and events that either do not enter 
our conscious reflection or exceed our ability to make sense of them (though we may reflect 
upon this experience and understand it later). Reflective experience is experience that is guided 
by certain principles of rationality and salience, which help us determine when we know that 
something is worth reflecting upon, and how to do so. Above the level of pre-reflection, 
experience is always mediated by thought – habits, principles, and attitudes – derived from our 
reflection upon previous experiences.  
While John Dewey argued that education should be grounded in experience, he was 
careful to note that experience does not lead automatically to learning. For this to happen, 
experience must be genuinely educative, by which he meant intimately connected to the form 
and substance of what we learn and is able to afford future experiences.19 However, it is 
important to note that the reflection required to make an experience genuinely educative may 
come later, long after the experience has occurred – even if the content of the experience was 
retained at the time. Without reflection, our experience can be narrowed by the pattern imposed 
                                                
18 William Gaudelli and Megan J. Laverty, "What is a Global Experience?," Education and Culture 31, 2015. 
19 John Dewey, Experience and Education: The 60th Anniversary Edition. West Lafayette, IN: Kappa Delta Pi, 
1938/1998. 
 8 
 
from previous experiences, which may be self-deceptive or self-fulfilling, and do nothing to 
teach us anything new or challenging.  
Global experience is, by definition, experience outside of or opposed to our local, 
habitual modes of experience. A global experience is not necessarily an experience in another 
country – though you would certainly expect a person studying abroad or attending an 
international conference to have a global experience. In fact, you can have a global experience in 
your local surroundings, with local things. Indeed, what makes a global experience powerful is 
what makes any experience powerful – the pre-reflective force and the reflective implications.  
Like garden variety experience, the richness of our global experiential lives depends upon 
a regular tracking between the pre-reflective and reflective domains of experience. Moreover, as 
learning depends upon new, and often challenging experiences, global learning cannot occur 
without new pre-reflective experiences that force us to reconsider or reorient our prior ways of 
understanding the world and ourselves. Our habitual modes of experience are framed to keep out 
challenging pre-reflective experiences from disturbing us. Thus, intentionally putting ourselves 
in situations that allow global experiences to “slip through the cracks,” so to speak, creates the 
greater possibility of future reflection, and thus, future global learning. Of course, as a global 
learner becomes more proficient at reflection and accustomed to the value of global experiences, 
he or she will seek out these experiences without hesitation.  
That global learning primarily derives from continuous reflection upon experience is why 
we first need a philosophical orientation to global learning to help ground and guide an empirical 
one. I am not suggesting, however, that a philosophical account of global learning has nothing to 
learn from empirical accounts of global learning. Quite the contrary – as my study intends to 
show, empirical findings that challenge and question a philosophical account are invaluable for 
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improving said account. However, a solely empirical orientation only provides what we have 
learned about global learning thus far, and the policies, case studies, and instruments we have 
created to facilitate, exhibit, and assess it.  
Another way to describe global learning in terms of reflective experience is to refer to it 
as a form. If global learning is a form, previous accounts of global learning in higher education 
written from a comparative perspective are at risk of collecting “instances” of global learning 
without really understanding what underlies them, what ideas motivate them, and what unsettling 
experiences hide amongst them. By describing global learning as a form – rather than as a 
selection of possible content – I am suggesting that the idea of “global” performs a greater 
explanatory role than being merely a stand-in for “international.”  
Alternatively, “global” should be formally conceived as “holistic.” Global learning as 
holistic, on the one hand, is premised upon an ideal completeness of perspectives within it, at 
least in spirit, and on the other hand, connotes a learning undergone by the whole person, which 
may be said to include intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and political “knowledge.” As the “world” is 
the ostensive subject of the global learner’s experience, knowledge accrued about the world 
necessarily depends upon radically contingent circumstances because the world is always 
changing. According to Philip J. Rossi, educators attempting to understand how to address global 
issues in education must ask the question: from a moral standpoint, what is educational about 
globalization?20 Namely, what is it about the process of cultural and intellectual exchanges that is 
worth understanding in the realm of intrinsic moral benefit that may be conveyed to students?  
As I will argue, an adequate account of global learning must seek to establish a 
motivating ground for the global learner’s capacity to ethically consider these radically 
                                                
20 Philip J. Rossi, The Social Authority of Reason: Kant’s Critique, Radical Evil, and the Destiny of Humankind 
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press), 2005. 
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contingent circumstances – in other words, to educate the capacity for autonomy and realize 
authentic self-identity.  
 The Inner Pedagogue: Ingredients of a Kantian Global Learning 
This study develops a line of inquiry that draws inspiration from Immanuel Kant’s 
treatment of the relation of ethics and aesthetics to problems within education, and more 
specifically, to the problem of defining and affording moral education into what may be broadly 
referred to as adulthood. I utilize a broad array of primary texts in Kant’s oeuvre, with a focus on 
his wide-ranging ethical and aesthetic thought. Moreover, I consult secondary texts by leading 
Kant scholars and contemporary Kantians. I find within Kant’s overall philosophical program a 
resource for grounding my own ideas of global learning in higher education.  
No other philosopher shares so many of the concerns regarding the role of education in 
fostering a moral and global identity – and has written about them in as sustained and systematic 
a fashion – as Kant does and has. Kant argues that, in a fundamental sense, for a person to be 
moral is his or her own business; it ultimately comes down to an individual’s autonomous choice 
to be moral. While morality is a priori, it is not innate, and thus may be afforded through moral 
education.21 Kant is specifically concerned with educating every learner entering adulthood to be 
a thinker and to call upon their “inner pedagogue.”22 According to G. Felicitas Munzel, Kant 
suggests that our vocation as human beings [Bestimmung des Menschen] “functions formally as 
such a supreme pedagogical principle and existentially as the inner teacher found everywhere in 
human reason.”23  
                                                
21 Paul Guyer, “Examples of Moral Possibility,” in Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary, edited by 
Klas Roth and Chris W. Suprenant (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012): 124-38. 
22 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic, edited by Michael J. Young (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 
1992. 
23 G. Felicitas Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy: Toward Education for Freedom (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2012): 223. Emphasis in the original. 
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Certainly, what Kant would think about the contemporary phenomenon of “globalizing” 
higher education, Susan Meld Shell has observed, is very much an open question.24 Given Kant’s 
explicit defense of cosmopolitanism in his philosophy of history (including his early proposal for 
a global federation of states), as well as the general permeation of cosmopolitan ideas throughout 
his entire philosophical career, this may seem to be a surprising conclusion. If Kant is such a 
proponent of human beings’ progress toward a cosmopolitan identity, and sees education as 
instrumental in achieving this aim, would he not want universities to pursue policies that 
encourage greater “global mobility,” and make students more “globally aware,” as the discourse 
runs today? Of course, for a Kantian account of global learning to succeed, so much would turn 
on how the term “global” is interpreted and brought into congruence with Kant’s deeply 
committed and carefully reasoned defense of a humanistic, Enlightenment-centered education for 
students’ intellectual, moral, and aesthetic development.25 
Kant does not have a theory of global learning in the sense that we speak of it today. 
Kant, like other thinkers of his time, does not use the term “global” anywhere in his writings to 
describe the world at large and considered as a whole. Some comparable terms he uses 
periodically are “universal,” “natural,” and “cosmopolitan.” In describing something as 
“universal” – such as the supreme principle of morality, the Categorical Imperative – Kant 
means that it is equally binding for all of humanity. Rational cognition and aesthetic awareness 
of the beautiful are also universal because all human beings are capable of them; they represent 
part of our vocation as human beings.  
                                                
24 Susan Meld Shell, “Kant on the Humanities,” in Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary, edited by 
Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012): 210. 
25 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” Practical Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996): 17-22. 
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Characteristically, the terms that Kant uses to connote the global have an inner sense and 
an outer sense. In other words, morality is essentially a matter for inner reflection because the 
moral law can only be understood through an individual’s autonomy or capacity for self-
determination. However, the appropriate outer conditions – such as an awareness of history, 
anthropology, art, and politics – are necessary to help further along this process of inner moral 
work. For instance, “cosmopolitan” describes both the unity of inner relations within a person 
understood as a whole and the unity of outer relations between persons, institutions, and nation-
states. Kant describes the “cosmopolitan sense” of philosophy as “the science of the relation of 
all cognition and of all use of reason to the ultimate end of human reason, to which, as the 
highest, all other ends are subordinated, and in which they must all unite to form a unity.”26 
Philosophical inquiry is properly connected with every aspect of human life and experience. 
Following Kant’s delineation of the inner and outer senses of the “global,” I primarily use the 
term “global” to connote the “whole” in global learning and secondarily to describe the empirical 
fact of global higher education systems.  
When it comes to his views on education in general, Kant has usually been taken to focus 
much more on the inculcation of a moral disposition and character in children than he is in 
drawing out the implications of his moral education for adults. However, recent Kant scholarship 
has demonstrated how Kantian ethics understood broadly encompasses both Kant’s traditionally 
understood deontological moral theory (such as his theory of autonomy, account of free will, and 
the Categorical Imperative) and a robust, anthropological account of human nature and empirical 
“helps” that work in concert toward a providing for a full ethical life.27 Considering the lifelong 
                                                
26 Kant, Lectures on Logic, 538. 
27 Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 1999. Cf. Robert B. 
Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), 
2000. 
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and lifewide implications of this scholarship, existing accounts of Kantian moral education have 
presented too limited a picture, often presenting Kantian moral education as developing from 
Rousseau’s educational theories and focusing exclusively upon children’s education.  
In fact, Kant elaborates a complex, multi-tiered theory of moral education that is 
developed in both his intentionally “educational” works (like Lectures on Pedagogy and The 
Conflict of the Faculties) and his other works of practical philosophy (like the Remarks, The 
Critique of Practical Reason, The Critique of the Power of Judgment, Religion Within the 
Boundaries of Pure Reason, Lectures on Ethics, and Lectures on Anthropology), evincing an 
awareness of the diversity of moral educational contexts and challenges.28 Furthermore, previous 
literature has not drawn consistent connections between Kant’s aesthetics, his views of higher 
education, and his moral educational theories. As a result, a Kantian moral education for adults 
has not been explicitly elaborated.  
Methods 
This study develops an account of global learning using moral inquiry, understood as an 
ongoing practice of engaging moral concepts in everyday life.29 According to Michele Moody-
Adams, moral inquiry features “the myriad ways in which human beings articulate and interpret 
moral concepts, rules, and principles in action, as well as display moral sentiments and responses 
in emotions, attitudes, and actions.”30 Moral inquiry, following Moody-Adams’ reading, should 
not be rigidly monocultural and import unquestioned assumptions about the automatic rightness 
                                                
28 Prominent scholarship on Kant’s theory of education have emerged in recent years. See, for instance, G. Felicitas 
Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy: Toward Education for Freedom (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press), 2012; Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant, eds., Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary (New 
York, NY: Routledge), 2012; and Georg Cavallar, Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism: History, Philosophy, and 
Education for World Citizens (Berlin: De Gruyter), 2017. 
29 Michele Moody-Adams, Fieldwork in Familiar Places (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1997. 
30 Ibid., 178. 
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of liberal democratic institutions in making its judgments.31 Moral inquiry must, in the end, be 
accountable to diverse global learners in diverse communities and derive from their actual 
experiences and reflections. So positioned, moral inquiry seeks to facilitate the complex 
endeavors of global learners in improving their own learning as moral inquirers of experience.  
Communities of global learners always come with certain existing understandings that 
moral inquiry taps into and subjects to analysis. As Moody-Adams states: 
the empirical foothold of moral theory, like all moral inquiry, is the self-understanding of 
the community of moral inquirers potentially addressed by the inquiry. Any moral 
stance—whether a sophisticated philosophical construction, a loosely connected set of 
prereflective intuitions, or an incoherent jumble of judgments and attitudes—will be 
bound up with particular visions of the sorts of persons who accept or reject such 
positions or intuitions, or who make such judgments and hold such attitudes.32 
 
These various judgments and attitudes are derived from experiences that are often left un-
addressed by global learners. As a result, we often have scant understanding of where our true 
influences on engaging in global learning lie.  
Building an account of global learning, like moral theory in general, must be informed by 
the experiences of actual global learners, from the “pre-theoretical deliverances of the moral 
consciousness of those to whom the theory is addressed.”33 By “pre-theoretical deliverances,” I 
read Moody-Adams to comparably mean “pre-reflective” experiences or just garden variety 
experiences. These experiences may helpfully cause global learners to reflect upon the 
trajectories of their lives and change them. Moody-Adams argues that any serious inquiry in 
moral philosophy presupposes a moral anthropology upon which it is built, a distinctive 
                                                
31 Moody-Adams, Fieldwork in Familiar Places. Cf. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home 
and Abroad (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press), 2006; Avner de Shalit, Power to the People: 
Teaching Political Philosophy in Skeptical Times (Lexington, KY: Lexington Books), 2006.   
32 Moody-Adams, Fieldwork in Familiar Places, 138. 
33 Ibid., 140. 
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approach she derives from the work of John Rawls and Kant.34 With mutually reinforcing 
philosophical and empirical resources, the mirror of moral inquiry methodically reveals both the 
aspirations we hold and the realities we experience as global learners.  
 A common objection to moral inquiry is that the implicit beliefs and assumptions of a 
community can only be understood by those directly involved in the life of that community. As 
culturally, epistemologically, or ethically “relative,” it is claimed, a community’s beliefs and 
assumptions are not accessible to moral inquiry, and for that matter questioning via open 
discussion or challenge at all. However, the very idea that experience can be “pre-theoretical” or 
“pre-reflective” means that we do not understand it even if we do experience it on some level. 
While a community’s “relative” beliefs and assumptions may legitimately name a bounded 
conceptual space that undergirds their experience, it does not follow that this space is in some 
way inaccessible to an outsider’s understanding. As Donald Davidson35 and David Bridges36 
have separately shown, the very act of identifying one’s own beliefs and assumptions, as one’s 
own and not another’s, presupposes an awareness of another person’s beliefs and assumptions. 
Because so many values and the reasons behind them are widely shared across cultures, 
dialogue about moral issues is both possible and necessary.37 To adequately engage in reflection, 
we need other influences on our understanding, trusted interlocutors from outside of our habitual 
modes of experience.  
 
 
                                                
34 Ibid., 152. 
35 Donald Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation 
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1984): 183-198. 
36 David Bridges, “Nothing About Us Without Us: Ethics and Outsider Research,” in Fiction Written Under Oath?: 
Essays in Philosophy and Educational Research (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2003): 133-152. 
37 For an account of dialogue across different cultural practices that minimally retains objective morality, see 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, “The Primacy of Practice,” in Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (New 
York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007): 69-86. 
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Public Reflective Equilibrium 
As Moody-Adams suggests, moral inquiry requires an approach that combines 
philosophical and empirical methods. This approach is deployed both to develop a more 
adequate moral theory and to foster understanding and continued growth among the global 
learners addressed. In this study, I find such an approach for data collection and analysis in 
public reflective equilibrium.38 A “practice-oriented philosophy,”39 public reflective equilibrium 
is formulated by Avner de-Shalit as a form of “public consultation” that tests and expands the 
limits of philosophical understanding on a topic or problem. In this approach, philosophers 
conduct open-ended research interviews with select informants who, by virtue of their 
“positioning” vis-à-vis a critical domain or issue, possess unique positional knowledge, 
experiences, and perspectives that may be “mined” for ideas to improve an existing philosophical 
theory.  
Public reflective equilibrium seeks to modify Rawls’ approach to reflective equilibrium. 
Reflective equilibrium, as described by Rawls, tests a philosopher’s “considered judgments” – 
intuitions with no obvious reason to doubt – regarding a theoretical idea or issue by consulting 
relevant empirical examples to determine if the considered judgments are accurate or feasible.40 
In public reflective equilibrium, the philosopher casts the reflective net much wider than in 
traditional reflective equilibrium. For de-Shalit, there is no reason to assume that a philosopher’s 
                                                
38 Avner de-Shalit, Power to the People: Teaching Political Philosophy in Skeptical Times (Lexington, KY: 
Lexington Books), 2006. Cf. Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit, Disadvantage (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press), 2007. 
39 Other examples of “practice-oriented philosophy” include the work of Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 
(New York: Basic Books), 1977; Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in 
American Life (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), 1985; and Rachel Sharp, Anthony Green, and 
Jacqueline Lewis, Education and Social Control: A Study in Progressive Primary Education (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul), 1975.  
40 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 2001. 
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limited knowledge of a domain or issue will necessarily yield a diverse enough set of considered 
judgments to inform the creation of a more adequate philosophical theory. 
In public reflective equilibrium, the comportment of the philosopher is one of 
inquisitiveness and open-mindedness toward the informant, who is regarded as a knowledgeable 
“expert” of his or her experience. Research interviews should be constructed to allow informants 
to elaborate upon their understanding of concepts and issues, and explain their motivations for 
action, in a natural, free-flowing manner. However, the open-endedness of this approach does 
not preclude the philosopher from questioning, challenging, or even making judgments about the 
normative stances offered by informants. Public reflective equilibrium is, above all, a dialogue 
conducted between two (and sometimes more) equally curious partners sharing the same moral 
inquiry and concerns. 
Cohort 4: The Global Perspectives Collaborative Pilot 
The empirical research component of this study focuses on a pilot themed social studies 
methods course on “global perspectives,” conducted as part of a teacher certification program in 
the College of Education at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The Global 
Perspectives cohort, otherwise known as Cohort 4, ran from September 2014 to May 2015. 
Cohort 4 targeted a diverse array of seniors in their final year of K-8 teacher preparation who 
expressed a prior interest in global issues and studying abroad and/or teaching abroad after the 
completion of their studies. Seniors who were completing a bilingual/ESL endorsement and/or 
those intending to teach in Champaign-Urbana area local schools were also placed in Cohort 4. 
The study participants were the Director of the Global Perspectives Collaborative Pilot and 
social studies teacher educator, and sixteen students in Cohort 4. Primary data collection 
occurred during the fall semester of 2014.  
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Two distinct methods of qualitative research were conducted: in-depth interviews and 
ethnographic observations. Interview subjects were observed in the context of their daily 
educational activities (thirty hours total) and interviewed about their prior and current 
experiences with global learning in a non-directive, associative manner as recommended by 
public reflective equilibrium. Interviews were conducted once for each participant (lasting about 
one hour each) near the midway point of the fall semester of 2014. Questions asked in these 
interviews were developed within the a priori themes that emerged from my initial literature 
review of student autonomy and self-identity and have informed the present account of global 
learning. The open-ended interviews were audio recorded and transcribed for analysis. 
The University of Illinois Institutional Review Board approved this research study.41 All 
students in Cohort 4 were invited to participate,42 and those who consented to be interviewed and 
became participants in the study43 remain confidential and were provided with pseudonyms that 
appear in the final study. Each transcribed interview was assigned a number that corresponded to 
a participant name. The key of the numbers and names was kept in a secure location separate 
from the data. The data collected for this research was stored in a password protected folder on 
my Dropbox account.  
Using the transcription data from the interviews and ethnographic field notes, I analyzed 
the data by assigning thematic codes to meaningful responses. These themes began with the a 
priori themes derived from the literature review. However, new themes and philosophical 
considerations have emerged since this data was initially collected and analyzed, which have 
forced me to revise some of my earlier conclusions and modify the philosophical account of 
global learning offered in the present study. The empirical data from Cohort 4 is here presented 
                                                
41 For IRB Approval Letter, see Appendix A. 
42 For Research Participant Invitation Email and Research Description Script, see Appendix B and C, respectively. 
43 For Student Interview Protocol and Faculty Interview Protocol, see Appendix D and E, respectively. 
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in Chapter Five, “’I Belong to the School’: A Poetic Example of the Global Teacher.” I draw 
upon the principles of arts-based research to construct poems as a medium for presenting 
research findings and interpretations.44 
Outline of the Present Study 
What constitutes global learning in higher education is a problem. Yet it is not the 
problem that either its proponents or detractors envision. Most critics and educators conceive 
global learning as an ideological, institutional, curricular, or pedagogical problem, foisted upon 
us by globalization and the international higher education marketplace. In contrast, I conceive of 
global learning as, principally, an ethical and aesthetic problem about living morally and 
responsively as adults in the modern world. Rather than being a latecomer to the higher 
education scene, fighting for limited space and resources, global learning speaks to what endures 
about learning itself, after the exigencies of globalization – the necessity of adult re-learning. By 
way of an introduction to the complete argument and assorted contents of the present study, I 
offer the following chapter outline.  
Chapter Two 
In the United States, the “political” imperative of global higher education signifies that all 
institutions must, in some way or other, globalize their operations by redirecting scarce resources 
to increase international partnerships, student recruitment, and competitiveness in international 
ranking systems, among many other areas. Moreover, in the U.S., the “pedagogical” imperative 
of global learning signifies the move to globalize the undergraduate curriculum by ensuring that 
                                                
44 For a similar approach, see Monica Pendergast, Peter Gouzouasis, Carl Leggo, and Rita L. Irwin, “A Haiku Suite: 
The Importance of Music Making in the Lives of Secondary School Students,” Music Education Research 11:3 
(2009): 303-317. Cf. Laurel Richardson, “Poetics, Dramatics, and Transgressive Validity: The Case of the Skipped 
Line,” The Sociological Quarterly 34 (1993): 695-710. For sources on arts-based research, see Tom Barone and 
Elliot W. Eisner, Arts Based Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage), 2012; Tom Barone, Touching Eternity: The 
Enduring Outcomes of Teaching (New York: Teachers College Press), 2011. 
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all students develop global awareness and responsibilities of global citizenship. As I argue in 
Chapter Two, “The Global Imperative in Higher Education,” both imperatives are problematic 
because they tend to elide or distort fundamental interpersonal relations by modeling an ethos of 
“seeming,” rather than “being,” thus idealizing the global learner and neglecting the global 
learner’s unique experience as a resource for learning.  
On the one hand, the global higher education system assumes a particular relational 
attitude of isomorphism, or rampant institutional copying, which models interpersonal relations 
among academic leaders, faculty, staff, students, and other interested parties in higher education. 
On the other hand, global learning, as it is currently configured, is a series of capacities, 
dispositions, and knowledge requirements that position learners as both the ultimate constructors 
of knowledge and “blank slates” for social or nationalist values needed for a supposed global 
success. After examining these issues, I reconsider the use of cosmopolitanism, or world 
citizenship, as a concept in global higher education in light of these challenges, defending a 
“grounded” reading of Kant’s cosmopolitanism as preferable to other competing accounts for 
incorporating cosmopolitan ideals in higher education. I conclude that whichever approach to 
global higher education, global learning, and cosmopolitanism is utilized, the experiential 
perspectives of actual global learners, must delimit proposed global educational policies and 
practices.  
Chapter Three 
 Global learning is fundamentally determined by the realities of adult learning, 
intellectually but especially morally, in the globalized world – an idea oddly neglected in 
discussions of higher education. Becoming an adult, for philosophers like Kant, is signified by a 
moral awareness of our vocation as human beings, with the capacity for autonomy and the desire 
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to elucidate our self-identity through learning about the world. To construct a more adequate 
account of global learning in higher education, we need to regard global learners, even 
“emerging adult” college students, as exercising full autonomous agency over their global 
learning choices. In Chapter Three, “Cosmopolitan Moral Education for Adults,” I argue that 
global learning holistically conceived commits us to a version of adult moral education that 
contains as its central endeavor, re-learning.  
Re-learning, or the calling into question of what one has previously learned and the 
reconfiguring of life purposes, is the principle underlying my account of global learning, 
cosmopolitan moral education for adults. I defend this account by, first, showing the difficulty in 
facilitating global learning for “emerging” adults because of the lack of experience with moral 
decision-making. I then elucidate the stages of my account, leading global learners through an 
awareness of autonomy, authentic self-identity, vocation, and the reconstructive process of re-
learning, indicating where Kant’s theory of adult moral education enters as a resource. I conclude 
by suggesting that appropriately conceived moral and aesthetic examples are essential for 
helping to overcome the pedagogical and experiential problem of realizing global learning. 
Chapter Four 
Global learning re-imagined as cosmopolitan moral education for adults necessitates a 
commitment to the creation and promotion of moral and aesthetic examples that present what 
global learning is like to a prospective global learner, thus helping to surmount the yawning gap 
of moral experience for young adults. As adults have stronger powers of reflection than children, 
they need better examples upon which to reflect on morality. In Kant’s ethical and aesthetic 
theory, the example provides daily guidance for acting morally and helps to exercise humans’ 
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capacity for reflective judgment. However, in all existing accounts of the example, what is 
emphasized is the principle or content and not the form the example should take.  
In my account of the example in Chapter Four, “Global Learning and the Example,” I 
argue that it is primarily the form of the example, rather than the content, that educates the 
learner. To this end, I defend a “non-narrative” approach to example construction in global 
learning. Using Kant’s aesthetic theory as a framework, I present two possible global learning 
exemplars – one a person and the other an artwork. I then turn to Kant’s speculative account of 
sublime presentation in helping to decipher Abbas Kiarostami’s complex Iranian film, Life, and 
Nothing More…, and discuss his “fill in the blanks” aesthetic philosophy as a productive model 
for example construction. I conclude by gesturing toward additional non-narrative approaches to 
example construction.  
Chapter Five 
In the sustained example of global learning I construct in Chapter Five, “’I Belong to the 
School’: A Poetic Example of the Global Teacher,” I compose a series of poetic stanzas that 
present interview data with students and a professor in a social studies methods course, one 
component of the Global Perspectives Collaborative Pilot conducted from fall 2014-spring 2015 
in the University of Illinois College of Education. Purposefully constructed to minimize 
researcher contextualization and maximize reader co-construction and interpretation, the 
example illustrates the stages of re-learning that the participants undergo.  
Collective student reflections chart the cohort’s journey from initial awareness of self-
identity, to experiences with education, the sources of the teaching vocation, challenges to 
autonomy development, re-learning at the threshold of graduation and the beginning of their 
careers, and so on. The professor’s reflections chart a similar process of re-learning, though 
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moderated by age and experience with moral decision-making, from development of the global 
perspectives theme, connections with a global self-identity, the theoretical framework of inquiry-
based learning, to challenges with sustaining educational innovations and experiments. In my 
discussion, I offer some interpretation of themes that emerged for me from the example and 
comment on the lack of connection between colleges of education and the global learning agenda 
in universities. 
Chapter Six 
 With my account of the moral and aesthetic example in Chapter Four, and the extended 
global teacher example in Chapter Five, I ground the individual and interpersonal dimension of 
global learning. However, the institutional dimension of global learning is also essential to 
consider when applying the ideas of cosmopolitan moral education for adults to university 
practices, and while beyond the scope of this study, should be the subject of future research. 
Specifically, institutions of global higher education need to possess a morally cosmopolitan 
ethic. In Chapter Six, “From the Example to the Institution,” I conclude my argument for an 
ethical and aesthetic account of global learning by offering the following approaches to practice 
for my account: fostering interhuman relations, ensuring cosmopolitan right, sustaining 
educational experiments, and expanding example creation and circulation. I support these 
approaches with examples from my own experience. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE GLOBAL IMPERATIVE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
Within the U.S. context, when education is described as “global,” or that it should be 
“more global,” as it often is today by academic leaders, policymakers, practitioners, and even 
students, the speaker usually has at least two meanings in mind. First, education, and particularly 
higher education, should be conceived as an inherently global enterprise wherein colleges and 
universities are urged to redirect their activities and resources to capitalize on transnational 
developments in teaching, research, service, recruitment, student mobility, and institutional 
collaboration, among other areas. I call this the political dimension of global higher education 
because it addresses the aims of the institution within a larger global system. Second, the activity 
of education, both in its content and delivery to students, should embody the capacities, 
dispositions, and knowledge requirements that all educated adults need to engage with complex 
global issues, ultimately preparing them to be productive and conscientious global citizens. I call 
this the pedagogical dimension of global higher education. Both understandings of global higher 
education are framed as the preparation of individuals and institutions for the exigencies of a 
higher educational world that is regarded as irrevocably changed through the economic and 
cultural forces of globalization as well as the consequences of greater interconnectedness. 
However, the danger in thinking that higher education has “irrevocably changed” due to 
globalization is twofold: first, what is morally distinctive about the aims of higher education is 
minimized, and second, the idea of the “global” as necessitating a commitment to the whole 
person is either lost or undermined. 
In this chapter, I argue that the two major parts constituting how global higher education 
currently exists – the political and the pedagogical – model an interpersonal ethos that privileges 
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“seeming,” or how one would prefer to be seen as opposed to how one actually is, over 
“being”.45 This ethos of “seeming” perpetuates the notion of the idealized global learning 
institution and the idealized global learner or global citizen. Consequently, the experience of the 
actual global learner is neglected in the pursuit of aims that privilege social ends and values 
rather than ethical individualism.  
After interrogating the political and pedagogical dimensions of the global imperative in 
higher education, I turn to the much-referenced philosophical concept that often undergirds 
discussion on global higher education: cosmopolitanism, or global citizenship. In this final 
section, I critically examine major competing accounts of cosmopolitanism in higher education 
and offer a “grounded” reading of Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal that serves as a central plank of my 
account of cosmopolitan moral education for adults in Chapter Three. 
Global Higher Education as a Political Imperative 
In 1919, a radical vision of the new global university came from American sociologist 
Thorstein Veblen, who offered this justification: 
The interests of science, and therefore of the academic community, do not run on national 
lines and cannot similarly be confined within geographical or political boundaries. In the 
nature of the case these interests are of an international character and cannot be taken 
care of except by unrestricted collusion and collaboration among the learned men of all 
those peoples whom it may concern.46  
 
Veblen remarked that since the destruction of Europe during World War I, American scholars 
were needed to uphold standards of tradition. He envisioned the United States as a cosmopolitan 
space with the unique potential to shelter fleeing academics. In The Higher Learning in America, 
Veblen proposed the establishment of “an international clearing house and provisional 
                                                
45 Martin Buber, “Elements of the Interhuman,” The Knowledge of Man: A Philosophy of the Interhuman, edited by 
Maurice Friedman (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1965): 72-88. 
46 Thorstein Veblen, The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities and 
Businessmen (New York: Hill & Wang, 1967): 39. 
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headquarters for the academic community throughout that range of civilized peoples whose 
goodwill they now enjoy,--a place of refuge and a place of meeting, confluence and 
dissemination for those views and ideas that live and move and have their being in the higher 
learning.”47 As is evident, Veblen’s motive for globalizing the university directly related to his 
views of the universal character of disinterested scientific inquiry among “civilized peoples” as 
well as his conviction that the United States provided the best possible setting to preserve this 
inquiry. As an unusual mixture of globalist and nationalist rhetoric, Veblen’s account of a 
cosmopolitan university illustrates two competing strands that would characterize global higher 
education as a political imperative to the present day.  
Since the end of World War II, what was known as “international education” has featured 
prominently on the policy agenda where it quickly came to connote two distinct motives or 
orientations. First, international education represented a political/nationalistic motive. To support 
American strategic interests and competitive dominance in the global marketplace, an in-depth 
cultural, historical, and linguistic knowledge of foreign nations is required. Second, international 
education represented an ethical/moral motive, exemplified in the ratification of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.48 The moral motive of international education believes that, in the 
face of global problems that transcend national borders, fostering greater understanding, kinship 
and sense of global responsibility can provide shared educational solutions for all.  
The Push for Internationalization  
The terms “internationalization of higher education,” “comprehensive 
internationalization,” or simply “internationalization,” are used to describe the process of 
                                                
47 Ibid., 38. 
48 Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(New York: Random House), 2002. 
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manifesting global higher education in institutional contexts.49 When applied to the broad swath 
of postsecondary institutions (private and public, 2-year and 4-year, liberal arts and research, to 
name a few descriptors), internationalization encompasses a “complex and shifting landscape” of 
activities and agendas.50 Jane Knight has provided a characteristic definition of 
internationalization: “the process of integrating an international, intercultural, or global 
dimension into the purpose, functions or delivery of postsecondary education.”51 
Internationalization encompasses the traditional functions of international education (such as 
area studies centers, study abroad, international student and scholar affairs, and international 
partnerships) with newer curricular concerns (like reforms “globalizing” general education, 
service learning programs, or transnational research and policy institutes), as well as newer areas 
like the commercialization of academic research into intellectual property and the creation of 
international branch campuses or centers in “developing” or “emerging” countries. The guiding 
principle of internationalization privileges no one configuration. It simply holds that all activities 
in a university must in some way have (or aspire to have, as constitutive in an institution’s 
mission) a global component.  
As an institutional process, internationalization does not, in itself, offer an answer to the 
question of “why” we should globalize higher education. It just asserts that we should, or rather 
that we already are, globalizing. Academic leaders tend to answer “why” by pointing toward 
various external goals intended to be achieved through internationalization, such as better jobs 
for students, economic competitiveness, growth of national interests, and a high reputation 
                                                
49 For a representative account of internationalization, see: John K. Hudzik, Comprehensive Internationalization: 
From Concept to Action (Washington, D.C.: NAFSA), 2011.  
50 Laura E. Rumbley, Philip G. Altbach, and Liz Reisberg, “Internationalization within the Higher Education 
Context,” in The SAGE Handbook of International Higher Education, edited by Darla K. Deardorff, Hans de Wit, 
John D. Heyl and Tony Adams (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2012): 6.  
51 Jane Knight, “Concepts, Rationales, and Interpretive Frameworks in the Internationalization of Higher 
Education,” in The SAGE Handbook of International Higher Education, edited by Darla K. Deardorff, Hans de Wit, 
John D. Heyl and Tony Adams (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2012): 29. 
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among institutional peers. Like earlier efforts in globalizing higher education in the previous 
century, the internationalization of higher education is not an ideologically neutral process – 
decisions to allocate scarce resources are still justified by appealing to national/patriotic and 
global/universal reasons.  
Proponents of global higher education argue that becoming more global – from 
“preparing for a global society” to “global citizenship” – should be a new and central aim 
guiding policy and practice in higher education.52 On the one hand, academic leaders seek to 
make greater affordances for “global engagement” in their respective institutions, including 
expanding international partnerships and recruiting more international students. On the other 
hand, educators and policymakers seek to ensure that every student develops “global awareness” 
while in college, whether through coursework, co-curricular activities, education abroad, or 
opportunities to understand and appreciate multicultural diversity within their campus and in 
surrounding communities. Empirical questions plague higher education institutions over how the 
needs for global engagement and global awareness should be related. This line of questioning 
relates to the more efficient functioning and economic viability of the institution in question. 
Colleges and universities that wish to become more global – in the eyes of their constituents and 
institutional peers – tend to reach for one overarching internationalization strategy that will 
address both the institutional needs of global engagement and the student needs of global 
awareness.  
                                                
52 Through ostensive agreement, there is wide disagreement between strong and more minimal accounts of the 
global education aim. For a strong account, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense 
for Reform in Liberal Education (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998): 50-84. For a more minimal 
account, see Derek Bok, Our Underachieving Colleges: A Candid Look at How Much Students Learn and Why They 
Should Be Learning More (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006): 225-55.  Bok lists his aim as “preparing for 
a global society,” opposing stronger “global citizenship” accounts like Nussbaum’s.   
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At an institutional and inter-institutional level, it is often difficult to hold a single agent 
responsible for promulgating these views because they are ever-present in current rhetoric and 
thinking. It is also difficult to ascertain what exactly someone means when they, for example, 
refer to “global engagement” and “global awareness.” Nevertheless, there is enough “family 
resemblance” between the various uses of these terms for an informal speech community to arise 
to connect these terms, making them easily accessible and understood by every member of an 
academic community from administrator to student.53  
However, there are better and worse uses of terms like global “engagement” and 
“awareness” that connect more with their analytic meanings within education. According to 
Richard Pring, terms like “education” and “indoctrination” are constrained to mean certain things 
because they sit in a “logical geography” of concepts, which lays out necessary logical 
connections between related but distinct terms.54 Thus, interrogating the nature of global 
engagement and global awareness, both as independent and as related concepts, promotes the 
clearer use of terms as well as demonstrates where the use of terms has gone astray. How are 
these concepts linked? Does one follow from the other? Is one more important than the other? Of 
course, academic leaders, educators and policymakers would all claim that any global 
engagement activity undergone by an institution would ultimately be in service of student 
learning needs of global awareness. But this claim is empty if no convincing account of how and 
why a global higher education institution intends to connect global engagement with global 
awareness is offered.  
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The Logic of Aspiration and Imitation 
A range of implicit beliefs and assumptions about what the internationalization of higher 
education should be and do for the persons, societies and business interests involved characterize 
the current system. Social, economic, political, ideological, and bureaucratic developments in 
higher education have led higher education to be subject to conflicting interests that attempt to 
control and direct it. These developments tend to compound the sense of rudderlessness and 
fluidity of identity within both the macro and micro levels of higher education.  
Each higher education institution – with varying levels of support and influence from 
national priorities – formulates the individual, educational, and societal goals of global education 
very differently, and implements them in a fashion that accords with their deeply held values, 
interests, and desires for self-(re)definition. Yet each higher education institution looks to a 
model, or a set of models, as inspiration for its process of self-definition. As Karl Jaspers noted, 
“To map out the idea of the university means to orient ourselves by an ideal which we can never 
more than approximate.”55As one example of such an idealized model, the North American ideal 
of the entrepreneurial, socially engaged, global research university continues to be widely 
imitated in other countries, as well as by colleges and universities in the U.S that traditionally 
had a very different purpose or mission.56 Though diverse institutions often imitate similar 
models, like the one just mentioned, each imitation is inevitably different.  
Philip Altbach and colleagues have helpfully referenced what sociologists call 
“institutional isomorphism”57 to describe the current imitative environment in global higher 
education. According to Francesco Duina, isomorphism “refers to the fact that widespread 
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conformity to certain models and myths produces organizations that look and behave alike.”58 In 
the rampant, unchecked institutional copying of higher education, isomorphism seems to occur 
when the desire to replicate the perceived successes of other institutions results in the conscious 
intention to cultivate a self-image for the world as a particular kind of educational institution that 
one aspires to be rather than the institution one actually is and can be. The pressure to copy 
others seems to be rooted in the logic of competition between universities, for a higher place on 
international rankings, prestige in the eyes of their peers, better business contacts, and of course, 
in the securing of the best students and most noteworthy academics and researchers. In a 
different context, Stanley Fish similarly bemoans the desire for institutions to copy common 
rhetorical strategies in the writing of mission statements that stray far from the core of a 
university’s mission of teaching and learning.59 
As global higher education systems continue their reforms and move closer together 
through isomorphism (if still, in many ways, remaining worlds apart), the efficacy of imitated 
models are called into question. For example, Altbach has drawn attention to what he sees as 
inevitable consequences of the model of global mass higher education, or “massification.” These 
consequences include the deterioration of educational quality and student learning, stark 
inequality among educational institutions and student access worldwide, the decline of high 
standards of academic professionalism, and the general erosion of higher education envisioned as 
a public, as opposed to an exclusively private, self-interested, good.60 Mass higher education first 
began in the U.S. out of a felt social need and political mandate to expand access to those 
students desiring a “better” life. The unequal state of global mass higher education (albeit 
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undertaken for ostensibly “democratic” purposes) is the result of taking the notion of 
massification as the central and overriding educational aim. With the focus of adequately 
equipping more young people with the skills needed to navigate the increasing complexities of 
the modern world, massification has created a highly stratified system of colleges and 
universities worldwide. The logic of imitation creates intractable dilemmas not only for higher 
education institutions, but also for the nature of relations at the individual and interpersonal 
levels.  
Interhuman Problems 
Isomorphism – regardless of the academic and business interests promoting it – models 
the relationship of “seeming” vis-à-vis global others. Seeming, just as it suggests, refers to the 
cultivation of a self-image that projects how one would like to be seen rather than how one 
actually is, which as a result, hampers genuine interpersonal relations. I would like to draw an 
unlikely parallel here to Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue as presented in his important 
essay, “Elements of the Interhuman.”61 In that essay, Buber argues that what he calls the 
“interhuman,” or the sphere of life characterized by dialogue with others, is threatened by the 
modern emphasis on impersonal socialization. “The sphere of the interhuman,” according to 
Buber, “is one in which a person is confronted by the other. We call its unfolding the 
dialogical.”62 Buber distinguishes the social from the interhuman. Whereas the social describes a 
mere grouping of persons who interact according to set rules and pathways, the interhuman 
describes the conditions of mutuality and shared fate in the relationships between persons.  
 Buber describes three challenges affecting the prospects for interhuman life, which may 
be applied to how relationships are conceived in global higher education. The first challenge is 
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the dichotomy of “being” and “seeming.” Whereas being refers to the actual person presented as 
how she really is, with all her unique imperfections, seeming refers to the desire to appear as 
something or someone else, how she wishes to be seen, as a cultivated image or representation 
for public interaction. The second challenge is the problem of inadequate perception of the other 
person and the need for what Buber calls “personal making present.” Due to the imposition of 
seeming in interpersonal relations, genuine perception of others, which must be the foundation 
for experience and the possibility of learning, is significantly curtailed. The third challenge is the 
dichotomy of “imposition” and “unfolding,” which Buber likens to the difference between 
propaganda and education in the practice of teaching. By lacking perception of the other as a 
genuine person with all of his or her differences in perspective and unique personal traits, we 
tend to regard social influence in terms of imposing one’s values upon others rather than 
allowing their unique capacities and dispositions to unfold.  
Buber urges us not to think of these challenges as either/or distinctions. Being and 
seeming are constantly blended to cope with the pressures of social life. However, what Buber 
regards as dangerous is an overall ontological attitude of seeming that overrides any possibility 
of being, thus permanently distorting how others see us and how we see ourselves. Kant warns of 
a comparable situation when he elucidates the notion of an “evil maxim,” poisoning the ground 
of our ethical decisions and underlying behavior. For Kant, such “evil maxims” replace or 
subvert our existing moral maxims and damage our capacity for moral decision-making.63  
How can we determine whether a person’s comportment is fundamentally characterized 
by being or seeming? As Buber reminds us, we must invite dialogic relationships with our whole 
selves. Being is a matter of process and action – our actions and those of others – and not merely 
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a “state” that one can statically be in. The whole question of authenticity begins in our relation to 
our own comportment and goals. Thus, we must be vigilant in our self-reflection if we are to 
meaningfully engage with others. 
Educators and policymakers are prone to lay out paths of action that guide institutions to 
strive for particular social ends. In doing so, idealized representations of the faculty member, 
academic leader, and student are included as necessary figures in the achievement of these ends. 
These representations of stakeholders are either logically, or rhetorically, necessary, for the 
social ends in question. This is regarded as a necessary move for institutions to make considering 
that their focus is on generality rather than specificity. Unfortunately, such a move poses 
interhuman problems of the sort Buber describes.  
Global Learning as a Pedagogical Imperative 
Global learning has been recently construed as a necessary extension, and even 
completion, of the project of liberal arts education. The theme of the “global” is used by authors 
to invoke a cosmopolitan approach to knowledge of the world and the fertilization of the human 
mind within particular cultures. This is an understanding of global learning that undergirds 
humanistic discourse. The earliest and most visible promoter of global learning was the 
AAC&U, which spearheaded a major initiative called Shared Futures: Global Learning and 
Social Responsibility and has consistently discussed global learning in the pages of its flagship 
journal Liberal Education.64 Of course, like many policy initiatives in the U.S. higher education 
context, Shares Futures is eclectic, U.S.-centric, and inherently incomplete. Nevertheless, Shared 
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Futures is particularly noteworthy for being well articulated, with principles and proposals that 
express educators’ ground level understandings of what global learning means. 
The stated intention of this policy initiative was to “globalize” the liberal/general 
education curriculum and provide useful models and rubrics for diverse institutional structures to 
implement global learning in the education of their students. According to its website, the 
AAC&U is “the leading national association concerned with the quality, vitality, and public 
standing of undergraduate liberal education.”65 The AAC&U attempts to reorient the global 
education discussion – traditionally focused on the internationalization of campus infrastructure, 
activities, and services, both “at home” and abroad – toward a focus on student learning 
outcomes in undergraduate education.66 To understand the particular meaning that global 
learning holds for the AAC&U, the following description is helpful: 
The initiative was built on the assumption that we live in an interdependent but unequal 
world and that higher education can prepare students to not only thrive in such a world, 
but to creatively and responsibly remedy its inequities and problems. A quality liberal 
education in the 21st century provides students with opportunities to work 
collaboratively, to examine the world’s human and natural systems from multiple 
perspectives, and to integrate learning across the curriculum by following the threads in 
an increasingly complex reality. Such an education—often referred to as global 
learning— intentionally wrestles with questions of diversity, identity, citizenship, 
democracy, power, privilege, sustainability, and ethical action.67 
 
In this account, global learning – when appropriately understood as learning that equips learners 
with knowledge, dispositions, and skills that relate to what they do and can be in a changing 
world – must be integrated into the general and specialized curricula that prepares students for 
life, professions, and societal obligations beyond the university.  
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During the 2013 inaugural AAC&U conference entitled “Global Learning in College,” 
administrators and faculty members from various higher education institutions gathered to 
discuss the role of global learning in undergraduate education. “Best practice” cases and 
strategies from their respective campuses were shared, and some principles and goals for global 
learning policy initiatives were clarified and debated. Given the AAC&U’s longstanding mission 
to promote liberal learning in higher education, it came as no surprise that the sentiment 
expressed by many at the conference was that global learning represented an important 
component of a traditional liberal education for all students. However, an even stronger claim 
was frequently articulated: that, in the words of one presenter, “global learning really is essential 
learning.”68 In other words, beyond being a mere component, global learning should be equated 
with a liberal education, but updated and “globalized” for the 21st century.  
This is perhaps why experienced liberal educators feel uneasy with global learning, 
construed as a newer and better replacement of a traditional liberal arts education. Most 
educators have a stronger sense of what constitutes an “essential” liberal arts education – for 
instance, developing an intellectual independence and critical disposition through a grappling of 
“the best which has been thought and said”69 – and do not understand what new competencies 
global learning adds to an already (on their view) globally minded approach. “Essential” global 
learning risks sounding like an eclectic mix of impossible to achieve ideals and intellectually 
questionable notions, much like “global citizenship.”  
For example, Robert Louden expresses his doubts about inculcating cosmopolitan moral 
dispositions in intransigent undergraduates when he makes the following observation: 
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Many American colleges and universities at present strive to offer curricula aimed at 
promoting world citizenship and “cultivating humanity” in their students, but no hard 
data exist to support the claim that such curricula are successful in achieving their aim. 
Certainly there is no guarantee that students who receive an education intended to 
inculcate cosmopolitan dispositions will actually develop such dispositions and act 
consistently with them. Some people are resolutely selfish, and no amount of exposure to 
a world-citizen model of education is going to change them. Educators can only try to 
inculcate cosmopolitan dispositions, and then hope for the best—acting on the highly 
plausible assumption that the habits of thought, reflection, and emotional response human 
beings learn when young usually (but not necessarily always) influence their moral 
orientations as adults.70 
 
Louden expresses a sentiment commonly found among liberal education advocates who question 
the efficacy of global citizenship education and its claim to “replace” or “transform” liberal 
education. Louden does not criticize a teacher for wanting to help students become good 
cosmopolitans. Yet he rightfully raises doubts about how to go about achieving that goal. Louden 
worries that the aim of global citizenship education to improve students’ moral awareness is an 
idealized fantasy because students’ moral dispositions have already been formed by the time they 
arrive in a college classroom. Thus, he points out, a teacher can only convey what he or she 
knows about the values of global citizenship through a liberal arts education and hope that 
students become good cosmopolitans in the process.  
In order to assuage such doubts, the AAC&U has made a concerted effort at specifying 
desired learning outcomes for global learners, with the current emphasis on what global learners 
can do.71 The AAC&U makes a clear distinction between global learning seen as a pedagogical 
imperative and global higher education more broadly, which embodies an international education 
perspective.72 The question is whether reform from one perspective or the other should determine 
policy changes. Subsequent AAC&U global learning proposals have strongly evoked the image 
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of the global learner as a constructor or navigator of complex identities and multiple selves while 
emphasizing the importance of interdisciplinary knowledge and general education reform.  
In 2005, a major grant from the Henry Luce Foundation provided backing for AAC&U’s 
Shared Futures Initiative, providing support for 16 colleges and universities to develop 
“integrative general education curricula that use global learning and global challenges as a 
fundamental organizing principle for undergraduate learning.”73 According to the Luce proposal, 
global learning should result in “demonstrable student progress” in the following: 
• Gaining a deep comparative knowledge of the world’s peoples and problems; 
• Exploring the historical legacies that have created the dynamics and tensions of 
the world; 
• Developing intercultural competencies so they can move across boundaries 
and unfamiliar territory and see the world from multiple perspectives; 
• Gaining the scientific knowledge needed to understand the global contexts of 
critical civic issues such as sustainability, climate change, or energy. 
• Sustaining difficult conversations in the face of highly emotional and 
perhaps uncongenial differences; 
• Understanding—and perhaps redefining—democratic principles and practices 
within a global context; 
• Gaining opportunities to engage in practical work with fundamental issues that 
affect communities not yet well served by their societies; 
• Believing that their actions and ideas will influence the world in which they live.74 
 
These outcomes present an ambitious and hard-to-assess group of competencies that demand a 
strong account of learner ability. As a result, the AAC&U has more recently provided guidance 
on making these ideal-sounding aims more practicable through the Global Learning VALUE 
Rubric and explicit suggestions for campuses creating their own rubrics.75  
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According to the AAC&U, one of the most pressing needs in global learning policy is the 
availability of examples of best practices in global learning that exhibit what colleges and 
universities are doing to make global learning a reality for students.76 Moreover, key proponents 
of global higher education have called for more case studies or examples of student 
perspectives.77 These examples are expected to illustrate what is possible given different 
institutional frameworks, to be shared and circulated among different global learning 
policymakers and practitioners.78 The intention of these examples is to bridge global learning 
theories, including philosophical theories of cosmopolitan education, and the practice of global 
learning in a particular institutional and cultural context. The question of applicability and 
relevance are foremost in policymakers and practitioners’ minds.  
 As articulated by the AAC&U, global learning assumes the status of what might be called 
a meta-aim – a framework within which the other aims cohere and work together. Global 
learning thus construed does not attempt to override other legitimate aims because it is based in 
them and reliant upon them flourishing. Fernando Reimers has contended that global education 
within the university should be subject to deliberation alongside other aims in order to “articulate 
a vision of the aims of global education before detailing the learning experiences that such an 
education entails … [thus clarifying] how such an education might help graduates obtain jobs, 
help faculty increase instructional effectiveness, and help institutions serve a more diverse 
student body.”79 In other words, global learning takes a position on what education should be and 
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do. It is a substantive philosophical concept that makes a difference for every educational agenda 
onto which it is affixed. 
Attempts to Instrumentalize the Global Learner 
Thus far, the focus of global educators, academic leaders, and policymakers has been on 
providing rhetorical, “best-of” lists of requisite knowledge, skills, and competencies for the 
development of global learners, future adepts prepared for the rigors of globalization. These lists 
of particular learning outcomes are sufficiently malleable to “fit” with any number of competing 
agendas. After a suitably global education, the learner is considered to be a “global citizen,” with 
particular allegiances but equally at home everywhere.80 Despite the differences between primary 
and secondary education, and higher education, a similar focus holds. The needs of the learner as 
an “ethical individual,” as the “primary object of moral concern,” do not take priority.81 
Moreover, generalized competencies that lack a grounding in the individual learner’s experience 
and self-identity serve to alienate particular student populations from global higher education.82 
A critical eye might be cast on how these emerging global adult learners are positioned vis-à-vis 
the external interests and agendas furthered by their respective institutions, nations, cultures, and 
corporations. While there is a growing body of critical studies on the widespread adoption of a 
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neoliberal ideology in providers of global higher education, this literature tends to avoid 
constructing a positive account of global higher education as a shared moral enterprise.83  
Those who idealize, and thus instrumentalize, the global learner often emphasize, the 
“whole person” of the student. Such an emphasis sees the health and wealth of the emerging 
adult student as somehow maintaining the nation’s interests rather than representing a 
commitment to the actual student as an ethical individual. The value of a liberal arts education is 
often justified internationally through the national-competition model. For example, institutions 
with a liberal arts focus have opened in countries like Singapore and the United Arab Emirates in 
partnership with Ivy League universities. At the well-publicized opening of Yale-NUS in 
Singapore, various public supporters of liberal education, including university presidents and the 
AAC&U, described the liberal arts as providing students with a well-rounded education, critical 
and creative thinking, which are necessary prerequisites for living and succeeding in the global 
world order that is constantly changing.84 In this model, a liberal arts education provides the 
student with value-free, adaptable tools that can help in the pursuit of ends that will advance their 
nation’s interests.  
There are several presuppositions in this line of thinking, namely an instrumental 
understanding of “critical and creative thinking,” that of the “whole person,” and the theme of 
constant global change. What do people mean when they refer to a well-rounded education 
reaching the whole person? Presumably, it involves at least their intellectual, moral, aesthetic, 
and cultural understandings. But it depends a lot on how and for what purpose these capacities 
are used. If they are cultivated for the benefit of the student, the student is seen as the ultimate 
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arbiter and end in this process; they may make of the education as they wish. On this account, the 
nation cannot claim that they expect ends apart from the student’s own to result. Of course, many 
justify a liberal arts education through an understanding of the student as human capital; thus, a 
more “critical and creative thinking” graduate is already a part of the increasing of a nation’s 
profile and interests. However, a human capital approach does not consider one student’s ends as 
different from another student’s ends. Students are interchangeable or replaceable. This extends 
to the overall homogeneity of students who participate in liberal arts education: they are among 
the elite, well-resourced and powerful members of society. This leads Brighouse to argue that 
these elite students, afforded unique opportunities benefiting from their unearned elite status, 
have a moral responsibility (as do educators who teach them) to choose professions that support 
egalitarian social benefits.85 
 While the national-competition model is one of the most popular models for justifying 
and promoting a “global” liberal education, it does not seem to accord a central place to the 
interests and ends of individual students apart from the national interests that bind them. By 
stressing “individual benefit,” while also meaning “national benefit,” a liberal arts education is 
essentially promulgating its elite, nation-centered status rather than instilling an orientation 
toward social justice in its students and other stakeholders. Moreover, the notion of the “whole 
educated person,” in this context, is actually positioned antithetically to any substantive account 
of autonomy that accords students intellectual and moral decision-making ability over their lives. 
A perhaps more benign approach to instrumentalizing the global learner is the advocacy 
for paternalism regarding learner choices, accompanied by a return to in loco parentis views of 
higher education. On this view, only a responsible educator should decide what students learn for 
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their overall well-being since students do not have the foreknowledge that would enable them to 
grasp what would ultimately help them. The democratic potential of global learning can easily 
morph into a sense of entitlement. As consumers of higher education, students reap of what they 
perceive as global learning’s rewards, such as upward social mobility, better employment 
prospects, and the assuming of an elite “global” lifestyle.  
Reorienting Global Citizenship 
That adult learners are, in some sense, global citizens, is often invoked as a compelling 
justification for global learning as a pedagogical imperative. Moreover, the realization of our 
global citizenship status is regarded as the desired goal of engaging in global learning. Yet most 
proponents of global learning do not attempt to explain what they mean by global citizenship. 
Stronger and weaker accounts may be discerned. For instance, Nigel Dower’s strong account 
regards global citizenship as a stepwise development of awareness of human rights paired with 
concerted action toward the alleviation of human suffering across national borders.86 For Dower, 
global citizenship represents a political commitment that does not necessarily accord with 
policies of liberal moderation and toleration. Global citizens are defined by how engaged they 
are with global issues and can point objectively to the work that they do to improve global life. 
Global citizens are construed as self-selected, global interest-seekers rather than persons who are 
born into and irretrievably a part of a particular nation.  
On the strong account, global citizenship is only tangentially developed through an 
immersive cultural experience abroad. Rather, global citizenship is intentionally woven into 
standardized curricula (in schools) or rhetorical devices (through information sources) in our 
home country. This strong account of global citizenship raises questions about whether its 
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commitment to inculcating specific global knowledge and dispositions is the correct approach 
when seeking to awaken in learners an interest in encountering world cultures and lifestyles. 
Weaker accounts typically view global citizenship as comparable to a state of mind (as in, for 
instance, Ulrich Beck’s “global thinking,”87 an orientation Georg Cavallar calls “epistemological 
cosmopolitanism”88) wherein a global learner progresses toward an understanding of his or her 
global identity and obligations as these intertwine with his or her local or national citizenship.  
The relation of global citizenship and national citizenship is obscured because many 
people do not have a clear notion of what national citizenship itself means. Beyond our 
positioning as citizens or permanent residents of a certain country with definite obligations (like 
paying taxes and voting), citizenship education (beyond a relatively muted “civic” education89) 
has largely faded away as an explicit curricular aim in higher education. The positing of global 
citizenship raises the question of whether we, in fact, live and enact our national citizenship 
robustly or are merely the indifferent beneficiaries of our status as citizens. According to Vilem 
Flusser, being born a citizen into a culture acts as a kind of wool over the eyes, disabling our 
critical ability in making objective sense of our country and national identity.90 However, as 
Flusser observes, we are connected to our cultures through many invisible threads – and ripping 
those threads comes at a large personal cost.  
In their focus upon transforming knowledge rather than experience, strong accounts of 
global citizenship underestimate the powerful, subconscious draw of the national and its effects 
on experience. Rawls notes in his theory of justice as fairness that it is a dramatic, monumental 
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decision – not without its difficulties and traumas – for a person to exit from their nation-state 
and adopt a new one.91 Global citizens, counter to this, do not seem to experience any such 
monumental, traumatic decision to traverse global boundaries. To change one’s citizenship is 
simply a matter of acquiring new, transferrable knowledge and adopting a new set of 
presuppositions. The powerful, unsettling force of global experience, challenging everything one 
holds dear is minimized as much as possible and quickly adapted to one’s existing interpretive 
frameworks. In such a way, global learners positioned as global citizens are easily able to 
construct their own identities and navigate global realities. The experience of being 
fundamentally unsettled is not allowed to stand on its own but must be subsumed under a broader 
consensus and worldview that confers upon us membership in an exclusive club (the global 
citizen club). 
I hold that a critical schema may be cultivated that reorients global citizenship toward an 
irreducible focus on global experience, and particularly upon the fact of re-learning that 
characterizes moral education in adulthood. We barely scratch the surface of the things we 
experience with our eyes and our minds. I do not think we are epistemologically different once 
we name ourselves global citizens. We are rather the same person with a slew of different 
experiences that can be read in multiple ways. In the next section, I lay the groundwork for my 
account of cosmopolitan moral education for adults in Chapter Three by defending a more 
“grounded” version of Kant’s idea of cosmopolitanism that still retains the distinctive normative 
focus that I require for my account. Then, I consider three other noteworthy accounts of 
cosmopolitanism in higher education that, in various ways, challenge but do not surmount the 
durability of Kantian cosmopolitanism.  
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Reconsidering Kant’s Cosmopolitanism for Higher Education Today 
For Kant, developing a cosmopolitan disposition is a process that begins in childhood and 
helps to unify moral education. It is central to what Kant calls the “moral catechism” needed for 
instilling a moral disposition in children. In his Lectures on Pedagogy, Kant advises that an adult 
mentor must: 
stress to [the child] philanthropy toward others and then also cosmopolitan dispositions. 
In our soul there is something that makes us take an interest 1) in our own self, 2) in 
others with whom we have grown up, and then also 3) an interest in the best for the world 
must come to pass. One must make children familiar with this interest so that they may 
warm their souls with it. They must rejoice at the best for the world even if it is not to the 
advantage of their fatherland or to their own gain.92 
 
In this section, I address concerns about the idea of cosmopolitanism as a guiding framework for 
global higher education, namely, that as an objective moral theory it is not sufficiently 
“grounded” in the perspectives of today’s globally mobile adult learners. I begin by analyzing 
Kant’s influential account of cosmopolitanism and show how its “grounded” aspects are often 
overlooked. Next, I position my own reading of cosmopolitanism vis-à-vis other prominent 
approaches for applying cosmopolitan ideals to higher education today, showing how it builds 
upon their insights as well as critiques and modifies their problematic conclusions.  
Kant’s Cosmopolitan Account of Friendship 
In Kant’s original formulation of the concept in the modern era, cosmopolitanism, or 
“world citizenship,” is not in conflict with the values of the nation. Unlike the image of the 
cosmopolitan as a rootless and unattached individualist, Kant argues that a cosmopolitan could 
and should be a good nationalist, a good patriot.93 By this Kant probably means that persons are 
inclined to form special ties with those in their surrounding communities and it is only upon 
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these connections that persons are able to model future relations with distant friends. 
Nevertheless, today, higher education policies that reflect both cosmopolitan and nationalist 
values are often seen to be in direct conflict.  
For me, Kant’s expression of the basic disposition of the cosmopolitan person can be 
found most eloquently in his early analysis of friendship in his Lectures on Ethics. According to 
Kant, there is a greater basis of friendship between a scholar and a merchant than between a 
scholar and another scholar. This is because, for Kant, the basis of friendship is difference. He 
poses the question in this way: “What, then, is the basis for that compatibility and bond of 
friendship? Identity of thought is not required for that purpose; on the contrary, it is difference, 
rather, which establishes friendship, for in that case the one supplies what the other lacks.”94 
While friendship is based on different life experiences, and the willingness to share them, for 
Kant, prospective friends must share a kind of moral awareness and agency. In his words, friends 
“need to have the same principles of understanding and morality, and then they can fully 
understand each other; if they are not alike in that, they cannot get on at all together, since in 
judgment they are poles apart.”95 
For Kant, the capacities for reason, morality, and judgment are inherently universal. Our 
individual, culturally embedded exercise of these capacities, on the other hand, are 
manifestations of our practical reason and agency in different circumstances. Friends must in 
some way recognize and honor the capacities for reason, morality, and judgment in each other if 
humanity is to progress to a cosmopolitan future. For cosmopolitan friendship, according to 
Kant,  
we have to guard against closing our heart towards others who are not of our company. 
Friendships are not found in heaven, for heaven is the ultimate in moral perfection, and 
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that is universal; friendship, however, is a special bond between particular persons; in this 
world only, therefore, it is a recourse for opening one’s mind to the other and communing 
with him, in that here there is a lack of trust among men.96  
 
Kant warns that the inability to “see right into each other” and to find what “[we] were looking 
for” spells the end of friendship.97 
Reading Kant’s account of friendship as the basis for his moral cosmopolitanism, we see 
how cosmopolitanism may be inherently grounded in the everyday dealings of diverse actors that 
reflect mutual respect and an openness to building community.98 According to Pauline Kleingeld, 
Kantian cosmopolitanism is an “attitude taken up in acting: an attitude of recognition, respect, 
openness, interest, beneficence and concern toward other human individuals, cultures, and 
peoples as members of one global community. One need not travel at all to merit the designation 
of being a citizen of the world” – in Kant’s case, never moving from the city of his birth, 
Konigsberg.99 Moreover, experience of global others does not equate to knowledge of them. 
Kant argues in the “Friedlander” anthropology lectures that knowledge of human beings does not 
necessarily derive from world travel.100 Instead, it begins in close anthropological study of one’s 
own experiences, extending this study to human beings in one’s physical surroundings. 
Extensive travel, perhaps, results in particular knowledge of human beings around the world, but 
does not necessarily lead to general knowledge of human beings. Travel may function as a boon 
to extending our already developing capacities for understanding human nature by furnishing us 
with further examples to reinforce or challenge our current understandings. The human capacity 
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that is built from pragmatic knowledge of the world is prudence: prudential knowledge informs 
how we should act with global others in accordance with morality.  
Some global educational theorists have challenged Kant’s interpretation of 
cosmopolitanism as an organizing principle.101 They believe that only a more modern update of 
cosmopolitanism, shorn of the supposed universalistic connotations, is able to accommodate the 
diverse backgrounds and shifting mobile identities of international students today. However, 
Kantian cosmopolitanism has always been a form of hybrid, or grounded, cosmopolitanism that 
deals with what Barbara Herman calls the “problems of living well and living together.”102 
Universal values are not automatically opposed to local understandings. The resources of a 
cosmopolitan imagination may enable a deeper appreciation of local needs. 
Themes of Cosmopolitanism in Global Higher Education 
Today’s understandings of the cosmopolitan university typically invoke the empirical 
reality of diverse perspectives represented on campuses, which Cavallar in his classification of 
types of cosmopolitanism refers to as “cultural cosmopolitanism.”103 Higher education 
policymakers make explicit mention of an engagement with these diverse perspectives to 
illustrate a university’s “cosmopolitan” credentials. Philosophical accounts of cosmopolitan 
higher education have argued for a change in ethos regarding citizenship education, particularly 
important for faculty and students who already inhabit the space of transnationalism and 
frequently represent the economically advantaged and elite of their respective societies. “Our 
lives,” writes Brighouse, “are profoundly interlinked with those of strangers, and for most of us 
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in the rich world, our actions implicate some foreigners more than most compatriots.”104 
Furthermore, as national strategies are increasingly defined in terms of economic growth, a 
cosmopolitan ethos in the operations of the university is seen as an important counterbalance to 
the drive for global economic competitiveness that threatens to outstrip the learning needs of 
individual students. National values are strengthened, rather than challenged, through what Rizvi 
calls “corporate cosmopolitanism,” a belief that “the market, as a single global sphere of free 
trade, has the potential to promote greater intercultural understanding and peace [by taking] all 
human beings as equal potential trading partners.”105 The fear is that ethical cosmopolitanism is 
here coopted within a regime of corporate finance that neglects the justice claims and 
responsibilities of the cosmopolitan subject.  
Nussbaum’s Socratic Cosmopolitanism 
Since any discussion of cosmopolitanism in education inevitably refers to Martha 
Nussbaum’s influential work,106 it is important to first clearly lay out her views on global 
learning, which are firmly rooted in her belief in the importance of a traditional liberal arts 
education for all college students. Nussbaum’s concern for liberal educational values in higher 
education, as seen through her defense of arts and humanities programs facing cuts under the 
new global ethos of economic growth and competition, would later become infused with her 
cosmopolitanism. For Nussbaum, a quality liberal education is necessarily global—as universal 
human concerns and aptitudes must be—and goes beyond the minimum of presenting a diverse, 
buffet style array of international content.  
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The most important aspect of a cosmopolitan education, for Nussbaum, is the 
development of ethical and reasoning capacities to imaginatively comprehend and engage the life 
circumstances of distant others. Through an encounter with different lifestyles and traditions, a 
greater appreciation of what connects us universally as humans is developed, beyond our 
accidental birth in particular nation-states and cultures. Seeking to cut off criticism that she 
ignores valuable local connections and identities, Nussbaum stresses that these cultural relations 
are indeed important, but should be balanced with global obligations: 
In educational terms, this means that students in the United States, for example, may 
continue to regard themselves as defined partly by their particular loves—their families, 
their religious, ethnic, or racial communities, or even their country. But they must also, 
and centrally, learn to recognize humanity whenever they encounter it, undeterred by 
traits that are strange to them, and be eager to understand humanity in all its strange 
guises. They must learn enough about the different to recognize common ends to see how 
variously they are instantiated in the many cultures and their histories.107 
 
The notion of Nussbaumian global learning as an “updated” liberal education is highly 
influential on current reforms for globalizing the traditional liberal arts curriculum. The equation 
of liberal education with global learning can be shown in how Nussbaum utilizes the Stoic 
meaning of liberal as “[liberating] the mind from the bondage of habit and custom, producing 
people who can function with sensitivity and alertness as citizens of the whole world.”108 This 
vision of the liberal person as global learner depends a lot on Nussbaum’s Stoic interpretation of 
the figure of Socrates. It is in the development of ostensibly Socratic liberal educational values 
like critical thinking about concepts, an open-mindedness toward plurality, and an ethical focus 
on the good life, that Nussbaum fashions her main practical proposals for global learning in 
higher education. 
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For Nussbaum, the global learner is one who adheres to the form of a Socratic education 
and molds it to fit the particular content and circumstances of his or her life.109 This latter aspect 
of the global learner’s personhood is greatly influenced by progressive education, East and West, 
particularly in the life and pedagogical philosophies of Rabindranath Tagore and John Dewey, 
both of whom Nussbaum relies on for particular examples of her ideas in action.110 Global 
learning depends on a great deal of local, contextual understanding, from one’s own historical, 
religious, political, and artistic contexts, which must be built upon to make engagement with 
global issues more meaningful. This is what leads Nussbaum to advocate so strongly for a 
“disproportionate” grounding for all American students in American constitutional traditions and 
great literature from the Anglo-American tradition, regardless of what advocates of 
multiculturalism in the curriculum would prefer.111 Nussbaum’s understanding of global learning 
as a path to world citizenship leads her to criticize curricular paths that seek as an end product 
the understanding of “diversity” to not really speak about anything deeply or in particular.  
An education for global citizenship takes the whole life. And to be desirable for students, 
it must lead to a meaningful life as well as employment.112 As an issue spanning the world, 
Nussbaum contends that global education policy must begin with a “widely shared narrative of 
human childhood.”113 The university years are the critical period for awakening students’ 
curiosity and growing knowledge towards worthy, human aims. This developmental trajectory 
begins much earlier, in childhood, where Nussbaum argues that learners are able to develop the 
elements of rational inquiry, questioning, freedom of mind, a realization of human weakness and 
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the necessity of community; importantly, children develop “compassionate concern [for persons] 
… as an end and not a mere means.”114 Learners must not aspire to control or invulnerability, 
“above the lot of human life.”115 When they get to higher education, students are ready to 
develop what Nussbaum calls “positional thinking” and “empathetic perspectival experience.”116 
These considerations necessitate Nussbaum requiring undergraduate students to not 
declare a specific major or focus in the first two years in order to take a wide variety of courses, 
prominently humanities courses, including philosophy (where Socratic critical questioning must 
be taught) and world religions, and nothing “purely scientific or purely vocational.”117 It should 
be clarified that Nussbaum is not anti-science, but in favor of science if “rightly pursued,” 
meaning that teaching should focus on “critical thinking, logical analysis, and imagining.”118 
Nussbaum is adamant that the creation of globally-focused courses should be faculty-driven and 
flexible, designed according to the personal interests of the faculty member, which will better 
help them advocate before the university community as well as inspire their students. Cultivating 
imagination and advancing perception of nuances within complex cultures (through tools like 
films and real artifacts) is very important for Nussbaum because it helps students avoid 
“descriptive vices” like overgeneralization and romanticism of foreign lands.119 As should be 
clear from the preceding, Nussbaum advocates a pedagogy of active, open-ended discussion, role 
playing, with regular teacher feedback, and even a “nuanced, qualitative form of national 
assessment.”120 
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The main limitation to Nussbaum’s approach is its avoidance of any kind of moderately 
non-ideal kinds of arrangements, particularly those that include scientific or vocationally-focused 
programs, because from her line of argument she clearly believes that liberal inquiry and open-
mindedness are in some sense antithetical to them. This suggests only a limited applicability to 
research-heavy settings. The question remains whether Nussbaum’s ideal pronouncements and 
curricular prescriptions, which are intended to support the development of student autonomy in 
modern democratic societies, adequately capture what is valuable about the diversity of 
justifiable approaches to global learning for adults.  
Brighouse’s Liberal Cosmopolitanism 
 Harry Brighouse’s approach to contending with globalized higher education and the 
needs for global learning may also be referred to as the “accidental cosmopolitan” approach.121 
Brighouse, as a steadfast defender of liberalism as a guide to education theory and policy,122 has 
made it clear that his foremost educational concerns have not deviated from his focus upon how 
adults develop both autonomy and a conception of justice through the process of education. 
Brighouse pursues educational solutions to Rawls’ central question, originally formulated in A 
Theory of Justice: “Viewing society as a fair system of cooperation between citizens regarded as 
free and equal, what principles of justice are most appropriate to specify basic rights and 
liberties, and to regular social and economic inequalities in citizens’ prospects over a complete 
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life?”123 Like many political philosophers working with issues of education,124 Brighouse has 
focused almost exclusively on how children in schools may best learn the skills and dispositions 
for being citizens in a liberal democracy, analyzing relevant cases like school choice, whether to 
teach patriotic history, and what role the family should have in a learner’s educational 
development, always evenly focusing on the extent to which individual arrangements and 
schemes serve, or do not serve, the aims of autonomy and equality.  
Arguing for the necessary extension of Rawls’ social justice concerns to the whole world, 
Brighouse finds himself more in line with philosophers like Thomas Pogge125 and Nussbaum126 
herself who are critical of the late Rawls’ stance of toleration of illiberal regimes with poor 
human rights track records. However, unlike Nussbaum, Brighouse does not regard 
cosmopolitanism as a liberal virtue in itself but as an essentially empirical reality, as well as a 
form of identification, that differently affects local constituencies and considerations when 
balancing the important educational aims of autonomy and equality. In other words, 
cosmopolitanism in its practical import may actually work against the demands of justice; if 
local control of educational opportunity is in the hands of certain advantaged “cosmopolitan” 
communities, ”they will seek to support the autonomy of their own children at the particular 
expense of other “parochial” communities that also deserve an autonomous education for their 
children.127 As such, being a global citizen is not a valid subject of study in higher education. 
What students need are the liberal skills and dispositions for acting well and fairly in the new 
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globalized reality, where comprehensive and perfectionist views of life that tend to deny the 
agency of others in living self-determined lives dominate the public sphere and must be 
critiqued. Like Nussbaum, Brighouse takes a developmental approach toward the inculcation of 
liberal values in the young and how those values are built upon “over a complete life.” 
Only recently has Brighouse written on how his educational ideas would develop into 
higher education specifically, taking as his impetus the increasingly stratified, globalized, and 
economically-focused character of elite research universities. Writing as a faculty member in an 
elite, international, research-focused university, Brighouse explicitly grounds his observations in 
the lived experience of his own position as a philosopher in a university with certain 
responsibilities. Rather than relying on thought experiments to advance his argument, he often 
uses cases from his own practice. Brighouse and McAvoy argue that universities are essentially 
in the business of upskilling an already privileged, mobile generation of students to assume 
positions ready-made for them in the global workforce. Universities confer powerful credentials 
that increase elite students’ human capital, used as a “gatekeeping mechanism” to keep the less 
advantaged out.128 Faculty members, who are complicit in this process of “social closure,” are 
well-positioned and obligated to help students develop global social responsibility.129 Brighouse 
and McAvoy argue for a greater paternalistic, character forming role for faculty members over 
their students, an important aim should be to “influence the structure of the motivations of the 
students they teach, to promote an ethic of public service, a sense of privilege and of what the 
duties are that accompany it.”130  
Such an approach, which Brighouse extends to the creation of a justice-related “ethic” for 
complicit professors, attempts to return the focus of liberal education – degraded by the illiberal, 
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instrumental values associated with economic globalization – to the concept of the “educated 
self,”131 reintroducing moral responsibilities as a necessary component of the development of 
liberal intellectual skills. It is important to note here that Brighouse regards the promotion of the 
educated person through primarily the ethical lens of the teacher-student relationship and not as a 
top-down, institutional solution. For Brighouse, this focus on the educated self is a development 
from his earlier proposals for “autonomy-facilitating education” and its focus on liberal skills 
and abilities.132  
In the realm of civic education for children, Brighouse argues for an education that 
equips learners with the knowledge, skills, and abilities of autonomous thought and reflection, 
teaching children how to live well and to “endorse it [life] from the inside.”133 This “autonomy-
facilitating education” is distinguished from “autonomy-promoting education,” which attempts to 
mandate specific patriotic virtues and content and suffers from the poor legitimacy of learners. In 
arguing that many different institutional arrangements may successfully facilitate learners’ 
autonomy, Brighouse notes that “autonomy, though susceptible of an abstract definition, cannot 
be practiced outside the specific situation of individual lives; schools should reflect this.”134 As a 
consequence, education policymakers must not be doctrinaire in regarding a necessary, if/then 
connection between a single institutional policy and the achievement of autonomy. Autonomy, 
furthermore, is not an all-or-nothing achievement for the learner; it is important to note that 
educational arrangements which are not wholly living up to the liberal ideal, but have very caring 
and dedicated teachers, may still be very beneficial for the learners. Therefore, Brighouse 
pursues not an institutional solution, but rather an interpersonal one.  
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The curriculum that Brighouse recommends is the traditional, content-based liberal 
education program, featuring critical reasoning, intensive study of a range of religious and 
ethical views, case-based encounters with specific moral conflicts across cultures, and “history 
seen as a social science” rather than as a vehicle for nationalistic ideals.135 Though apparently 
similar to Nussbaum’s proposals, Brighouse displays a more neutral commitment regarding 
content and specific cosmopolitan virtues than Nussbaum does. Instead he emphasizes useful 
skills and abilities of autonomy for students to pursue a diverse array of options for a flourishing 
life. Brighouse notes that his autonomy-facilitating education is “concerned with the way in 
which children negotiate their identities, rather than with the end-result of those identities, and it 
does not aim at inculcating a self-consciously cosmopolitan identity, any more than it does a 
deeply religious identity or a national identity”136 
The development of autonomy-facilitating education must not stop once students enter 
higher education. However, the powerful pressures to conform to commercial and economic 
educational goals, for both students and faculty members, are even stronger in today’s 
universities: “the fractured environment of the modern research university in which faculty 
members are primarily focused on their own research and peer approval, [leaves] the 
undergraduate student body to devolve into what is often times a self-destructive, anti-
intellectual, conformity-driven party culture.”137 Such pressures, deriving from a problem with 
“freedom of choice” at research universities, as Brighouse sees it, necessitates a more steadfast, 
hands-on response by professionals committed to liberal values. The general education 
curriculum, rather than an ineffective “menu of courses,” should “be more about engaging 
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students in contemporary ethical and social problems.”138 The approach to global learning 
Brighouse is advancing here is committed to “cross-age interaction,” where teachers (advanced 
liberal learners) act as role models for students (apprentice liberal learners), to “expand and 
diversify the range of influences on the formation of the students’ characters and attitudes.”139 
Brighouse defends against the charge that his proposals are too “paternalistic,” arguing that there 
is no non-paternalistic default position in higher education and that there is nothing wrong “about 
placing conditions on receipt of such a benefit, especially when the recipient is in a position to 
refuse the whole package.”140  
Brighouse’s proposals for global learning in higher education place a perhaps inordinate 
amount of faith in the character of the faculty member to embrace the ethic of care he 
recommends, and perhaps too little faith in the ability of the adult student to credibly navigate 
the pressures of globalized life and discern how to pursue the good life in accordance with liberal 
values. Brighouse makes the argument that “the Marxist view” of higher education, as 
“instrumental for the political and economic purposes of society,” and the “liberal conception” of 
higher education, as “enriching the intellectual lives of students and simultaneously inculcating a 
sense of responsibility to the society,” are in fact not contradictory – because students, Brighouse 
contends, regard the purpose of education as the former, while professors should see the purpose 
of education as the latter.141 Professors should, thus, educate students to better appreciate the 
importance of the liberal conception because it will ostensibly help them better in whatever 
future endeavors they may undergo. However, it seems that the harsh realities of employment 
politics that are practiced by transnational corporations in the global workforce are 
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underemphasized in this overly-generalized picture. At the very least, more difficult cases that 
students face as prospective employees must be considered to determine if Brighouse’s intuitions 
about the efficacy of liberal skills holds true. 
Rizvi’s Epistemic Cosmopolitanism 
Rizvi’s approach to cosmopolitanism may be distinguished from Nussbaum’s and 
Brighouse’s approaches in a couple of notable ways.142 First, it assumes an explicitly educational 
or learning focus from the very beginning, generally eschewing the issue of balancing 
cosmopolitan rights and responsibilities with more local and national allegiances, which is the 
line taken by most political philosophers. Second, Rizvi builds his cosmopolitanism not from a 
particular philosophical vantage point within liberalism, as Nussbaum and Brighouse do, but as a 
direct response to “an empirical reality resulting from the ease with which goods, finance, 
people, ideas and media are now able to flow across the world, leading to a radical shift in our 
understanding of space and time.”143 According to Rizvi, cosmopolitanism is interpreted here 
…not as a universal moral principle, nor as a prescription recommending a form of 
political configuration, but as a mode of learning about, and ethically engaging with, new 
cultural formations. My argument is that if global interconnectivity is now a pervasive 
socio-cultural condition then teaching about cultural and intercultural relations should no 
longer be aligned to the requirements of national prejudices, but has to become 
cosmopolitan with a focus on attempts to develop in students a set of epistemic virtues 
with which to understand the dynamics of global transformations. This does not mean 
ignoring local issues, but to understand them within the broader context of the global 
skills that are reshaping the very nature of localities.144 
 
Rizvi’s account of the “epistemic virtues” in cosmopolitan learning represents a more developed 
account of the skills and competencies of global learning, in certain respects, than Nussbaum and 
Brighouse. Rizvi more adequately describes the particular characteristics and modes of inquiry, 
                                                
142 See Fazal Rizvi, “Epistemic Virtues and Cosmopolitan Learning.” The Australian Educational Researcher 35, 
no. 1 (2008): 17-35. Cf. Fazal Rizvi, Encountering Education in the Global: The Selected Works of Fazal Rizvi 
(London: Routledge), 2014. 
143 Rizvi, “Epistemic Virtues and Cosmopolitan Learning,” 22. 
144 Ibid., 21. 
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which characterize global learning and are contingent upon social circumstances. Rizvi draws a 
distinction between values and epistemic virtues, which he describes as “habitual practices of 
learning that regard knowing as always tentative, involving critical exploration and imagination, 
an open-ended exercise in cross-cultural deliberation designed to understand relationalities and 
imagine alternatives, but always from a position that is reflexive of its epistemic assumptions.”145 
The account of global learning presented by Rizvi focuses on the proper means to inquire after 
global knowledge. He describes this mode of inquiry as “tentative and strategic, working against 
the illusions of dualities and certainties,”146 which helps students relate to global 
interconnectivity.  
While Rizvi mentions that his account of cosmopolitan learning is grounded in the 
empirical realities of student life, he evinces very little awareness of how his proposals might 
work within actual curricular planning. Rizvi never mentions any particular fields or disciplines 
where this learning would most flourish. This suggests that Rizvi believes these epistemic virtues 
for cosmopolitan learning to be embedded in every field of study, from arts, humanities, and 
social sciences, to the natural and vocational sciences. While this may be intentional, it tends to 
obscure Rizvi’s actual meaning for higher education reform. In actuality, Rizvi would probably 
agree that what Nussbaum and Brighouse have recommended should populate the curriculum: a 
wide plurality of sources, including the traditional liberal arts canon and more recent cases 
showing conflicting cultural perspectives.  
Toward an Adequate Account of Global Learning 
Higher education institutions boldly state their aims, leaving nothing out. They are, at 
once, nexuses of teaching, learning, and scholarly dialogue, “world leaders” in research and 
                                                
145 Ibid., 30. 
146 Ibid., 29. 
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innovations, and good servants of the community’s needs. Yet, for each adult learner served by 
various institutions of higher education, there are stark differences in approach, personality, and 
history. Thus, a closer consideration of human experience in higher education, both individual 
and interpersonal, is essential.  
Global learning has an epistemological and moral basis in the life of the university, thus 
concerning students, educators, academic leaders, and other community stakeholders as learners 
involved in communication around the meaning of global experience. The global learner’s 
perspective is the focus upon which the legitimate aims of higher education are based. For an 
account of global learning to succeed, the first-person perspective of the global learner— “what 
it is like” and why it is important—must be scrutinized in conjunction with other perspectives to 
guide policy and practice.147 Educational policies and practices are typically justified by 
appealing to what is objectively beneficial for students to learn and experience, often conveyed 
in paternalistic fashion. To better account for the perspectives of actual global learners, an 
experiential condition must hold for proposed global learning policies and practices. 
While global learning is, in the first place, a matter of pre-reflective and reflective 
experience, it is also a matter of communities, programs, institutions, and policies. The fragility 
of our own subjective experiences with global learning impels us to seek out (and build) global 
communities within which we can compare and collectively adjudicate experiences and form 
bonds of friendship across difference. Global learning has inner conditions for its possibility, but 
it also has outer conditions for educational interventions with hopes of succeeding. As global 
learners, we make plans, develop projects, use our meagre rationality, and enter the fold of 
community with nary a thought for how we arrived. An adequate account of global learning must 
                                                
147 The distinction between subjective and objective—or agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons—is adapted from 
Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 1979. 
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consider the importance of our fragile existence as learners and our fundamental ignorance. 
Global connection is ideal while global loneliness is actual.  
I relate strongly to Robert and Jon Solomon’s critical eye on the idea of a university 
education as an investment, which they argue: 
does not allow for perhaps the single most important fact about an education, and that is 
how much searching and reflection, how many false starts and wrong roads, how much 
‘waste’ an education often requires. A decent education includes any number of ‘useless,’ 
‘impractical’ subjects as well as skills with some—we hope—immediate application, and 
that means that the very idea of the university as an investment institution is in error.148 
 
It will be argued that an answer to the persistent student (and parent) question of “how is this 
going to help me get a better job?” that stresses our positive capacity for failure and fundamental 
ignorance will not be understood or appreciated by the student at this stage in their educational 
development. Naturally, no learner wishes to fail at what they are attempting to do. However, as 
Dewey reminds us, if learners engage in educational experiences embedded with these 
dispositions, they will become integral to learners’ future experiences. Wiping these important 
dispositions from the journey of learning does not allow students to learn that failure can be a 
positive thing, and thus risk-taking – with a high likelihood of failure – is a learning endeavor to 
be cherished and rewarded.  
  
                                                
148 Robert C. Solomon and Jon Solomon. Up the University: Re-creating Higher Education in America (Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1993): 17. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
COSMOPOLITAN MORAL EDUCATION FOR ADULTS 
Global learning in higher education should be reframed to answer the question: what is 
required for adult learners to learn in today’s globalized world? This may seem like an eccentric 
question for global learning in higher education to answer, both impossibly broad and unusually 
connected to adulthood. Higher education is not typically considered a species of adult learning. 
This is because college students, the supposed beneficiaries of global learning, are not typically 
considered to be adults in the “achievement” sense, but in the “growth” (developmental) 
sense.149 This contention rests upon the premise that college students are not real adults, but 
“emerging” adults,150 occupying a middle ground between adolescence and full adulthood, and 
thus not able to exercise full autonomous agency over their learning choices. However, there are 
good reasons to consider college students as fully autonomous in both the moral and intellectual 
senses, and thus full-fledged adult learners. It bears reminding that college students are not the 
sole beneficiaries of global learning in higher education. Consider the diversity of global learning 
opportunities for faculty, staff, and academic leaders in higher education and the many 
opportunities for association, partnership, and experimentation – in essence, learning. Since, by 
common consensus, questions about purpose, authenticity, and relationship are moral questions, 
I argue that global learning adequately conceived commits educators, and consequently their 
students, to adult moral education. 
Global learning in higher education prepares adult learners to learn during and after 
formal education has ostensibly ended. How this process is conceived depends on how one sees 
                                                
149 Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education (Springfield, IL: Thomas), 1960. 
150 Jeffrey Arnett, “Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens to the Twenties.” 
American Psychologist 55, 5 (2000): 469-80. Cf. Christian Smith, Lost in Transition: The Dark Side of Emerging 
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the aims and purposes of education, beginning in early childhood, to prospective adulthood, and 
across the span of life. John Dewey, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Martin Buber 
are a few of the notable philosophers who have developed accounts of moral education in the 
transition to adulthood.151 However, most philosophers who address educational questions 
typically focus on the childhood phase of education and assume that whatever adult education 
might come to should, theoretically, be a direct correlation of the intellectual and moral 
“foundation” provided for in early life. For example, Louden questions the efficacy of 
inculcating cosmopolitan dispositions in young adults who have ostensibly formed the primary 
moral notions that would build their adult behavior.152 However, while Louden indicates that a 
renewed moral education for adults is at least possible, he does not consider the diversity of 
settings that facilitate adult moral education.  
Moral education does not stop in childhood; contrary to what some may believe, the most 
challenging part of moral education occurs in adulthood. Moral education as an adult occurs 
under very different conditions than what children face – it is not (as) compulsory or constrained 
by parental authority. As children, we learn and adapt our life to one set of principles that are 
instilled within us by older mentors. However, our moral experience is limited as children, 
adolescents, and college-aged young adults, affording little opportunity to develop, strengthen, 
and test out these initial principles. As full adults with greater moral experience, we undergo 
regular challenges and setbacks to those very principles we learned in childhood. In response to 
these challenges, we discover whether we are able to uphold those very principles or must 
replace them.  
                                                
151 The major works for these authors on adult moral education include Dewey’s Democracy and Education and 
Experience and Education; Rousseau’s Emile; Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, Religion Within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason, and Lectures on Pedagogy, and Buber’s Between Man and Man.  
152 Louden, The World We Want, 151. 
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Adult moral education is ultimately more meaningful than moral education in childhood 
precisely because it is a product of an adult learner’s discoveries of autonomy and self-identity in 
response to regular challenges to “unlearn” in the radically contingent circumstances of life. Kant 
– and Dewey after him – imbues the term “vocation” [Bestimmung] with the important sense of 
transitioning to adulthood through an awareness of our unique role in carrying out our moral 
purpose in professional and political life.153 I take these dimensions to be fundamental to 
adequately understanding and applying the concept of global learning to our educational lives. 
In renaming my account of global learning, cosmopolitan moral education for adults, I 
seek to emphasize the normative and lifelong dimensions of global learning. It is important to 
note at the outset that my account of global learning is not a “cosmopolitan” theory in the 
modern political sense of global citizenship that I analyzed in Chapter Two. In my view, the aim 
of global learning should not set as its ultimate end to make students good cosmopolitans, which 
as Louden has pointed out, is a difficult aim to achieve with few guarantees. A cosmopolitan 
disposition represents a definite, comprehensive moral stance about the world that is hard to 
realize even for supposedly mature adults. Alternatively, the aim of global learning should be 
upon learning how to unlearn – or what I refer to below, re-learning. 
The central principle that characterizes adult learning in my account is re-learning. Re-
learning is the process of an adult learner calling into question what he or she has previously 
learned and using this self-reflective process to reconfigure his or her life’s purposes. Re-
learning is an agentive process, which is often triggered by sudden external events that may 
result in protracted internal deliberations. It is, by no means, a given. To begin the iterative 
process of re-learning, an adult learner must engage in moral experience that questions and 
                                                
153 See Kant, “Collins,” in Lectures on Ethics, 200. Cf. Dewey, Democracy and Education, 306-320. 
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challenges his or her perspectives. He or she must also seek out these unsettling experiences with 
global others.  
In this chapter, I develop my account of cosmopolitan moral education for adults in the 
following stages. First, I describe an important problem facing accounts of adult learning, which 
I call the Problem of Adult Learning and how it ought to be addressed. Second, I analyze the 
principle of re-learning and draw out its connections with Kant’s concept of vocation, situating it 
within my account and relating it to contemporary understandings of vocation in higher 
education. Third, I use Kant’s analysis of the interrelation of autonomy and self-identity as a 
resource for elucidating my own uses of these concepts. Fourth, I examine various 
understandings of autonomy and self-identity in traditional and contemporary higher education. 
Finally, I apply further concepts from Kantian adult moral education and relate these concerns to 
the account of cosmopolitan moral education for adults.  
 The Problem of Adult Learning 
At its most basic level, higher education is for, and by, adults. The proper subjects of 
higher education are the adult learners themselves, primarily students, but not excluding other 
participants in campus life, such as faculty members, staff members, and administrators. Adult 
learners assume many distinct roles and learn for a variety of reasons over a lifetime. It is 
important to state this seemingly obvious point because it is easily assumed, wrongly, that only 
persons labeled as “students” learn or developmentally change in higher education. This in fact 
neglects the incredibly diverse array of formal and informal learning experiences, in and out of 
class, which occur on a university campus.154 Students often become teachers in some capacity; 
                                                
154 See William G. Perry Jr., Forms of Ethical and Intellectual Development in the College Years: A Scheme (San 
Francisco. CA: Jossey-Bass), 1999. Cf. Pascarella, Ernest T. and Patrick T. Terenzini. How College Affects 
Students: A Third Decade of Research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005. 
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administrators return to being students. In the university envisioned as an intergenerational 
learning community, participants in higher education remain the same ever-developing adult 
learners. 
However, a yawning gap does divide the experience of young, “emerging” adults and that 
of older adults. What I call the Problem of Adult Learning is simply this: that adults require 
different kinds of experiences to learn, but these experiences may elude us for reasons beyond 
our immediate control, such as age, culture, or social position. This is not a question of a lack of 
cognitive knowledge, but of experience with moral decision-making. While cognitive knowledge 
may be acquired through memorization and other rote learning methods, moral experience 
requires the learner’s autonomous assent and is acquired within the context of relationships. How 
are young adults able to develop the needed intellectual and moral awareness that must derive 
from direct experience of these matters if they are still too young to go and seek out these 
experiences themselves?  
Traditionally, societies construe the Problem of Adult Learning as, alternately, a problem 
of knowledge, access, positioning, and the conferral of social legitimacy. Thus, societies address 
it by taking a firm hand in directing higher and continuing adult education. Like the broader 
society, institutions take positions on the Problem of Adult Learning by deciding which roles and 
representations are valid for its citizens, permanent residents, and immigrants and refugees (not 
forgetting international students and scholars) to follow. These roles may be purposefully or 
unintentionally designed in a self-interested fashion, and thus limit adults’ experience to a set list 
of prescribed outcomes, rather than seek to expand adult learning by addressing their autonomy 
as receivers and questioners of these roles.  
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The Problem of Adult Learning separates a teacher from her students not in terms of 
knowledge, but rather the capacity for unlearning prior assumptions through moral decision-
making. A teacher has internalized this capacity for unlearning and has learned how to utilize 
this capacity to influence students’ knowledge acquisition and relation to knowing itself. The 
difference between a teacher and a student is not merely a stage of maturity, the difference 
between an “emerging” adult and a full adult. A teacher embodies a kind of awareness about the 
world and about how little one knows about the world and uses that awareness as a guiding 
principle behind curricular and pedagogical choices. That awareness is difficult to convey to 
students who – out of no fault of their own – have not had the requisite experiences with 
unlearning and moral decision-making.  
Thus, moving from emerging adulthood to full adulthood is not merely a question of 
further knowledge and waiting out the stage. It is a question of teachers and other adult mentors 
applying the lesson of unlearning to giving students experiences that present these ideas in 
concrete forms. How are these ideas to be conveyed? Unlearning is not about acquiring 
knowledge, but about developing a level of self-possession or ironic stance in determining how 
to respond to radically contingent circumstances in the world.155 The educational experiences 
students need are experiences of unlearning, or what I refer to below, re-learning. More 
precisely, learners require experiences that involve subtraction rather than addition to uncover 
the root principles. These experiences reveal to students the formal structures of experience in 
the world underneath the veneer of knowable things.  
 
 
                                                
155 I rely here on Vilem Flusser’s distinctive use of irony as a moral stance. See Vilem Flusser, “Taking Up 
Residence in Homelessness,” in Writings, edited by Andreas Strohl (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minneapolis 
Press, 2002): 91-103. 
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Principle of Re-Learning 
Making the leap from one level of awareness to another level of awareness requires an 
openness to re-learning. Re-learning involves the assessment and possible abandonment or 
conversion of our prior learning. In my view, re-learning embodies what learning in adulthood is 
like, which is critical to global learning. Re-learning is connected to Kant’s moral education 
because it is undergone through reflection upon moral examples that call to mind prior 
experiences for assessment and through reconsideration of examples’ implications for our life.156 
This sort of reflection and reconsideration occurs in an ongoing manner throughout one’s life, in 
formal and informal settings, from the standpoint of the student and the teacher, on- and off-
campus. Thus, global learning is much more than what occurs within the confines of a university 
classroom or auditorium – it describes the fact of moral education as an adult.  
Developing the ability to re-learn involves experiencing what Deborah Kerdeman has 
referred to as “being pulled up short.”157 According to Kerdeman, to be pulled up short is a 
fundamentally confounding experience, “which disrupts self-inflation, betraying false pride, 
invincibility, or exaggerated desire for self-control. … Insight does not arise in advance of or 
apart from being pulled up short; to be pulled up short is just to see that I have been deluding 
myself.”158 In every sense, we can never be complete masters of our choices. As I argued in 
Chapter Two, ambitious lists of capacities and dispositions, generated by the AAC&U and 
others, create the false impression that global learners are ultimate constructors and controllers of 
their own knowledge. However, re-learning is just as much about the development of humility 
and an appreciation of interdependence as it is about independent insight. By re-learning, we are 
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engaged in questioning our basic frames of thinking. This questioning process is not self-
instigated, but always comes through disruption from without of our settled ways of thinking, 
forcing us into self-reflection upon knowledge accrued through prior experiences. That is what 
makes it re-learning.  
Being able to re-learn involves a commitment to the ideal of autonomy, but importantly 
moderated by the experience of being pulled up short described above. Autonomy, as it is 
occasionally construed, suggests a desire for what Onora O’Neill calls “mere, sheer 
independence,”159 an unbounded ability to make free choices in line with one’s desires. Such a 
view evokes the all-powerful constructor metaphor critiqued earlier. This stunted view of 
autonomy is not consistent with the view of global learning as re-learning I argue for here. In my 
account, autonomy is a value developed in relationship with external events that force a 
reassessment of our beliefs. By being autonomous, we admit ignorance and actively cultivate a 
sense of humility.  
Our autonomy is intimately associated with our understanding of self, which makes its 
appearance through what is other. Thus, autonomy should not be understood as a master value 
that controls everything in its wake, but as a value that works in concert with the development of 
self-identity throughout a lifetime. A strange environment, a foreign person, a different angle 
upon a familiar object or idea, draws us forward into new territory, making our autonomy and 
selfhood an issue for us. As persons, we are never done developing the sense of autonomy and 
self-identity. This development, however, does not indicate that we are gaining ever greater 
control of our lives, but rather developing a greater capacity for re-learning through radically 
contingent circumstances. As adults, we experience an ever-shifting ground between our 
prospective and full autonomy as we continuously re-learn.  
                                                
159 Onora O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002): 25. 
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Global learning as re-learning provides the realistic face of the full challenge of education 
in adulthood and what it entails. The diagram below presents re-learning as an iterative, 
reconstructive process that begins with the fundamental starting point of “becoming” an adult – 
The Problem of Adult Learning – and leads through the development of autonomy and self-
identity, as they contribute to our ever-renewing sense of vocation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Process of re-learning. 
 
 
The Educational Sense of Vocation 
 
In higher education, vocation is usually described as vocational education – finding a job 
and getting the education needed to maintain it. This understanding of vocation is where liberal 
education proponents describe vocation as being unsuited to higher education.160 Yet everyone 
agrees that finding a career is an important end for students in higher education – liberal and 
vocational education proponents alike. But there is, within vocation, the job that I am supposed 
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to do, as well as my reflection upon it. To what extent does it (the job) inform or improve how I 
think of myself? The latter part is properly the liberal educational sense of vocation.  
For instance, on a college campus, what is important about the genuine choosing of a 
vocation among different participants, including faculty, students, academic leaders, and staff? 
Should participants see their job as just a job, or as something that contributes to how they learn, 
understand, or appreciate themselves? The process of re-learning requires perceiving others as, in 
some sense, reflecting the outcome of their autonomous vocational choices. The account of 
global learning presented here expects that global learners see global learning as, in some 
personally meaningful sense, their vocation.  
The idea of vocation falls directly within the provenance of higher education as an 
unstable “middle ground” between prospective and full adulthood. The relevance of vocation can 
be seen, thematically and pedagogically, in the transitions students make during this period. Kant 
has an important concept of vocation in relation to education, which has obvious parallels to his 
moral theory. For Kant, the transition from education for childhood to education for adulthood 
represents a marked shift in understanding of one’s vocation. “At sixteen,” Kant writes, a youth 
is “on the verge of manhood, and then education by discipline comes to an end. At this stage he 
learns increasingly to recognize his vocation, and hence must get to know the world. At this 
entry into manhood he must be apprised of his real duties, of the worth of humanity in its own 
person, and of respect for it in others.”161 Yet, Kant is careful to warn that there is a fundamental 
limit to the moral influence that a teacher can have upon a student’s entry to adulthood. A 
student must discover her vocation – for Kant, humanity’s shared vocation – using her own 
moral self-direction.162 
                                                
161 Kant, “Collins,” in Lectures on Ethics, 220. 
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While the movement for a global liberal education sharpens many of the traditional 
conceptions of liberal education by making them more urgent and relevant, as the AAC&U has 
shown in the Shared Futures initiative, this movement for global liberal education also 
necessitates a reevaluation (and perhaps abandonment) of certain “prejudices” of liberal 
education. As I argue here, one of the prejudices worth abandoning is the hard division between 
liberal education and vocational/professional education. A denial of the importance of vocational 
concerns (and courses) for students, according to Bok, “will diminish the chance to help 
undergraduates think about their careers in terms broader than simply making money.”163 
Referring to a sort of vocational understanding that goes back to educational reformers like 
Dewey, Bok highlights the importance of “giving students a larger view of the professions that 
goes beyond mere skills training”164 and helping them find their expanded sense of a vocation 
through a variety of activities that tap into their interests and values.165 Gutmann continues the 
effort of integrating liberal and vocational education by arguing for required courses on social 
and ethical issues of the professions to be offered as a part of a general education.166 However, as 
these authors observe, significant institutional and disciplinary barriers exist to putting liberal 
and vocational/professional education on a more equal footing. 
Vocational concerns may be considered “positional” interests for adult learners. In other 
words, the educational sense of vocation is central to not only defining our career path, but to 
realizing our well-being and completing our life’s projects. Mortimer Kadish raises the 
importance of considering the positional interests of “participants” in higher education as those 
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interests that are inherent to their positions as students or faculty members – which they are 
strongly motivated to have realized.167 Kadish argues that adhering to the positional interests of 
students and faculty members by the institution is necessary because the existence of the 
institution is premised on an acceptance of these positional interests among its aims and 
purposes. Kadish describes the three central positional interests (of students and faculty 
members) of “effectiveness,” “self-formation,” and “coherence,” in the following terms:  
(1) an interest in students preparing themselves for effective participation in the society 
they are about to enter; (2) an interest in students reaching a decision about what they 
actually want both for themselves in society and for themselves as civilized human 
beings if, as is likely, they do not already know; (3) a derivative interest in the coherence 
of the first two interests.168  
 
The key point to be observed about these positional interests is that both effectiveness and self-
formation are legitimate interests students have, and that neither, say, a wholly liberal education 
or a wholly vocational education, can outrank the other’s rightful place in the student’s life. 
However, as Kadish notes, it is anticipated that a student will discover new, unexplored regions 
and capacities within herself that gives her the tools to question decisions she has made that 
narrow her horizons on getting a particular job and having a particular kind of life “out there.” 
The Interrelation of Autonomy and Self-Identity for Global Learners 
At this point in my argument, global learning requires an adequate account of learner 
agency that explains what constitutes an engagement in global learning and articulates why it is 
desirable and valuable for the learners themselves. For such an account to succeed, it must 
reconcile the deep-seated interest learners have in making independent choices in light of their 
own projects with the inescapable demands of global connection and moral obligation that global 
learning implies. Allowing other “interested” parties to take on the role of representing our 
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intentions and goals effectively relieves us of a central responsibility for human moral agency: 
that of self-definition.  
Critiquing the motivations guiding global learning can be addressed with the distinction 
between interest and self-interest. To have an “interest” in something means to be invested in 
having a particular end realized. Where does this investment lie for the adult learner? In the 
relation to self – one has an interest in realizing an end that contributes to developing one’s self-
identity. This may be an end that involves one’s own person, but it could just as well involve 
others. On the other hand, to be motivated by “self-interest” more narrowly connotes a pursuit of 
ends that are calculated to benefit a person’s external standing and holdings irrespective of any 
development in self-identity (one’s self-identity may certainly consist of moral stances that 
motivate one to be a self-interested person, but not necessarily so). In this section, I begin by 
defining autonomy and self-identity, respectively. Then, I show how these concepts are always 
interrelated in being a global learner. 
Autonomy 
Engagement in global learning as an adult necessitates a commitment to autonomy that 
underwrites any form and content considerations. The word autonomy has two parts: autos, 
which means “self,” and nomos, which has been variably translated as “rule,” “determination,” 
“legislation,” “governance,” or “bounded area.”169 Persons, professions, communities, 
associations, and states may all be described as autonomous – self-governing – in two 
interconnected senses: first, that they possess a basic, inviolable dignity as individual wholes 
with prime decision making power; and second, that this decision making power is guided, to a 
relevant extent, by self-endorsed principles, reasons, or desires and not through undue coercion 
                                                
169 Andrew Sneddon, Autonomy (London: Bloomsbury Ethics), 2013; for alternate translation of autonomy as 
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or external manipulation. I say “to a relevant extent” to indicate that even when autonomy is 
regarded as an important political, moral, or personal ideal there is still considerable variation in 
how much autonomous control is possible, or even desirable, over a complete and well-
functioning lifespan – which may be why Joseph Raz describes the autonomous person as “part-
author of his own life.”170  
The notion of global autonomy171 (also referred to as “autonomy of persons”) describes a 
generalized capacity for self-governance whereby thoughts and related actions undertaken by a 
person adhere to particular goals, projects, and narratives that derive from that person’s self-
identity. Local autonomy (also referred to as “autonomy of choice”), on the other hand, describes 
the extent to which individual choices are freely enacted, (a) without coercion and (b) in line 
with particular “higher-order” desires and motives. According to Andrew Sneddon, autonomy of 
persons requires all of the conditions of autonomy of choice plus “self-knowledge” and “self-
shaping”: “Self-shaping is the capacity for autonomous choice reflectively deployed toward 
one’s own identity [which] must be complemented by knowledge of oneself, both as a particular 
individual and in more generic regards.”172 In other words, while local autonomy ensures that the 
basic dimensions of choice are autonomous, global autonomy ensures that those choices truly 
reflect the priorities of the individual learner. Local autonomy is necessary, but not sufficient, to 
achieve the global autonomy. In this study, I use “autonomy” to consistently intend the global 
sense of autonomy just described; thus, I drop “global” as a descriptor for autonomy.  
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Self-Identity 
An agent’s self-identity is what she understands herself most fundamentally to be, from 
her own perspective.173 In contrast, an agent’s identity or public identity comprises how she is 
seen by others; it is primarily constructed through interactions with others in her family, culture, 
nation or religion, and contains an amalgamation of perspectives on her life. An agent’s self-
identity may contain facets of her public identity, but it cannot be reduced to it. Something 
comparable to this distinction can be seen in George Herbert Mead’s distinction between the 
“Me,” or other-derived sense of self, and the “I,” or the self as expressed in individual action.174 
Possessing a self-identity is a necessary condition for regarding one’s life as one’s own, rather 
than someone else’s, to guide, shape, and assume responsibility.175 Self-identity so understood is 
comparable to Christine Korsgaard’s notion of “practical identity” as the seat of an agent’s 
autonomous decision making: “It is the conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us 
that give rise to unconditional obligations. For to violate them is to lose your integrity and so 
your identity, and to no longer be who you are.”176 For Marina Oshana177 and Harry Frankfurt,178 
a self-identity is the product of free choice, which is both grounded in the empirical 
circumstances of the person and a resource for their being morally autonomous. 
It is important to distinguish what I mean by the development of a self-identity from what 
Kant negatively alludes to as the “dear self.” Kant opposes the focus on the “dear self” to those 
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who live in accordance with principles: “Those always who have their dear self before them as 
the sole focal point of their efforts and who attempt to make everything turn on the great axis of 
self-interest are the most common …”179 In the Groundwork, Kant similarly opposes the self-
interested “dear self” to those who act from a motive of duty that might incur some self-denial.180 
For Kant, the dear self represents a free choice made by a person to make self-interest the 
underlying motive of a choice. It is not a description of the empirical character of a person who 
cannot “help” but to be self-interested.  
Autonomous Self-Identity 
In linking self-identity to autonomy, I follow Oshana181 in arguing that one’s image of the 
world is something that is inescapable about ourselves and what we make of ourselves. Also, 
according to Dieter Henrich, this view stands close to the basic Kantian outlook on the individual 
in the world, which he describes below: 
We might imagine the world simply as a field that can be shaped according to norms that 
only we as agents can bring into play – a world that is not itself a source of norms, and 
still less a receptacle of norms bestowed by an authority above. The agent in this world 
has the self-image of being the sole source of both actions and norms. These are imposed 
upon the world through knowledge of laws and technical transformations, and established 
there in social institutions and in the constitutional state. The norms that bear upon this 
agent’s self-image are entirely self-derived and self-referring: they have to do with 
individual self-preservation, not in the sense of survival in a hostile world, but in the 
sense of instituting a world shaped by reason alone.182 
 
The problem for every member of the university community, including students, is in 
determining the limits or borders of his or her moral consciousness, and maintaining an authentic 
self-identity. Global learning begins in an experience had by a particular person. In turn, that 
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person works to make sense of that experience through self-reflection and making choices about 
ends given particular environmental constraints. This process of inner work can only be observed 
from the outside. And though we might try to influence it to go in a way we would prefer, our 
understanding of the learner’s experience and our own ability to influence him have practical as 
well as principled limits. If there is coercion in any way, the experience and learning cannot be 
rightfully claimed to be the person’s own, whether it is product of his own ignorance or his own 
achievement. Ultimately, the person must do the inner work of global learning on his own.  
A Space for Human Aims 
Individual learners are justified in pursuing a variety of aims that, when pursued in 
conjunction with each other, often result in tensions between aims that seem to conflict. These 
aims may be pursued for intellectual, moral, or prudential reasons, or a combination thereof. The 
important point is that, despite all of them being “justified” aims for learners to pursue, there still 
arise prima facie conflicts between them that require philosophical argument to resolve.  
When a question is asked, an interlocutor’s first instinct is to answer it according to his/her 
available experience, knowledge, and cultural understandings. The answer reflects the person 
who is answering. These different “answers” must be gathered together in order to find some 
common ground for a more coherent, publicly adjudicated approach to global learning. 
Ultimately, whether a policy or practice constitutes a legitimate “opening” for global learning 
should be a conversation that concerns all members of the community.  
The nature of institutional change, both within and outside of the institution, must be 
derived from either already existing relationships or informal associations among autonomous 
members of the teaching and learning community. The most significant relationship in higher 
education is that between the institution and the individual. Ordinarily, it is also the one that is 
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murkiest, the most hidden in plain view. Daily higher education practices seem to be habitually 
propelled by solitary work, classes, meetings, and various other activities – rather than by 
institutional aims and purposes. Our individual experiences and plans within higher education 
seem simply our own, ultimately dependent upon our own agency and desire to succeed, rather 
than on the institutional structure per se. As a result, we tend to introduce a strict division 
between first person, “subjective” experience within higher education and third person, 
“objective” aims, purposes, goals, agendas, and strategic plans. A consequence of this view is 
that individual and institution seem like different entities altogether, with different defining 
ontologies, purposes, and motivating grounds. In The Idea of the University, Jaspers observes 
that “The ultimate problem posed by the institutional structure of the university depends on 
persons, not institutions, which are no more than a physical prerequisite.”183 For higher education 
to succeed on a human level, its aims must recognize the relationship between individual and 
institution, and the relationships persons weave with each other, which inform the flourishing of 
every aspect of the university. 
Parallel Autonomies: Institutions and Individuals in the Modern World 
There is a certain exemplarity about how higher education undergoes its activities, both 
in separation and in connection with the influences of the world. A basic tension between 
conceptions of autonomy and external control underlies these debates about the proper purpose 
and role of the university, as it does in discussions about individual human agency. This tension 
plays out, for instance, in debates over what should constitute the curriculum, as in a liberal 
education for intellectual and moral preparation for modern life, or in a vocational/professional 
education for a more targeted preparation for a particular sector. 
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As one example, the desire to prepare young adults for a modern, more globally 
interactive world – while ultimately serving national interests – is a prime motivator for global 
higher education. Influential accounts of the aims of higher education have long hinged their 
conclusions upon the best way for higher education to prepare students for the modern world. Of 
course, there were and are vast differences in how this “preparation” should be achieved and the 
institution in embodying a preparatory role. Some scholars envision a robust role for higher 
education in making sense of the modern world. In 1930, Abraham Flexner expressed his faith in 
the university as the only institution capable of confronting the challenges of the present. His 
colorful (albeit dated) account is worth quoting in full: 
In this present-day world, compounded of tradition, good and bad, racial mixtures, 
nationalistic and internationalistic strivings, business interests, physical forces of 
incredible power for good and ill, emancipated workers and peasants, restless Orientals, 
noisy cities, conflicting philosophies – in this world rocking beneath and around us, 
where is theory to be worked out, where are social and economic problems to be 
analysed, where are theory and facts to be brought face to face, where is the truth, 
welcome or unwelcome, to be told, where are men to be trained to ascertain and to tell it, 
where, in whatever measure it is possible, is conscious, deliberate, and irresponsible 
thought to be given to the task of reshaping this world of ours to our own liking, unless, 
first and foremost, in the university? The wit of man has thus far contrived no other 
comparable agency.184 
 
Flexner believed that the university should not fear or avoid the modern world, but it should 
engage its problems and attempt to solve them. However, he was careful to note, a scholar 
should not be held responsible for the world’s conduct or use of his or her scholarly findings. 
Following Flexner, contemporary sociologists of education have noted how higher education 
systems function as “hubs,” or key sites where various sectors such as the labor market, economy 
and nation-state interact.185 
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Other scholars regard the modern world as anathema to the mission of the university. In 
Michael Oakeshott’s defense of liberal education, a university is a “place of learning” where 
worldly concerns are suspended and disinterested scholarly activity (or a “conversation” with 
tradition) is expected to take place.186 Unlike Flexner, University of Chicago president Robert 
Hutchins believed that if the university sought an affiliation with the modern world in any way, it 
would lose its sense of academic mission and become subservient to the world.187 Thus, for 
Hutchins and many modern-day liberal educators, a university must withdraw from the world 
and prepare students in a distinctive way. A metaphysical education, where students grasp the 
foundations of life through examination of literary and philosophical “exemplars,” a canon of 
“Great Books,” would equip students with the traits of mind to navigate any changing world they 
encounter.  
The idea of preparing students for the modern world is not something educators can 
altogether escape. I believe that there are two competing impulses in the idea of preparation, 
which directly relate to Buber’s issue of influence. The first impulse is to prepare students in an 
unbiased fashion with knowledge and skills that will enable them to make their own decisions 
about life. The second impulse is to prepare students in a particular way (not so much 
indoctrination as persuasion) to adopt certain attitudes regarding the world because we as 
educators believe they are the right or only attitudes to hold. Of course, even if we do conduct 
our activities as “neutral,” we inevitably convey certain biases through our very actions and the 
selection of what we consider important to teach.  
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Preparation may be carried out in a fashion that does not bias students toward one 
particular conclusion while allowing educators to remain true to their own deeply held beliefs. 
The key is that educators undergo the same learning their own students undergo. The idea that a 
teacher should not learn, not to mention question their own beliefs, violates the principle that the 
global educator conveys to his or her students: that global learning really is about learning to live 
as adults in a globalized world. The epistemic virtue of open-mindedness and self-questioning 
must be modeled. As adults, we are all strangers to the “prepared for” world and, in a sense, 
burdened with the same circumstances. 
Institutional and Faculty Autonomy 
In higher education today, autonomy is most often mentioned in discussions of 
institutional freedom and the “special” role of the university in liberal society. Rawls selected the 
university (along with the church and the family) as a prime example of an “association” in a just 
society.188 In his usage, the word association connotes a distinct community that crosses political 
boundaries: “members of a community are united in pursuing certain shared values and ends 
(other than economic) that lead them to support the association and in part them to it.”189 
Associations are constrained only indirectly by a society’s background institutions. For Rawls, 
what defines a university are “certain shared values and ends” that adhere to liberal principles.  
Theorists of higher education in the liberal tradition like Gutmann have generally 
followed Rawls in his emphasis on the university’s special role as an autonomous community 
that is bound by the principles of liberal democracy. In Democratic Education, Gutmann defines 
a university’s role in terms of “associational freedom” that is relative to democratic purposes, 
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including nondiscrimination.190 While Rawls recognizes the university’s role as a separate, self-
determining agent in liberal society, he neglects to explicitly discuss the role of autonomy in the 
function of its learning activities undergone, for instance, by its faculty and students.  
One major wedge issue seems to be how autonomy is construed under conditions of 
economic competition. Gutmann and Bok have pointed to a constitutive tension between the 
university’s mission of promoting academic freedom and acting in accordance with economic 
development.191 Both aspects of university life have been attributed, in different ways, to some 
conception of autonomous agency. Gutmann, for instance, distinguishes between the “relative 
autonomy” of free scholarly inquiry, which adheres to institutional standards of academic 
conduct deriving from a university’s democratic purposes, and a more generalized autonomy of a 
free agent or citizen.192 Bok, however, collapses this distinction and welcomes economic 
development as a necessary and legitimate aim of higher education while admitting that it exists 
in tension with the more traditional aims of liberal education. Bok lauds supposedly autonomous 
faculty members who pursue “many centers of initiative [that] hence encourage innovation and 
experimentation.”193 For Bok, the productive tension in modern research universities between the 
aims of liberal education and economic development is central to how the ideal of autonomy 
plays out for faculty members and administrators.  
Student Autonomy 
The question of whether institutional and faculty autonomy necessitates being committed 
to student autonomy is a controversial one and has evolved in recent American history. Basing 
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his views on Kant’s theory of autonomy and writing amid the antiwar movement, philosophical 
anarchist Robert Paul Wolff argued that the combined university faculty and students represents 
a fully autonomous community of learning that should collectively adjudicate curricular 
decisions as equals.194 Unlike Wolff, most liberals today urge a relatively paternalistic stance and 
caution universities against being “too responsive to student preferences.”195 Bok states the 
concern with individual autonomy in this way: “students may exaggerate the importance of 
acquiring the skills to get their first job or succumb to the desire to attend an institution with an 
active party life or a big-time athletic program while underestimating the long-term benefits that 
a good undergraduate education can provide.”196  
Bok’s argument for what I call a minimal view of student autonomy is the favored one 
among higher education theorists, even those who support an expanded autonomy for university 
faculty and staff. Student autonomy (unlike the “relative autonomy” of faculty members) appears 
to be equated with the notion of the “unencumbered” individual self,197 even by some of its 
supporters. Bok and others object to what O’Neill’s has called the “consumer view of individual 
autonomy”198 – a view of strong agency where free choice is an unmitigated good.  
However, as O’Neill has argued, this is not the only way to account for autonomy. 
According to O’Neill, valuing autonomy beyond just “mere, sheer independence” requires “an 
account of those deeper reasons [we have] to value both specific forms of dependence and 
specific forms of independence.”199 Determining which forms of dependence and independence 
specifically facilitate autonomy—in both its institutional/faculty and student senses – will help 
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policy makers create settings that cultivate both dispositions toward independent choice and 
moral responsibility.  
A more promising account of student autonomy is offered by Kyla Ebels-Duggan. 
Critical thinking is widely considered to be a necessary condition for being an autonomous 
learner, where autonomy is construed as primarily a matter of rational decision-making among 
options. Critical thinking has been described alternatively as a skill and an intellectual virtue that 
learners display in the evaluating of arguments put forward by alternating points of view. 
However, as Ebels-Duggan has pointed out, the “standard prescription” of autonomy tends to 
treat intellectual inquiry as primarily a matter of breaking down arguments and spotting their 
weaknesses rather than being positively associated with the virtues of charity and humility. 
Students trained in such a manner are “good at rejecting ideas but lack the ability to recognize 
those worth affirming and perhaps even loving.”200 In discussions of student learning, autonomy 
and agency are terms used to describe what students should possess in order to engage in 
learning productively, with an eye to how their learning will contribute to their growth and self-
understanding. These concepts, however, have complicated backstories that belie the simplistic 
equation of autonomy with critical thinking that educational writers tend to make.  
The parallel autonomies of college life are memorably portrayed in a sociological study 
by Howard S. Becker, Blanche Geer, and Everett C. Hughes.201 These authors raise the 
interesting suggestion that students and faculty displayed a divergent understanding about the 
relation of academic achievement and individual ability. While faculty they interviewed regarded 
student academic achievement as a direct outcome of individual ability and motivation either 
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innate or maximized through training, students thought that “the student controls his own 
academic fate by the amount of effort he puts forth … They thus attribute variations in student 
performance to an unwillingness to give sufficient time and effort to academic work or to a 
deliberate decision to put one’s major effort elsewhere.”202 The point is not whether such a view 
is objectively correct or not. The point is rather that what faculty perceive as instances of 
nonautonomous behavior may be understood, from the learner’s point of view, as part of a larger 
autonomous project that relates to his or her understanding of self. For instance, the basis for a 
critical awareness of how autonomy relates to community is perceived by students in other, not 
explicitly academic ways, such as through participation in thematically-based student 
organizations or attendance of interest-based programs that bring together diverse participants.  
Challenges to Autonomy as a Value for Global Learning 
While descriptions of various capacities related to autonomous agency are frequently 
alluded to in the theoretical literature and policy statements on global learning – such as in 
AACU’s Shared Futures initiative – the idea of autonomy is rarely treated to a systematic 
account, let alone mentioned. This is a perplexing issue that needs to be addressed. Recently, 
there have been notable challenges to autonomy from within the field of global higher education, 
particularly for its supposed “universalistic” connotations in a field based upon diverse 
perspectives.203  
According to Simon Marginson and Erlenawatir Sawir, who are noted authors on 
intercultural education, global learning (or in their words “intercultural” learning) is a process of 
self-formation that is “complex, reflective, open, historically grounded, and subject to relations 
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of power.”204 In grounding their notion of intercultural education, Marginson and Sawir replace 
autonomy with “agency,” defined as “the sum of a person’s capacity to act. Agency is the seat of 
self-will, the ‘centralizing’ part of the self through which we manage ourselves and our own 
continuing formation in education, work, and other zones of activity.”205  
Marginson and Sawir claim that agency adequately performed is superior to Kant’s 
conception of autonomy. Furthermore, they challenge Kant’s interpretation of cosmopolitanism 
as an organizing principle by claiming that Kantian “liberal universalism” is “ill equipped to 
accommodate a plurality of positions.”206 Citing Rizvi, Marginson and Sawir state that Kantian 
cosmopolitanism “neither acknowledges cultural diversity as a permanent feature of modern life 
nor seriously addresses the historically inherited inequalities of power relations.”207 They believe 
that only learner agency and a more modern updated understanding of cosmopolitanism (shorn 
of the supposed universalist connotations of Kantian autonomy) is able to accommodate the 
diverse backgrounds and shifting mobile identities of international students today. 
I would like to tackle the objection that Kantian universalism is against pluralistic 
perspectives in toto. Since Kant is regarded as an exemplar of classical Enlightenment liberalism, 
I will recast this objection as an attack on liberalism. Now there are certainly justified complaints 
that have been leveled against liberalism as an overly universalistic doctrine (including by most 
liberals). McLaughlin echoes the sentiments of many modern liberals who regard the importance 
of community membership and cultural recognition as challenges to a too-static liberalism:   
The inadequacies of western liberalism with respect to securing a basis for contra-
individualistic motivation and for communal needs and imperatives are, for example, 
widely felt. Openness to the genuine insights contained in local forms of thought requires 
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considerable resources of sensitivity and imagination which extends beyond the 
philosophical.208 
 
As McLaughlin’s points make clear, the resources of a liberal imagination may enable a deeper 
appreciation of local needs. Kant’s account of autonomy makes clear that enacting universal 
moral obligations relies on specific, diverse local circumstances to influence practical reasoning. 
As Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift have observed, “the centrality of individual autonomy to 
liberalism has important ramifications for the meaning of a defensible multi-culturalism.”209 
Furthermore, there are conceptions of liberal universalism that are specifically designed with the 
needs of diverse discourse communities in mind. Seyla Benhabib has argued that universals must 
be relied upon for justification when dealing with specifically intercultural issues: for instance, 
“intercultural justice between human groups should be defended in the name of justice and 
freedom and not of an elusive preservation of cultures.”210 Rather than being opposed to local 
understandings, universal values are deeply entwined with them. 
In my view, students must not be supported merely to develop their agency. Agency is 
too relative a concept – no position is taken in Marginson and Sawir’s account on what sorts of 
agency to accommodate. As my discussion of autonomy has shown, elaborating on the specific 
reasons and justifications for making choices is necessary to make the pursuit of those choices 
legitimate. The simple assertion that students should exhibit agency that is reflective and 
knowledgeable of relations of power does not explain the theoretical and practical necessity for 
moral obligations that learners regularly exhibit. A fully integrated conception of autonomy, 
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which incorporates both personal and moral components, is necessary for the very idea of 
agency to gain traction.  
Further Kantian Openings in Cosmopolitan Moral Education for Adults 
Kant’s idea of autonomy, and his ethical thought in general, draws inspiration from 
diverse empirical fields of inquiry, including anthropology, history, and education, which form 
what Louden refers to as the “impure” part of Kant’s ethics.211 To maximize the significance of 
autonomy in my account of global learning, it is important to consider the breadth of empirical 
“helps” in Kant’s account to better combat charges of universalism.  
Early in his philosophical career, when he was beginning to formulate his critical 
approach to philosophy, Kant made the following observation: “Everything passes by us in a 
river, and the changeable taste and the different forms of human beings make the entire game 
uncertain and deceptive. Where do I find fixed points of nature that the human being can never 
disarrange, and that can give him signs as to which bank he must head for[?]”212 Kant expresses 
a sense of exasperation in his search for “fixed points of nature” to enable human beings to grab 
onto (his metaphor of a riverbank suggesting a safe haven) and thus escape the bewildering array 
of human diversity and “changeable taste.” When Kant refers to “nature,” he means, following 
Rousseau’s understanding of the term, human nature and everything that connects to it.213 Note 
that Kant sees the river of human diversity as something that is self-made, by humans who 
“disarrange” through different opinions. This perpetual relativism relies upon humans 
discovering what is “fixed” within themselves, which will enable them to be consistent in their 
actions. 
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Kant later addresses this problem by developing the notion of “orientation,” which helps 
us discover our innate or immoveable rational center. In “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself 
in Thinking?” Kant describes the notion of orientation as a task of reason that involves using a 
given direction (the one in which we are going) to determine other directions and where they in 
turn lead.214 He compares this to “seeing” with the use of our reason and “feeling” through the 
influence of nature. Orienting oneself in thinking is a process that ends in a “product,” namely 
knowledge; but this is knowledge that is not objectively grounded, once and for all, but 
knowledge that is revealed through the path of our use of reason that Kant refers to as “the right 
of reason’s need” to direct itself into nature.215 Using our reason freely, thinking for oneself, is 
for Kant our supreme intellectual responsibility, which he connects to our education for 
enlightenment.  
Central to reasoning freely and thinking for oneself is the ability to constrain our action 
through moral maxims. The formulation of the Categorical Imperative, to “act in accordance 
with a maxim that can at the same time make itself a universal law,”216 regarded as Kant’s 
primary contribution to moral philosophy, is often interpreted as a standalone, intellectual 
formula. However, Kant states that “access” to the Categorical Imperative relies upon 
“intuition,” developed through diverse experience and education.217 Learning to live with the 
Categorical Imperative helps to define our moral autonomy and serves as the basis for living a 
moral life amidst ever-changing circumstances. Otfried Hoffe interprets the application of the 
Categorical Imperative to human diversity in these terms: 
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The claim of morality is directed toward a being which can overcome neither its sensible 
nature nor its social and historical heritage. Man always remains a creature of needs, 
history and society. Thus, for him, morality always has imperative significance. It is a 
categorical commandment, but no human being can always be sure of following it. 
Morality in the sense of autonomy means recognizing and even affirming one’s needs 
and social dependencies without admitting them as the social ultimate determining cause 
in life. Autonomy entails going beyond mere needs and customs and thus finding one’s 
real self, Kant provokingly claims, as a moral being consisting of pure practical reason.218 
 
There are, thus, two important components to our orientation within the world: moral autonomy 
and our empirical character, which Hoffe refers to with his “creature of needs, history and 
society” statement. Our ability to direct our lives in accordance with certain moral norms has 
“imperative significance” over our empirical character. But it is important to observe here that 
our having an empirical character, and being able to grasp its significance in forming how we see 
the world, is a necessary condition for being morally autonomous in the first place. That we are 
irrevocably “creatures of needs, history and society” is not a weakness or a fault, but simply 
where we start from. The important “human” achievement is how we can become aware of this 
fact and use it to inform the construction of our self-identities. We learn to apply moral 
principles to the diverse empirical circumstances of others as well as our own.  
Global learning, as a delicate balance between using our moral autonomy and developing 
a unique self-identity in diverse circumstances, is what constitutes our “orientation” to the world. 
The importance of a self-identity for global learning is close to what Kant means by “character.” 
Indeed, Kant takes the formation of character to be the central task in moral education, which 
begins in childhood but is primarily the work of adulthood. In the Critique of Practical Reason, 
Kant understands character as central to our dignity as rational and moral beings, what makes us 
independent thinkers and choosers. He suggests that the only way for character to be developed 
is through a “pure moral motive”: 
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the pure moral motive must be brought to bear on the soul, the motive which – not only 
because it is the only one that can ground a character (a consistent practical cast of mind 
in accordance with unchangeable maxims) but also because it teaches the human being to 
feel his own dignity – gives his mind power, unexpected even by himself, to tear himself 
away from all sensible attachments so far as they want to rule over him and to find a rich 
compensation for the sacrifice he makes in the independence of his rational nature and 
the greatness of soul to which he sees that he is called.219 
 
Thus, the task of education – both in its formative initial stages and in its “later” stages of 
refinement in adulthood – is to find “the method of founding and cultivating genuine moral 
dispositions.”220  
The grounding of character by teaching learners to act according to maxims is the main 
theme of Kant’s views of moral education at all ages. For Kant, the basic relationship in 
childhood character formation relies on “above all things obedience” from the child under the 
absolute will of an adult leader who is reasonable and good. This is not as autocratic as it sounds, 
however; there are certain limits to the moral influence one person can have on another. It is 
important that the child’s obedience is completely voluntary and not forced or coerced in any 
way. This is because character formation is essentially self-directed, when the child acts 
according to moral maxims that she has formed through her own reason and values accordingly. 
Kant distinguishes between the use of maxims and discipline, which only cultivates habits and 
not the reason directly. An adult leader cannot impart an understanding of morality directly, but 
only indirectly, with gentle guidance and support, with examples that the child works upon. Kant 
elucidates this issue further: 
Maxims must originate from the human being himself. One should try to convey concepts 
concerning good and evil to children already early on in moral culture. If one wants to 
ground morality, one must not punish. Morality is something so holy and sublime that 
one must not degrade it and place it on the same level with discipline. The first effort in 
moral education is the grounding of character. Character consists in the aptitude of acting 
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according to maxims. In the beginning these are school maxims and later maxims of 
humanity.221 
 
As Kant observes, prefiguring Dewey’s The Child and the Curriculum, “In children … one must 
form not the character of a citizen but rather that of a child.”222 Naturally, the method and 
general appearance of this moral education will differ depending on the age and developmental 
level of the learner. As we have seen, cultivating one’s inner pedagogue must start with learning 
how to think for oneself.  
This notion applies to both learners entering adulthood and to university educators. 
According to Kant, the proper role of a university education is “to cultivate the capacity of 
reason, and to get [students] into the habit of the method of ratiocinating, and to establish the 
appropriate maxims of reason.”223 While Kant clearly distinguishes the pedagogical roles of 
teachers and students, he sees their moral education as belonging on the same continuum. 
Educators are not moral “experts” for their students, but rather fellow moral inquirers. As with 
their students, educators need, first and foremost, to remember what makes them a learner and 
thinker, which requires them to recall and reflect upon their own experiences. University 
educators must take the same journey of self-reflection as their students.  
In this chapter, I articulated and defended my account of global learning, cosmopolitan 
moral education for adults. Through the process of re-learning, global learners develop 
autonomous self-identity and learn how to pursue a vocation in the educational sense. Moreover, 
re-learning affords attitudes toward moral discernment that serve global learners in making their 
own choices about whether to adopt a more comprehensive theory of cosmopolitanism in their 
own lives. The crucial point is that the learner has chosen that path.  
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As a propaedeutic to the next chapter, I return to Louden’s worry that no hard data has 
shown that global citizenship education is successfully able to alter undergraduate students’ 
previously formed moral dispositions, which I discussed in Chapter Two. As a reminder to the 
reader, I include the quote below: 
Many American colleges and universities at present strive to offer curricula aimed at 
promoting world citizenship and “cultivating humanity” in their students, but no hard 
data exist to support the claim that such curricula are successful in achieving their aim. 
Certainly there is no guarantee that students who receive an education intended to 
inculcate cosmopolitan dispositions will actually develop such dispositions and act 
consistently with them. Some people are resolutely selfish, and no amount of exposure to 
a world-citizen model of education is going to change them. Educators can only try to 
inculcate cosmopolitan dispositions, and then hope for the best—acting on the highly 
plausible assumption that the habits of thought, reflection, and emotional response human 
beings learn when young usually (but not necessarily always) influence their moral 
orientations as adults.224 
 
In the next chapter, I intend to show that Louden’s worry about not being able to morally 
influence intransigent undergraduates may be ameliorated by a more robust approach to moral 
and aesthetic example construction. In fact, what Louden draws our attention to is the higher 
burden placed on the quality of moral examples students are engaging with. This is a pedagogical 
and experiential problem, and thus, one with a solution. The account of the example forms the 
necessary “completion” of the account of cosmopolitan moral education for adults I provided in 
this chapter. 
Moreover, Louden unintentionally introduces a related concern: to what extent is it 
possible, or even rightful, to attempt to morally influence other adults? The limits of a teacher’s 
moral influence upon his students does not seem to be a concern for most faculty today. It is 
simply assumed that moral influence is a part of teaching because – as the reasoning goes – what 
we teach students is morally worthy and an approach to knowledge that we believe they should 
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possess. However, as I hope to show in the next chapter, we have good reasons to throw doubt 
upon our ability as educators and curriculum developers to morally influence – not to mention, 
engineer – the moral dispositions we wish to see in students. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
GLOBAL LEARNING AND THE EXAMPLE 
In moral education, examples serve a primary role in fostering moral awareness and 
decision-making. Kant’s account of the example in moral education is addressed primarily to 
children. However, for the adult, who is necessarily a fully rational being, examples are also 
needed because “such a being needs sensible or palpable as well as purely intellectual evidence 
of the possibility of being moral.”225 Moreover, as Paul Guyer observes, “[f]or humans, seeing is 
believing, or at least sensory evidence is deeply conducive to our convictions about how the 
world ought to be as well as to those about how it is.”226 In the account of adult moral education 
Kant offers, particularly in The Conflict of the Faculties and the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, he requires suitable examples that present the sublimity of our vocation and inspire us 
to live a moral life through exemplars that subtly influence us.227 Kant understood that adult 
moral education was central to higher education and that it is as an adult reflecting on examples 
with others that we become fully aware of ourselves as cosmopolitan citizens. Yet, this kind of 
global learning is a challenging task.  
In this study, I have argued that cosmopolitan moral education for adults requires a 
constant process of re-learning – unlearning certain things and learning others – because our 
knowledge of the world is inherently fragile and may be subject to regular disruptions. For young 
or emerging adults, The Problem of Adult Learning always imposes a yawning gap of moral 
experience that limits the potential for re-learning. The diagram below illustrates the dilemma: 
                                                
225 Paul Guyer, “Examples of Moral Possibility,” in Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary, edited 
by Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012): 125. 
226 Ibid. 
227 See Immanuel Kant, “The Conflict of the Faculties,” Religion and Rational Theology (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press), 1996; Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press), 2000. 
 99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Re-Learning curtailed in adulthood. 
Developing sensory awareness of a moral idea is a task for our aesthetic abilities, which 
enable us to perceive moral ideas in our conscious mind through reflective experience. 
Aesthetics, along with religion and politics, are for Kant primary avenues for adult moral 
education because they enable us to place our moral intuitions alongside real examples with 
which we are directly involved rather than fictitious examples that “can all too easily be used to 
recommend an unachievable holiness of will rather than really possible virtue, which would lead 
not merely to frustration but to actual neglect of our real moral duties.”228 Since adults have 
stronger powers of reflection than children, they need better images and better examples upon 
which to reflect on morality.  
Given the importance with which global learning is accorded by policymakers and 
practitioners, to what extent can we build our own policies and practices upon institutional 
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examples that tend to elide the learner’s experience? As Chapter Two warned against, without 
alternative influences on our experience and thinking, we tend to imitate others and rely upon 
commonly circulated examples. More must be done to analyze what constitutes a good example 
of, and for, global learning.  
An example for adult moral education should engage the adult learner directly as a co-
creator of meaning. By doing so, the “completion” of the example will rely upon the actual 
experience of the adult learner, thus continuing the cycle of re-learning. The diagram below 
shows the cycle of re-learning, which above was broken and challenged, restored by engaging 
with the example: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Re-Learning restored with the example. 
In this chapter, I articulate what kind of moral and aesthetic example is needed to engage 
in cosmopolitan moral education for adults. First, I consider the use of the example in moral 
theory and note a lack of focus on the how of example construction. Then, I explore some 
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avenues for connecting Kant’s examples for moral education to his aesthetic theory. After 
presenting my initial account of the example, I argue for non-narrativity as a guiding framework 
for example construction. Finally, I elucidate and analyze two possible examples for global 
learning.  
Defining the Example in Moral Theory 
In all discussions of the example in moral inquiry with which I am familiar, I have not 
seen a single definition of “example.”229 It is used interchangeably with other terms, such as 
“case” (predominant in social science) and “thought experiment” (predominant in philosophy).230 
Stating that one is using a case, a common reply is “a case of what?” Similarly, the example is 
often taken to be an illustration of a more primary concept or idea rather than something that is 
meaningful in and of itself. Thus, “a case of” one thing may become a case of something else 
entirely, but no less meaningful for the user of the case.  
Philosopher Michael Walzer begins a discussion of moral minimalism with what he calls 
a “conceptual occasion” – in this situation, a television news clip from 1989 of protestors in 
Prague carrying signs reading “Truth” and “Justice” – that for him exemplified the idea that 
moral terms can have “thin” meanings accessible to all.231 As Walzer describes it,  
When I saw the picture, I knew immediately what the signs meant—and so did everyone 
else who saw the same picture. Not only that: I also recognized and acknowledged the 
values that the marchers were defending—and so did (almost) everyone else. … How 
could I penetrate so quickly and join so unreservedly in the language game or power play 
of a distant demonstration? The marchers shared a culture with which I was largely 
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unfamiliar; they were responding to an experience I had never had. And yet, I could have 
walked comfortably in their midst. I could carry the same signs.232 
 
As Walzer goes on to note, in the eventuality that moral terms are publicly adjudicated in some 
public forum, different, “thicker” interpretations that depend on different historical and cultural 
viewpoints may be expected. Regardless, Walzer’s “conceptual occasion” brought to him with 
remarkable clarity the principle he was trying to convey. The importance of this example is 
reinforced by its placement at the beginning of the text, setting the groundwork for our 
understanding. However, what is interesting about Walzer’s account is that he says literally 
nothing about why a picture on a film clip is able to have such a powerful impact, affording him 
to “penetrate so quickly and join so unreservedly” in the experience of the protesters. As is clear 
from interpreting his term “conceptual occasion,” Walzer – like many other moral philosophers – 
is primarily concerned with the “concept” or “principle” underlying the example.  
O’Neill has helpfully provided a classification of some of the distinct types of examples 
that may be found in moral theory. She distinguishes the following types of example: (1) 
imagined or real, (2) schematic or substantive, and (3) hypothetical or ostensive.233 O’Neill 
argues that moral philosophy’s use of examples, specifically within Wittgensteinian and 
“problem-centered” ethics, evince a lack of practical relevance and substantive dealing with 
human situations. As a remedy, she suggests a Kantian approach to the example that stresses 
both principle and practical relevance in ethics. According to O’Neill, the Kantian approach 
allows the elucidation of minor premises of moral principles to serve the collective adjudication 
of the example among diverse constituents, while simultaneously allowing individuals to 
interpret the example through major premises from their own moral tradition.  
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For his work on ethics and moral education, Kant uses schematic examples that have a 
determinate principle behind them. These are used, on the one hand, to elucidate what is required 
of morality, and on the other, to demonstrate how the moral law may be taught through 
education. In moral education, the object is for the student to reflect on the principle behind the 
example and allow it to influence how he makes his own decisions within his life. Kant 
advocates for the use of historical examples in moral education, not as models for imitation 
(which he disparages), but as figures to emulate as one carries off one’s own performance of 
moral duties.234 These historical examples, however, still fall under the schematic type of 
example more generally. Cultivating a sense of the ambiguity of an example is avoided in the 
schematic example. Similarly, in Wittgenstein’s use of substantive examples, the object is to 
reduce interpretation to a single valid interpretation after reflection upon a detailed example (that 
is often derived from literary sources).235 Naturally, students must use their reflective judgment 
in diverse ways to accomplish the task of identifying the underlying principle that is exemplified.  
None of these types of examples offers to problematize how representation functions and 
at times obscures the “point” of the example. Representation is understood as a layer of intention 
placed there by a creator using the tools of his or her medium. “Actual” examples or cases, for 
instance, are still represented despite being non-fiction or true-to-life. This is obviously the case 
with histories and biographies of famous (or infamous) individuals. Kant himself occasionally 
portrays historical examples in a heroic manner.236 These examples are, in fact, representations 
of the events and people they portray, and as a result, are subject to the individual ways of seeing 
of their producers. This is not a surprising point; it is intended to be a trivial point. Yet it is easily 
forgotten or neglected. This problem even occurs in something as innocuous as, for instance, a 
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simple filmed depiction (using a still camera) of a religious rite or event like the creation and 
destruction of a sand mandala: what is represented is both the thing itself and the video of the 
thing.237 Thus, we cannot simply take the ethical lesson and overlook the epistemological lesson 
of representing such an event. We cannot escape the representation. The best that can be done is 
to minimize its deleterious effects in the conveying of complex moral ideas to adult learners.  
Kant on Moral and Aesthetic Examples 
In Kant’s moral theory, an example provides a form of empirical “encouragement” that 
acting morally (in accordance with maxims) is possible. Moral examples “put beyond doubt the 
practicability of what the law commands and make intuitive what the practical rule expresses 
more generally.”238 Thus, typical examples for Kant include historical and literary examples, as 
well as thought experiments, that feature actions completed under the guidance of the moral law. 
The purpose of a moral example is to illustrate a moral concept rather than educate persons to 
exercise their moral autonomy.  
For Kant, examples provide orientation for adults in a complex world within which they 
have acted according to maxims throughout a lifetime, acquiring a history. Thus, they afford a 
radical change of the “supreme inner ground of the adoption of all the human being’s maxims in 
accordance with the ethical law, so far as this new ground (the new heart) is itself now 
unchangeable.”239 Moreover,  
Assurance of this [the ethical law] cannot of course be attained by the human being 
naturally, neither via immediate consciousness nor via the evidence of the life he has 
hitherto led, for the depths of his own heart (the subjective first ground of his maxims) 
are to him inscrutable. Yet he must be able to hope that, by the exertion of his own 
power, he will attain to the road that leads in that direction, as indicated to him by a 
fundamentally improved disposition. For he ought to become a good human being yet 
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cannot be judged morally good except on the basis of what can be imputed to him as 
done by him.240 
 
Through daily actions, an adult human being works at being ethical, becoming a good person, 
and it is in this spirit that adults need examples for their continuing moral education. The basic 
dignity of each of our human struggles arises through the recognition of the inscrutability of the 
self. Examples provide hope that we can become better. Examples make projects on the horizon 
possible.  
Aesthetic examples can both help, and hinder, the expression of moral ideas. For Kant, 
freedom is a fundamental concept that connects his examples in morality and aesthetics. The 
individual completes the examples in each realm through his or her freedom. While in morality, 
freedom is thought though concepts, in aesthetics, freedom is felt through the senses. The bridge 
between the realms of morality and aesthetics is the freedom of the learner and the ability to 
produce reflective judgments. According to Louden, responses to aesthetic experience are only 
morally significant “in so far as [they are] strongly analogous to the state of mind produced by 
moral judgment … Aesthetic experience offers human beings tangible access to concepts of pure 
ethics, and we need this access if we are to make ethics comprehensible.”241 Thus, for aesthetic 
experience to meet this criteria for moral judgment and feeling, it must be afforded with the help 
of examples that are constructed in a particular way that minimizes the barriers to this 
experience, namely the layers of representation that are inherent in the use of various mediums. 
Morality cannot be perceived in the right frame of mind if examples are overly-representational. 
Kant shows how the beautiful is not a good paradigm for accessing the morally good through 
examples; rather the sublime, specifically in raw nature, is best able to present our moral selves 
to us through reflective judgment.  
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An important point to make is that, within the Kantian account, examples are not enough 
to produce morality. As Kant observes, 
An example is not for copying, though it is certainly for emulation. The ground of the 
action must be derived, not from the example, but from the rule; yet if others have shown 
that such an act is possible, we must emulate their example and also exert ourselves to 
perform such moral actions, and not let others surpass us in that respect. … A bad 
example, however, is a stumbling-block and gives occasion for two evils; for imitation 
as a pattern, and for excuse.242 
 
Examples serve as a propaedeutic, or preparation, for morality. They show the possibility of 
making moral decisions and more importantly having a moral image of the world.243 However, in 
attempting to discern the “point” of an example, we are often in danger of straying too far into 
sheer copying of an example, whether a good or bad one. Either way, our imitation deprives our 
act of moral worth:  
Neither an account found in literature (be it fictional or historically factual), nor the 
exemplary individual (who in the first instance is to the teacher herself), is to be emulated 
in what in particular they do. They are to serve as a source of instruction for how one 
goes about drawing upon one’s own inherent principle of guidance, one’s own inherent 
practical law for directing those choices and actions that lie within one’s own purview.244 
 
An Initial Account of the Example for Global Learning 
An adult learner may learn through interacting with persons, engaging with them on a 
personal or educational level, or they may learn through interaction with things, such as 
particular works of art or places. I consider all these kinds of interactions that precipitate global 
learning as “examples” of global learning. As global learning involves going out beyond the self 
with the intention of learning from what we encounter, we can think of it as dialogic in nature – 
and like all forms of dialogue, global learning involves interacting with another person, or 
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another person “through” an object or artifact of some sort. In both cases, global learning with 
people and global learning with things, the global learner is afforded the opportunity to have an 
experience and to critically reflect upon that experience and its relation to his or her developing 
understanding. As the global learner is “free” to have an experience and to not learn from it, 
there can be no “guarantee” that a learner will utilize an example for learning. Because global 
learning is a fundamentally interpersonal or relational endeavor, it depends on other persons and 
perspectives to flourish, which come embodied in examples. 
In the broadest sense, we can conceive every “materialization” of thought as an 
“example.” Examples are a model or imitation of something else, they are constructed or found, 
and they consist of a particular form and content. Another word for example could be “image” 
and all it connotes in “obscuring” the world. When we experience an example, we ask the 
question: what is this an example of? Let’s say, I am a professor and am planning to teach a class 
on the moral dimensions of human rights education and want to show an appropriate example for 
students to experience. I hope to embody in the form and content of the example an 
understanding of global humanness in education, a non-Eurocentric humanism and a 
thoroughgoing moral cosmopolitanism, which I take to be core understandings of human rights 
education. How can these admittedly grand notions be expressed in something so particular as an 
example? One might assume that expressing global humanness only requires the creation of 
content (such as a film about a global struggle for human rights) that directly expresses the good 
intentions behind it. However, this ignores the importance of the viewer’s experience and 
perception of the form and goes directly to the “content” that the instructor wants learned. An 
example of global learning must surely begin with the acknowledgement of the limits of what 
can be expressed of the inherent boundlessness of the sublime idea of global humanness in the 
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example. To cultivate an understanding of global humanness, or any other moral idea, an 
example must nurture open-mindedness and attention to particular details while avoiding any 
anaesthetization through the form of representation. Content must follow from the form, not the 
other way around.  
Determining how an example might be experienced is different than determining what 
content the example should convey that the learner should learn. Global learning, like all 
educational concepts, is a fundamentally contested notion; global learning cannot be defined and 
parceled out so clearly in the form of learning outcomes. An example of global learning 
appropriately conceived could not function, for example, as a philosophical thought experiment 
that affords only one correct conclusion or carries out one stated purpose, as in the testing of the 
logic of an argument. Thus, global learning may be seen as a process of inquiry and contestation 
rather than the delineation of a product. An example does not presume to “show” what exactly 
global learning is, but rather the form of a global experience that may, but does not necessarily, 
lead to global learning. The form of the example – rather than the ostensible content – is what is 
to be discerned.  
Examples are structured opportunities for learning. In other words, examples must be 
carefully planned or designed to create an appropriate opportunity for a global learner to freely 
choose to engage with them. From this, it follows that in designating what kind of “experience” 
we want global learners to have with an example, we must also consider in what spirit we want 
global learners to perceive the example. In all cases, a faulty perception of others (leading to an 
experience of others) will curtail a global learner’s ability to understand her global experience, 
and ultimately learn from it. Furthermore, considering the other’s standpoint, his or her ability to 
understand us will be curtailed, thus harming the foundation of genuine interpersonal 
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communication. As we recall, the mutual perception and experience of others characterizes what 
Buber refers to as the realm of the interhuman, in which he labels the one of chief conflicts in 
this realm as that between “being” and “seeming.”245  
As examples model particular understandings of morality, we need to think more about 
the adequacy and affordances of our commonly circulated examples of global experience. We 
are all faced with the problem of representing the world as we find it. For this task, we rely upon 
a range of influences – often derived from our sociocultural environments and what we have 
learned from family and peers – to construct images of the world. According to Kant, humans 
possess “a discursive, image-dependent understanding.”246 In a similar vein, Louden states, “in 
order to think abstractly, we need images.”247 It is important to note here that when Kant refers to 
an “image” of the world, he does not mean a traditional pictorial image but a “moral image,” 
where moral ideas are made aware to us through experience and concretized in the form of 
exemplars. As Louden goes on to note about Kant’s account of the moral image in Religion 
Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, referring specifically to Kant’s discussion of Jesus, “the 
adult human mind needs concrete images in order to fully understand moral goodness. Due to 
our nature and because of the way our minds function, we need personal exemplars and tangible 
examples, not just principles.”248 As adults, our understanding of the world has been structured 
by images throughout a lifetime. These images, like all images, provide us with our only access 
point to the world, but also limit our view of the world and constrain our understanding. Despite 
our free will, we are subject to the limitations of our experience.  
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A good example needs to challenge, rather than confirm, our self-understanding. 
Examples should put “what it is like” to be a global learner in critical perspective. Most 
importantly, they focus on what a global learner makes of themselves through their global 
experience, which if qualitatively rich, will often be fraught with unsettling challenges to our 
self-identities. Good examples are hard to find (and in some cases, create). My account of the 
example for global learning commits me to an approach toward example construction that may 
be called non-narrative, which I argue best affords the direct experience of re-learning as 
indicating opportunities for being pulled up short and reflecting upon the limits of our 
understanding. 
The Self Turning Upon Itself 
Let us consider the following. When I reflect “disinterestedly” on my life up to this point, 
I perceive a series of disparate events punctuated by blanks, elisions and jump cuts, rather than a 
continuous narrative; there is a yawning gap between then and now. These are times where the 
idea of an autonomous self-identity seems very far away and little understood. At moments like 
this, I seem to possess little in the way of self-knowledge and perhaps little of a self at all. What I 
can retain, however, is the basic emotional quality of these often-depersonalized events and their 
relation to certain authentic inner states I had at the time of experiencing. Though I have lost 
much of the linkages between my inner states and certain events, I can only assume that some 
capacity for free choice played a role.  
In turn, when I reflect “interestedly” (or instrumentally), I consciously assume the role of 
storyteller or constructor of a life history. My purpose now becomes communicating something 
understandable about my life to others and perhaps to myself, and for this I need control over the 
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elements of my life. Yet the niggling doubt that I might be just as in the dark about my actual 
motives, intentions, and desires remains. 
Imagine someone had asked me whether I considered myself a global learner. After 
deciding in the affirmative, my first instinct would be to reach for anything that could be read as 
a “global” influence: the foreign country in which I was born, my multiracial heritage and 
upbringing between two cultures, growing up in “married student housing” with diverse 
international friends, organizing a global film series, being an instructor of English Language 
Learners, writing a dissertation on global higher education, and so on. Every person could point 
to different examples from his or her life that have influenced how he or she conceives global 
learning, which they could easily list off when pressed. These examples provide some sort of 
moral guidance and confirmation that our lives have followed a kind of narrative trajectory – 
even when we are completely unaware of following such a path in the moment. They portray 
either facts about my life that I had no choice in or descriptors about my life that do not explain 
my autonomy as a global learner without further elaboration. In a sense, our narratives privilege 
certain kinds of experiences that seem most meaningful while neglecting to include others that 
appear mundane. 
It is claimed that narrativity describes the basic characteristic of our lives as humans; we 
tell stories and make meaning and understand ourselves through stories. The notion of narrativity 
is often presented as a means for the construction of a coherent self-identity that connects 
disparate elements of one’s timeline.249 Narratives are sometimes thought of as the “foundation” 
of a culture. What defines and connects members of a culture, and separates them from the 
understanding of other cultures, is that they share the same content knowledge and implicit 
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understandings in narratives. This view is prominent in the ethical theories of Bernard 
Williams250 and Charles Taylor251, and a whole slew of cultural relativists. Narratives can 
certainly be shared across cultures – but they can never really be understood like members of the 
culture who produced the narrative can understand them. That comes through implicit 
understandings that cannot be represented. Narratives represent stories in other cultures; what is 
important here is that members of that culture represent their own lives for others. Narrativists 
occasionally challenge narratives for expressing certain power dynamics and ideologies rather 
than the “truth” of a culture and replace these old narratives with updated, more accurate 
narratives. Yet the validity of narrative construction itself is not called into question. 
To live “non-narratively” is to resolutely resist what seems to be an artificial consistency.  
To doubt narrativity means to place into doubt the experience of our lives, that it does not add up 
to something more complete, summative, whole; that it may falsify. There is a lot at stake, 
perhaps, in challenging narrativity as a guiding framework for meaning making. Thinking non-
narratively is an exercise in moral imagination. Is there another way to think about rejecting (or 
at best, bracketing) narrativity that involves, first, removing authorial control over meaning, and 
second, reinstating the viewer as co-constructor of meaning via multiple interpretations? On the 
one hand, non-narrative forms should be created to afford various kinds of educational 
engagement. On the other hand, students must be taught how to think non-narratively to “notice” 
these forms and be able to engage with them meaningfully. By this I am not suggesting that 
students (or all people) think of their lives as non-narrative, but that they learn to think non-
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narratively. Besides, whether one is “narrative” or “non-narrative” is likely a hardwired thing, as 
Galen Strawson argues, and beyond the power of education to change.252  
In my view, the difference that makes a difference between a narrative example and a 
non-narrative example relates to the form structuring our experience; my quibble is with no 
particular “content” or “meaning” in each. The narrative form, by its nature, reflects back the 
creator as sole constructor of how our experience should go with the narrative. The endpoint is 
predetermined by the logic of the narrative story. The non-narrative form, on other hand, is 
constructed to take this power out of the hands of the creator and leave the point of the 
experience radically open. Let me be clear: I love certain narrative stories in literature and film 
as much as the next person. Narratives can powerfully touch our lives and influence our 
experience in meaningful ways. However, what serves to inspire in a narrative, in my view, is 
primarily the creator’s vision (author, filmmaker) of the world. In a non-narrative, I am inspired 
by the preternatural realization that me, as a reader/viewer, am accorded equal creative standing 
in how the work will go. I want to clarify that narrative/non-narrative does not represent a strict 
binary. Works contain “more” or “less” narrative and non-narrative formal elements that reflect 
the creator’s philosophical stance.253 
Now imagine an example of global learning that came not from within me, like the 
examples of being a global learner mentioned above, but from without – an example that took on 
a life and inexplicable character of its own, deliberately unsettling my easy global narrative. 
Most importantly, such an example would highlight what I, as a global learner, were able to 
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make of myself through a global experience, which if qualitatively rich, will often be fraught 
with challenges to my self-identity. As a practice that traverses multilayered attentional spaces of 
educational contexts, global learning must be able to present (and not merely re-present) the fact 
of multiple interpretations that undergird any given “story” or issue of education, and thus avoid 
oversimplification. This is a particularly perplexing problem when attempting to gain insight into 
the lived experience in a culture different from one’s own. Narratives inherently limit and 
constrain potential meaning; while some limitations are important in awakening imaginative 
engagement, others can harden interpretation into a set pattern. As a formal design concept, non-
narrativity in examples of global learning attempts to include the mundanities of global 
experience and accord them greater explanatory meaning. 
In contrasting non-narratives with narratives, I have been careful to note that these 
concepts represent a sliding scale, not binary opposites. With a non-narrative, there is no single 
master narrative that ultimately directs what learners’ interpretations should be. In a very real 
sense, the “creator” of the non-narrative is just as much “in the dark” about the “point” or 
“meaning” of the non-narrative. What could be called “traditional” narratives present a form of 
storytelling that guides the recipients to a pre-ordained conclusion even if that conclusion is 
subject to interpretation. There is no such conclusion for a non-narrative. In a narrative, 
reflection turns upon the story and its implications. In a non-narrative, reflection turns upon the 
self, and specifically, our own cognitive attempts at finding meaning in the non-narrative. In this 
way, I argue, non-narratives have an intimate connection to the Kantian idea of the sublime, 
which also indicates a profoundly unsettling (and awe-inspiring) turn toward the limits of our 
reasoning capabilities.  
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Non-narrativity, as I develop it here, is directly connected to my account of global 
learning as re-learning through the experience of being pulled up short. It is also connected via a 
certain type of attitude – a willingness to take chances, risk, and court failure. Moreover, non-
narrativity puts the recipient in touch with the radically other, a relation that challenges and 
ultimately serves to promote one’s autonomous self-identity. The reader/viewer/recipient’s 
framework emerges from the non-narrative in encountering the radically other, which ultimately 
leads to re-learning. A “non-narrative” approach to global learning is inherently disruptive, 
strange, and puzzling – exactly what is needed to prepare for the radically contingent world 
today. 
Example of Global Learning I: Vilem Flusser 
Persons may function as one kind of moral exemplar. A person’s life may be viewed 
from the perspective of non-narrativity. I would like to describe an example that, I suspect, offers 
an alternative way of viewing global learning: the life of the exiled Czech Jewish philosopher, 
Vilem Flusser. As a young man, Flusser experienced the loss of his family to the Holocaust and 
fled his native Prague. Despite never completing his university studies, Flusser emigrated to 
Brazil (and much later, France) and had a long, varied career as a university educator, 
industrialist, and author on communication, linguistic, and technological subjects. One of the 
most prevailing themes in his work is the long, painful process of finding meaning, creative 
potential, and communion in the life of exile.  
Though Flusser’s own experience certainly reflects the painful severing of exile, his 
intention was to develop a positive conception of exile as a shared way of life. The exiled person, 
by the very fact of her presence, invites the non-exiled inhabitant into a self-reflective process 
that exposes the comforting cultural and national “blankets” for what they are – products of a 
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habitual, arbitrary, self-enclosed “community.”254 This is an experience that some philosophers 
have referred to as achieving self-knowledge through “othering” oneself.255 Flusser regarded 
choosing the life of exile as assuming a particular epistemological and moral sensibility with a 
distinct set of analytical tools, cultivated through ever-changing environments, and used for 
severing unchosen, un-reflected upon ties while weaving new ones with others. Only the latter 
form of ties, Flusser maintained, reflect our moral autonomy and the responsibility for others that 
must guide any true “global” engagement.  
Flusser is the author of the dictum: “To be unsettled, one first has to be settled.”256 There 
is something remarkable about Flusser’s dictum when read from the perspective of education in 
the era of globalization. If global learning involves unsettlement, we can all do it. We are all 
settled in something, somewhere, with someone(s). And being unsettled is something we all, 
albeit reluctantly, experience as human beings because we all have something to lose, to gain. In 
this sense, the idea of global learning has great democratic potential. But, as Flusser himself 
knew all too well, it has a terrible potential because it is the enemy of settled thinking 
everywhere.  
Settled thinking occurs anywhere there is an unacknowledged interest in maintaining 
something as is – as one would have it – a commitment to a content, perspective, ideology, or 
example that resists change. We are taught to mold the content of our life into so many self-
evident examples of our fundamental achievement. Global learning, Flusser teaches us, invites us 
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to epistemologically and morally engage with unscripted examples and interactions that serve as 
entrées to our fundamental ignorance. 
Example of Global Learning II: Life, and Nothing More… 
Works of art may function as another kind of global exemplar. Below is a much more 
detailed example than the one preceding, befitting its aesthetic and philosophical importance 
within my account and in my own adult education. Consider the following vignette: 
A father and young son are on a road trip in a small yellow car, somewhere in the hills of 
Northern Iran, where a catastrophic earthquake has struck and killed at least 35,000 
people and left 500,000 homeless in rubble-strewn encampments. Through the car 
window, I see a barren natural landscape mingling with traffic-choked roads and 
devastating wreckage, laboriously drifting by at a pace I have never encountered before. 
I remember the twists and turns of the car, the son’s spirited questions about what they 
are seeing, and the father’s patient answers and furrowed glances out the windshield. 
Their travails seem comically small compared to the incomprehensibly vast and chaotic 
landscape. Time passes, and despite it all, occasional glimmers of hope and curiosity 
punctuate long stretches of boredom on this journey into a strange land. Somewhere in 
the middle, I drift off. My consciousness fails to keep up. I suddenly wake back up in the 
semi-darkened auditorium. All I see are the same images flickering by on the screen, 
unchanging. How much time has passed? What have I missed? After this barely 
perceptible lapse of consciousness, I reenter the world of the film. 
 
I suggest that the above vignette presents us with an example of global experience. On its face, it 
seems to offer a first-person account of watching a film about a father and son taking a road trip 
in Iran after an earthquake, which is interrupted by the narrator falling asleep. It takes place in a 
“semi-darkened” auditorium, which could be a cinema or theatrical space, but may also evoke a 
school classroom.  
If we dig deeper, certain features of this account are not so easily discerned. On the one 
hand, the use of the present tense creates the impression of being there in the moment to 
experience a singular event and trying to make sense of its open-endedness and ambiguity. On 
the other hand, the mention of precise figures (35,000 people, 500,000 homeless) suggests a 
certain objective distance and prior knowledge about the historical circumstances of this 
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earthquake. Furthermore, the liberal use of figurative language (“barren natural landscape,” 
“laboriously drifting,” “comically small … incomprehensibly vast and chaotic,” “glimmers of 
hope and curiosity … long stretches of boredom”) conveys a vividly emotional and evaluative 
perspective that interprets this experience in terms of human details and stark environmental 
contrasts.  
While these features could be the result of an immediate reaction to the film, the 
selective, composed, and reflexive nature of the account (of both the act of watching the film and 
the film itself) more likely points to a distinct memory that is grounded in a personal, 
emotionally meaningful context. In fact, it may resemble experiences we have all had in 
attempting to make sense of a film (or any other difficult or abstract artwork) that immersed us in 
its world yet required our total investment and patience.   
When I reflect upon watching Abbas Kiarostami’s Life, and Nothing More… as a 17-year 
old student in a course called World Cinema Survey, I am somewhat surprised by how much 
significance I have attached to this particular global experience. After all, it was not a film I 
recall enjoying or admiring, but rather enduring (I drifted off multiple times.). For a kid growing 
up in Texas rather than Tehran, the tragic backdrop and cultural strangeness of the events did not 
unsettle me as much as the radically quotidian way these events were represented and 
experienced by the characters.  
Kiarostami’s film, for me, was about a struggle to comprehend an image of the world that 
extended beyond the confines of the film screen, incomplete and unknowable through a single 
point of view. Life, and Nothing More… invited me to become aware of the limitedness of my 
own perspective, pay attention and undergo boredom, be moved by and recognize painful moral 
truths, and be startled by sudden, sublime ruptures in my co-creation of the film’s meaning. 
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These weighty acts felt woven into the fabric of my lived experience. Like any experience, I 
could have forgotten about it immediately after it occurred – but in this case, for some reason, I 
did not. In fact, the perpetually episodic nature of my recollection of Life, and Nothing More… 
has paradoxically increased in overall meaningfulness and coherence as a singular experience in 
a way that other films I can remember more clearly do not. 
Such an endeavor reminds advocates for global learning that truly educative global 
experience must first begin with an awareness of the complex forms that determine our view of 
the world – rather than increased student “knowledge” of global content. I have never (yet) 
visited Iran nor lived through a catastrophic earthquake. All I can claim is to have once taken an 
impromptu road trip with my father, and in further experiences, remember what it feels like to 
become disoriented in a strange, even incomprehensible, environment where I needed the help of 
others. In relying upon these latter, ostensibly commonplace, universal experiences of the viewer 
as a resource, Kiarostami seems guided by the principle belief in a global humanness irreducible 
to a single worldview (such as a Eurocentric humanism). Beyond what might be called 
Kiarostami’s philosophical anthropology, the underlying tension behind Life, and Nothing 
More… as a constructed example is his attempt to create the conditions for aesthetic participation 
while minimizing the representational tendencies of film form and the easy mastery of the 
filmmaker’s “toolkit,” including the camera, actors, mise en scene, lighting and sound. 
Constructed as a reenactment of an actual road trip taken by Kiarostami and his son in 
Northern Iran to locate a young boy who had acted in his previous film, Where is the Friend’s 
House?, shortly after the Manjil-Rudbar earthquake decimated the region where it took place, 
Life, and Nothing More… elides any facile division between fiction and documentary, 
indistinguishably mixing the two. Kiarostami consistently uses images that have the same 
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combination of elements: the passing, un-staged earthquake zone, the expressionless gazes of the 
father and son, the traffic jams, the son’s questions to his father, the interactions with pedestrians 
to ask for directions, and the windows and doors that protect from outside reality. What this does 
is ever-heighten the viewer’s attention, to create, paradoxically, a more powerful emotional 
intensity the sparser, disconnected, and still the images become. Throughout the journey, a 
constant motif is the good will, tenacity, and selflessness of the real earthquake survivors with 
whom the father and son interact. They give directions, offer their stories, and help push the 
father’s car out of a rut while he is fussing about his own single-minded journey. There are many 
ruptures throughout the film: numerous cosmic long shots of the tiny sedan dwarfed by the 
deeply creviced landscape, rare bursts of sunlight through a piece of wreckage by the side of the 
road, and a singular caress of Baroque music, harpsichord and consort (one of the few instances 
of non-diegetic music on the soundtrack), as we observe a hillside funeral procession. Very few 
of these elements are completely within the filmmaker’s “control.” 
Cumulatively, Life, and Nothing More… presents an interdependent world that is 
radically contingent, unaccountable, and held together by the frailest of human connections, all 
the while eluding the limited perspective and interpretive account any viewer attempts to affix to 
it. When speaking about a film, or any other example, it is natural to speak of intentionality: who 
is the “author”? In the experience of this film’s image of the world, whose “world” is it? Whose 
intention or vision is reflected in how the world is constituted and deployed? An obvious answer 
would be: it is the filmmaker’s world, the person who creates the condition for experience of the 
film. Yet this runs up against the stated intention of filmmakers like Kiarostami who opt for 
radical unknowability. Are we to take Kiarostami at face value and say that it is all down to the 
viewer’s world? Or would it be more accurate to say that it is the professor’s world who decides 
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to screen the film as an example with a prescribed pedagogical intent? Or might we be getting 
this wrong by speaking in terms of aesthetic agency – could it simply be the camera’s world of 
automaticity (its program) that we are determined by, the scrupulousness of its mechanism in 
recording the visual and aural fields? These are all relevant questions that may be modified and 
posed with any example.  
Kiarostami must foremost be considered – as Stanley Cavell once proposed of French 
director Eric Rohmer257 – a “thinker” in film. He described his approach in the following way: “I 
believe in a cinema which gives more possibilities and more time to its viewer … a half-
fabricated cinema, an unfinished cinema that is completed by the creative spirit of the viewer, [so 
that] all of a sudden, we have a hundred films.”258 In this statement, Kiarostami articulates an 
aesthetic principle that also makes a basic moral point. A film should be constructed to enable 
“the creative spirit of the viewer” to play a constitutive role in determining what the film should 
ultimately mean. By giving “more possibilities and more time to its viewer,” a film offers its 
viewer adequate opportunities to reflect upon his or her role as co-creator and make responsible 
aesthetic decisions. If we are to take Kiarostami at his word, the filmmaker and the viewer are 
engaged in an intersubjective process of imagination and interpretation.  
Reading Kiarostami through Kant: Sublime Presentation 
In this section, I propose a kind of “sublime-guided” aesthetics that draws upon the 
resources of Kant’s inspiring analysis of the sublime, but serves to advance my overall account 
of the example of global learning through a non-narrative lens. Kant’s aesthetic theory, 
particularly his notion of “sublime presentation,” helps us understand what makes Kiarostami’s 
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work so persuasive as an example of global learning. Kant represents the feeling of the sublime 
with natural scenes of exaggerated magnitude, devastation, and might. There is a static, 
idealized, ‘fabricated’ quality about these examples that belies his own humble labeling of the 
sublime as a “movement of the mind,”259 which arises through a disjunctive meeting of the 
limitlessness of imagination with the totalizing power of reason. For Kant, the static images of 
nature’s might are not important in themselves, but rather function as a cipher for expressing 
what is beyond the capacity for images to represent: namely, the utter formlessness of nature, 
and the inferred expression of our cognitive striving and emotional release. Kant struggles to 
capture the “formless object”260 in nature from whence he can derive the feeling of the sublime. 
A product of the disruptive contours of nature, the sublime is inherently temporal; it shifts and 
eludes our ability to master it. Sublime feeling (albeit contrapurposive to nature’s flow), has an 
inherently productive function in developing our awareness of the “vocation” [Bestimmung] of 
our mind in attempting a measure of control over raw nature. However, this awareness does not 
extend to art because artworks are “always restricted to the conditions of agreement with 
nature”261 and receive their ground through the serene, disinterested contemplation of beauty.  
A core problem of the sublime is that, by its very nature, it seems to exceed aesthetic 
presentation. A brief discussion of presentation is apt. Kant’s concept of presentation 
[Darstellung] in the Critique of the Power of Judgment describes human beings’ faculty of 
analogically relating the disinterested aesthetic judgments of nature to the moral ideas of the 
cognitive realm. Ideas are presented to our minds through the viewing of nature, thereby entering 
conscious awareness for the first time. Munzel discusses the importance of presentation for 
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moral autonomy. She provides an analogy to musical performance to illustrate that presentation 
does not involve the perfect mastery of material, but rather a  
rendering of one’s own performance—as masterfully as one can. The difference is 
qualitative; it is a question of bringing forth a live exhibition [Darstellung] from the same 
sources in one’s own being and nature that are also the wellspring in the nature of the 
master or exemplary instance. Every such performance is original, but not individualistic 
in the pejorative sense of that term. Each is an original work of art, a concrete particular 
manifestation of the universal expressed by the idea of reason.262 
 
For Kant, the proper relation between our moral autonomy and examples, whether from nature or 
humanity, should be one of presentation. Presentation, unlike representation, does not rely upon 
imitation: “…the proper expression for any influence that the products of an exemplary author 
may have on others is to follow by reference to a precedent, not imitation; and that means no 
more than to draw upon the same sources from which one’s predecessor himself drew and to 
learn from him only the way in which one goes about doing so…”263 For the presentation of 
beauty, free and incidental nature takes on a purposive structure that creates an idea of the whole 
as a bounded object and “artwork.” According to Alison Ross, Kantian presentation undermines 
the claims of artistic representation, which is seen as producing “secondary copies [that] do not 
respond to the Idea’s call.”264  
 Contrary to the presentation of beauty, in the presentation of the sublime, a “feeling of 
pain…follows from the subject’s encounter with a surplus of parts (the formless or deformed in 
nature) [that] comes to depend on the forming capacity of the subject’s faculty of reason in order 
to be unified into a whole as an idea (not a presentation by images).”265 Thus, Kant has called the 
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sublime “negative pleasure”266 and the presentation of the sublime a “negative presentation.”267 
Similarly, Munzel accords importance to the sublime in structuring a work that relates humans to 
their surrounding world: “A work, a structure forged out of the relations between reason and 
human powers of agency and these, in turn, in relation to nature, community, and the 
transcendent, it exhibits the form of purposiveness of the human vocation.”268 As Kant shows, 
the very ‘boundlessness’ of the sublime, which results from the “absolutely great” quantity of 
nature “beyond all comparison,”269 evokes an imaginative desire to comprehend the passing flow 
of circumstance before it can be formed into objects and works. Formless objects in nature can 
include a seemingly limitless terrain or The Milky Way, as well as the unaccountable depths (or 
heights) of a virtue, human gesture, or emotion. All are aesthetically judged in a single intuition 
and become presentations of moral ideas that we strive for in ourselves. Whether the sublime 
can, in fact, be presented in artistic form – if conceived as a ‘formless object’ without the 
finalizing characteristics of a ‘work’ – is the philosophical drama Kiarostami’s film plays out.  
When Kant writes that there is “so little [in the sublime] that leads to particular objective 
principles and forms of nature corresponding to these,”270 he is considering the incompatibility of 
static, painterly forms to the aesthetic presentation of the sublime’s ideas. Kant is not suggesting 
that paintings are incapable of producing sublime feeling – only that the sublime in no way 
inheres in the sensibility of the art object itself and, as the sublime is supersensible, necessarily 
eludes an artist’s control. Thus, one can imagine static representational images where “gaps” or 
“ruptures” in the fabric of the work are imposed to purposefully exceed or transgress creator 
control over form and meaning. In Kant’s use of “so little,” he leaves it an open possibility for 
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the sublime to find another artistic medium, such as film, better suited to its presentation. In the 
non-representational work of certain avant-garde filmmakers – such as Michael Snow’s ultra-
slow panning across a room in Wavelength and James Benning’s stock still, subtly shifting 
footage of skies in Ten Skies – consciousness of the mind’s cognizing and in-forming capacity is 
foregrounded and serves as a motivating guide to representing the beautiful. These conceptions 
of a “sublime-guided” aesthetics as mathematical apprehension of space, cut off from character 
and narrative considerations, provide an interesting counterpoint to the work of Kiarostami. 
We see that within the philosophical literature on examples, startlingly little attention is 
paid to images (still or moving) as examples compared with sources from history, literature, 
nature and outlandish thought experiments. Much of the arguments for and against examples, 
both in contemporary moral philosophy and in Kant’s day, have tended to assume examples from 
one of these sources. When photographs or films are discussed, the focus of attention tends to be 
upon the content, story, narrative, characters, themes, and so on, all of them originally literary 
devices and all of them revolving around the matter of the example as opposed to its form.  
The Impossibility of Example Construction 
The account of the aesthetic example I present here utilizes the framework provided by 
Kant while offering a strong commitment to a particular form the example for global learning 
should take, namely that it should embody the first-person perspective in its expression, depict a 
real event in accurate spatial and temporal dimensions, constitute a “non-narrative” narrative that 
is completed by the receiver (unlike a traditional “set” narrative), and contain multiple levels of 
representation that serve reflection upon the example and the moral ideas that motivate it. What 
other conceptions of the example lack is any substantive account of what an example should 
contain to achieve its desired effect and how that effect necessitates a certain approach to formal 
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construction of the example. Kant’s use of aesthetic examples is almost entirely considered from 
the point of view of the receiver rather than the creator. As a result, there is no commitment to 
the what and how of an example’s construction within the Kantian framework other than that it 
should be guided by principle and offer moral guidance without romantic exaggeration.  
The account of the aesthetic example I provide is premised on the idea that image 
creation is a hazardous endeavor. An aesthetic example should minimize the deleterious effects 
of representational thinking. Flusser rehearses three main arguments against image creation that 
have their roots in philosophical and theological tradition, particularly in Plato:  
First, the perspective from which the images are created is ontologically and 
epistemologically suspicious: it casts doubt on whether what you see is, in fact, an object. 
Second, the image codes are connotative out of necessity: they allow for contradictory 
interpretations, and therefore, one cannot put much faith in images as models of behavior. 
Third, images are mediations between the subject and the objective world. As such, they 
are subject to an internal dialectic: they present themselves before the objects that they 
should be representing.271 
 
As a philosopher of exile, Flusser comes to a similar conclusion as Kant about the need for an 
image of the world: “we cannot orient ourselves in the world without first creating an image of it. 
(Imagination is imperative for comprehending and dealing with the world.)”272 Flusser’s critique 
of images rests upon Kant’s aesthetics and particularly his argument for the non-equivalence of 
aesthetics with art. For Kant, freedom is a fundamental concept that connects his examples in 
morality and aesthetics. The bridge between the realms of morality and aesthetics is the freedom 
of the learner and the ability to produce reflective judgments. According to Louden, responses to 
aesthetic experience are only morally significant “in so far as [they are] strongly analogous to the 
state of mind produced by moral judgment … Aesthetic experience offers human beings tangible 
                                                
271 Vilem Flusser, “A New Imagination” in Writings, edited by Andreas Strohl (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002): 111. Cf. Dieter Henrich, “The Moral Image of the World,” in Aesthetic Judgment and the 
Moral Image of the World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), 1992. 
272 Flusser, “A New Imagination,” 111. 
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access to concepts of pure ethics, and we need this access if we are to make ethics 
comprehensible.”273 Furthermore, Guyer points out that, for Kant, the only way that the duties of 
virtue may be taught is through the example.274 Virtues are not equated with certain kinds of 
supposedly right moral actions. Since they are intended to influence the demonstration of certain 
kinds of actions and ways of thinking influenced by them, the cultivation of virtues cannot be 
quantitatively handled like the teaching of factual knowledge. Examples offer opportunities for 
the deep cultivation of virtues. Following Guyer’s construal of the Kantian example for moral 
possibility, my account regards the example of global learning as a species of moral hope, 
possibility, and a project-oriented future for global learners in an interdependent world.275 
Using fiction to illuminate moral theory is another question that seems uneasily related to 
Kant’s principles of reflective judgment, as O’Neill observed.276 How do you carefully weed out 
fact from fiction? Since moral theory is categorical in Kant and does not brook any dirtying of 
the moral law, how do you know if the fictional expression is pure enough? Kant himself 
acknowledges that this task of discrimination needs to be done. The potential of using false, 
dated, ideologically biased reports as the basis for moral thinking is highly problematic, and 
sometimes Kant, a product of the 18th century, is not a useful exemplar in these respects. 
While developing a method for critically examining fictional examples is beyond the 
scope of this study, I can posit one possible approach. An open-ended example of the sort I have 
argued for requires the learner’s ability to assume what I call an ironic stance in responding to 
the example. Irony, in the carefully delimited fashion I suggest here, is an essential capacity for a 
                                                
273 Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics, 116. 
274 Paul Guyer, “Examples of Moral Possibility,” in Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2012): 124-138. 
275 Ibid., 124-138. 
276 Onora O’Neill, “The Power of the Example,” in Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical 
Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 1989. 
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global learner to track back and forth between a state of self-reflection and one’s daily life and 
commitments, allowing each side to inform the unique mental activity of the other in assessing 
various examples.  
Regarding the aesthetic example, the persistent question of “what is the point?” when 
experiencing the example – though a natural question – distracts from the possibility of an 
autonomous, self-reflective relation with an example. For the example, the maxim should be “fill 
in the blanks.” Following Kant, I hold that reflective judgment creates different valid 
interpretations of the example and its application to the development of the global learner. In the 
account of example-making presented here, the problem is to create examples while “resisting” 
representation. Returning to Louden’s worry for teaching world citizenship education as 
providing no ethical guarantees, the account of the global learning example presented here 
addresses the challenge of Louden’s worry by proposing a non-narrative way of designing 
alternative forms of engagement.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
“I BELONG TO THE SCHOOL” 
  
A POETIC EXAMPLE OF THE GLOBAL TEACHER 
  
This chapter is a sustained, non-narrative example of global learning. In Chapter Four, I 
constructed a non-narrative account of the aesthetic example, which I argued best afforded global 
learners the experience of re-learning. While my two examples of global learning in the previous 
chapter were of a person and a film, non-narrative examples may be constructed in any medium, 
and I suggest here that poetry is one such option. As in a film’s moving images, poetic lines and 
stanzas may feature an intuitive, associative series of linkages, potentially unbound from the 
controlling tendencies of narrativity. Moreover, poetry (and one thinks especially of modernist 
poetry by poets like T.S. Eliot, Jules Laforgue, Eugenio Montale, and St. John Perse) has the 
potential to contain many voices within its verses, representing a diversity of contradictory and 
occasionally disquieting perspectives without any attempt at reconciliation – evincing an 
appreciation of the sublime in attempts at making sense of them. Because of these virtues, poetry 
may provide resources for providing additional forms of non-narrative engagement with global 
learning.  
As a reminder, in my account of global learning, the process is iterative. Global learners 
must constantly reconstruct their understanding of themselves in the world through re-learning. 
The formative experiences that serve as global examples punctuate the re-learning process and 
serve as a catalyst to ongoing adult learning. Though presented as a series of stages, it is 
important to note that my account of cosmopolitan moral education for adults is not a stage 
theory. These are rough markers that exhibit a continuously evolving reflective process. The 
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diagram of my account of cosmopolitan moral education for adults is presented below (and is 
also found in Chapter Four). I provide it again here for the reference of the reader. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Re-Learning restored with the example. 
 
Research Presentation 
As I elaborated in Chapter One, this study was conducted using moral inquiry as a 
philosophical and empirical approach. Following Moody-Adams’ account, I conducted a moral 
inquiry that attempted to develop a deeper understanding of diverse global learners in the diverse 
communities in which they participate, deriving from their actual experiences and reflections. It 
is my hope that this moral inquiry will help facilitate the self-reflective processes of both the 
global learners addressed within the inquiry as well as promote the learning of future moral 
inquirers who share similar experiences. 
The empirical portion of this study was explicitly conducted in order to improve my 
philosophical theory. Utilizing the method of public reflective equilibrium, I conducted research 
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interviews with sixteen students and one faculty member of a social studies methods course 
required for elementary teacher certification, associated with a themed pilot on global 
perspectives. In these interviews, I allowed participants to elaborate upon their understanding of 
concepts and issues related to becoming a teacher and developing a global perspective, 
encouraging them to explain their motivations for choosing the teaching vocation.  
While I observed and interviewed participants, I have chosen to only present the 
interview data as a means for understanding my theory, as opposed to a full, more traditional 
presentation of the research. The reflections presented in this chapter derive from one-time 
interviews conducted at the midpoint of the fall 2014 semester. Although I observed all class 
meetings of the social studies methods course during the fall semester, I use only one brief 
vignette derived from observational data to begin the example presentation. All names and 
potentially identifying information are pseudonyms.  
I have chosen to present the interview data through the construction of poems as aesthetic 
objects. Each stanza of a poem represents a different voice of a core participant going through 
the process of re-learning. The titles of the poems, in italics, seek to capture the reflective stage 
through which the participants are undergoing, as shown on the diagram in Figure 3. I 
constructed the poems by thematically coding the direct quotes of participants in accordance 
with the rough stages of my model of re-learning. Then, I arranged selected quotes that presented 
a diverse array of experiences under each thematic title.  
This example is broken into three sections: an introduction, the voices of the students, 
and the voice of the professor. The example begins with an introduction to the Global 
Perspectives Collaborative Pilot and the inquiry-based learning process espoused by Maxine. 
The first part of the example presents how the young adults in the class are beginning along this 
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process of reflection and are, at times, struggling to do so because of a lack of examples to help 
surmount their relative inexperience and further their re-learning process. The second part of the 
example presents how the professor’s reflective process shows a more advanced process of re-
learning due to her experience. She is able to encounter risks and setbacks without losing sight of 
her ultimate goal of inquiry and global learning.  
This example is purposefully presented without researcher contextualization. The 
researcher’s voice does not interrupt the poems because I am expecting the reader to co-construct 
meaning from the participants’ words and experiences – in essence, filling in the blanks. As in 
watching a Kiarostami film, I expect the reader to put their interpretations alongside the text in a 
constant process of meaning making.277 The poems are all direct quotations of the participants 
and are in no way spliced together or embellished to “lead” to particular conclusions. However, I 
admit that the task of data presentation is in itself a form of researcher interpretation. Thus, this 
chapter is not entirely devoid of my contextualization and interpretation. In fact, the act of titling 
the poems at all in order to reflect my account of global learning presupposes interpretations. 
Overall, as a researcher, I wish to present a true and accurate portrait of these 
participants’ voices and arguments for the teaching vocation, and hopefully, instigate a dialogue 
in the process. Although I ask the reader to experience this example and create their own 
meaning, I also provide my own interpretations following the example. I do so by including a 
discussion section that draws together the major themes raised by the example and prepares the 
reader for the final concluding chapter, which brings us from the example to the institution of 
global learning.  
 
                                                
277 For a comparable method of interpreting qualitative research, see Judith Davidson Wasser and Liora Bresler, 
“Working in the Interpretive Zone: Conceptualizing Collaboration in Qualitative Research Teams,” Educational 
Researcher 25:5 (1996): 5-15. 
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The Example: The Beginning of the End 
The Global Perspectives Collaborative Pilot ran from September 2014 through May 2015 
as a pilot in the University of Illinois College of Education. This pilot was implemented in all 
five courses in the elementary education curriculum that Cohort 4 students were enrolled in 
during fall 2014. The global perspectives pilot was the first theme-based cohort (at least in recent 
years). In the words of an early participant, 
Maxine came into the class,  
offering the global perspectives cohort.  
She said we have this new cohort,  
it’s called global perspectives,  
and the theme is about global education.  
That’s all she really said.  
And we all were like, huh, what’s a cohort?  
We didn’t even know what a cohort was.  
And she just sent an email saying if you’re  
interested in being a part of learning about diversity, 
how we’re all interconnected, and I was like,  
that’s interesting,  
especially with my own background. 
 
All faculty members teaching in this cohort were expected to augment or modify their 
curriculum to satisfy the global theme. In articulating the purpose of the cohort, Maxine, the 
director of the pilot, observed 
I think everybody feels compelled to include “global” 
in their mission, in their purposes. 
I think it’s often much more rhetorical than it is put in practice. 
I think there’s some institutional support, but it’s not great. 
Because of how our education system has been non-global, 
very Eurocentric and very focused on ourselves in general, 
I think people are not prepared to teach about “global.” 
 
This quote illustrates some of the institutional challenges this cohort was attempting to address as 
well as some of the issues faced by teacher educators wanting to globalize the curriculum.  
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In addition to being the director of the pilot, Maxine was the faculty member who taught 
the social studies methods course. While the students experienced a “globalized” curriculum in 
all of their classes, this research focuses exclusively on the social studies methods course. 
Maxine had sought to create an inquiry-based world of teaching for her students during the pilot, 
something she hoped her students would implement within their own classrooms. As she noted, 
These are no “kid left behind” students.   
They’ve gone through their entire schooling  
under No Child Left Behind.   
So, they are used to working toward tests,  
working for rewards. 
Inquiry learning is not something  
that comes very natural to them.   
So, part of the reason of having them  
participate in an inquiry process, 
not as children, is so they can know for themselves 
what learning like that is because they  
may not have ever done that before, or very little.   
So, it’s a deliberate immersion project to put them  
in the kinds of situations of themselves learning,  
so that they’ll know what that feels like,  
what the value of it is.   
 
For Maxine, the idea of inquiry was a deeply cognitive process, intimately connected to how she 
regarded developing a global perspective. Because the inquiry process was discovery-based and 
emergent, the students were not always aware of what they were meant to focus on and what was 
expected of them. The following vignette takes us into the world of Maxine and her students – 
followed by their voices in poetic form.  
The students had come a long way in a short span of time, encountering experiences that 
left them confused, frustrated, and exhilarated. By the final day of social studies methods, the 
preservice elementary education students had entered full takeover mode in their placements. I 
don’t have many notes from that uneventful final class. The classroom was quiet. Maxine was 
doing most of the talking, tying up loose ends and explaining to students a reader’s theater 
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project they would complete during class. The preservice teachers were staring off in different 
directions during Maxine’s explanation of the reader’s theater project, perhaps pensively, 
thinking about what they had left undone for the semester. The purpose of reader’s theater is to 
help students struggling with reading to gain fluency by playing parts. According to Maxine, a 
teacher facilitates this activity by adding affect and emotion through unique visuals, props, 
music, and other storytelling devices. The teacher creates a world for her students to inhabit.  
In the spirit of reader’s theater, I present direct quotes from the students arranged in 
poetic stanzas and titled with the stages of my account of global learning. As with reader’s 
theater, the different voices take turns sharing their experiences. Like reader’s theater, I create 
the world for the reader to inhabit. However, unlike reader’s theater, these experiences do not 
cohere into a single, master narrative, but rather a mosaic of voices sharing interwoven journeys 
of re-learning.  
Part One: The Students 
 
School and Constructing Identity 
 
I grew up in Pesotum, Illinois.  
It’s a town of 600 people.  
It had an elementary school. 
It was old at the time; 
it’s been torn down since.  
But it was all for the kids  
that came from that town, I guess, 
and the surrounding areas. 
It was very small.  
Went through 6th grade there.  
7th and 8th grade was in Tolono,  
just south of here, at Unity.  
And the high schools, same,  
small town, not much diversity at all. 
Lot of farm boys.  
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The school I went to was a local [city] school  
Only three blocks from where I lived. 
So, we could walk to school or walk with  
our friends to school.  
The school I went to was majority  
Asian Americans, and the minority  
would have been Hispanic students, white students.  
It was very lacking in terms of diversity. 
 
I lived in mostly an all-white community.  
A wealthier neighborhood, some would say. 
Some people worked in Chicago, it was like  
30 minutes away.  
The schools were like normal class size,  
20 students, not very big.  
We had 5 elementary schools that fed into  
2 middle schools that went to 1 high school.  
And most of the kids went to that high school,  
the majority went all the way through together.  
Kind of all the same type of kids.  
My graduating class was about 650 to 700.  
It was like 680 something.  
And there were like 50 kids who came to U of I. 
Most of them went to college; it was kind of the norm.  
You went to college after high school.  
ACT prep and all that stuff, it was kind of normal. Yeah. 
 
I grew up in a low income,  
lower middle class, mixed neighborhood.  
And it was primarily African American  
even in the school I went to.  
Not only were we the only Serbian family,  
I didn’t have anybody else who shared my language 
or nobody knew the holidays I was celebrating. 
I was also the only white child in most of my classes. 
 
I noticed I was different.  
Especially, a lot of kids  
weren’t able to speak Spanish. 
So, I would be like a translator  
for my school sometimes. 
I was able to talk to basically everyone,  
but I did concentrate on the minority base. 
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I think I’ve always kind of considered myself  
a minority even though I might not be one,  
you know, physically, looking like a minority. 
 
So, they asked me a lot of questions  
and I kind of spoke for my entire country, my race. 
At first, I was kind of afraid because  
I might say something not true about my culture,  
so I was like, “It’s just my opinion, so don’t take it  
as the whole country’s opinion, the whole race.” 
I kind of always had that introduction  
before I said something.  
But later on, I just said whatever. 
 
In high school, I didn’t have many friends  
because it was mostly white people, so 
most of my friends were Asian, and there’s  
not that many Asian people. 
I also became more aware of my identity,  
so I joined Korean club.  
Yeah, I became, like, Korean club president.   
For me, it was hard because I would try to get  
people to come to Korean club, and I had some  
white friends and they were like, “Oh, I don’t feel  
comfortable because I’m not Asian.”  
And I’d be like, “How do you think I feel  
walking down the hallways in New Trier!” 
 
We do so much self-reflection in the class  
and maybe a lot of people need that,  
but I think, for me, I know… I know my story.  
And I definitely am aware of the stereotypes  
that come along with looking and acting,  
who I am, being white, being female,  
being from the northern suburbs of Chicago.  
And I’ve tried really hard to personally work through  
those stereotypes and see how those perspectives  
have manipulated my way of thinking. 
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The Roots of a Vocation 
 
In elementary school, I feel like teachers  
not only taught you what you needed to learn,  
but they were people I respected and people  
I looked up to. They would be very interested  
in us as people. We were like, we want to do this,  
and they were like, yeah, we believe in you.  
I think it’s the relationship of trust,  
the fact that my teachers cared about us outside of school,  
at school, they reached out to parents …  
I really think it’s what they did that made me feel  
like I belong to the school.  
That this is my home.  
 
My schooling atmosphere never really made  
me feel safe to go to school. 
Like, I enjoyed school, but it wasn’t  
a place that I knew that something bad wouldn’t happen. 
I think that kind of translated into the fact that  
I like protecting people, but that sounds weird.  
I think that school is such a huge integrated  
part of a child’s world, that it’s the best place  
to help them, the best chance to have a life. 
 
I’ve always wanted to be a teacher.  
I can’t even remember when it clicked in my brain  
that I wanted to be a teacher to be honest.  
Because I have known for so long. 
I literally played school instead of doing the normal  
things. And I was in preschool. I didn’t know  
anything about school. So, I don’t know where I  
got that from, but for some reason, I’ve always  
had that feeling that I wanted to be a teacher. 
 
I want to say my junior year of high school,  
I had a little hesitation [about becoming a teacher] 
because my mom’s a teacher, my aunt’s a teacher,  
my grandpa’s a teacher,  
so I have a lot of teachers in the family and I was like,  
what else could I do that wouldn’t be the same path  
as what I saw many other people doing,  
but I just think personally it’s just something  
I’m so passionate about and I have skills that would  
lend themselves to being a very good teacher.  
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Growing up, I realize that I did like  
to work with kids more than adults. 
Because kids are funny, 
they keep you on your toes,  
they have a lot to learn. 
I like dealing with children because  
you can teach them different things  
that they may not have heard of. 
You can impact their lives more  
then I think you can impact an adult’s life. 
 
I was more on the quiet side. 
Once people get to know me, obviously,  
I talk more, but I was quiet in class.  
When I was a little girl,  
I had hearing issues and they  
were debating putting tubes in  
or not, so it slowed my learning.  
I didn’t speak when I was supposed to.  
My mom noticed that my speech was delayed,  
so I had a lot of tutors when I was little. … 
I had a teacher in third grade  
who was my favorite teacher.  
She was like a big support,  
like she really pushed me.  
Maybe because I was struggling  
or she just saw me and thought  
that I could be successful.  
I worked with her throughout middle school,  
I went back to her classroom, volunteered,  
made all her bulletin boards …  
that was so much for me.  
I kind of want to be like that person  
for someone else. 
 
I wanted to become an educator  
because I realize growing up there weren’t  
always resources for people in different places. 
Being capable of being bilingual  
and knowing what I do now, 
I want to be able to help as many kids as I can. 
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[I was] lazy. I didn’t do much work. 
I hated homework. Never wanted to do it.  
I was always kind of…  
I was a student who would get a B. 
I knew I could pass,  
so I would just do enough to pass.  
And that was me.  
Socially, I had a good group of friends  
all the way from kindergarten  
through my senior year of high school.  
Hung out with the same people.  
Feel like being in the small towns,  
small high school,  
we pretty much knew everybody. … 
I wouldn’t do my homework.  
I would just come and do the tests  
and kind of BS the teacher,  
so to speak, into thinking I did what  
I was supposed to do. 
Or if it was something we had to turn in,  
like, “oh, I forgot it.”  
Always trying to find a way to sneak around.  
I would somehow find a way to know enough  
so on tests or something I could get my grade up 
and keep on passing that way.  
Honestly, I don’t think I ever read a book  
in high school, to be honest with you.  
[After high school] I spent 3 years out.  
I went to college.  
My parents got divorced  
and that kind of threw me off,  
and my grades slipped in the second semester.  
So, I just came home and worked for a year. 
And then I took some classes at Parkland  
and I was like, I don’t know what I want to do  
with my life, so I just kind of decided  
to join the air force and try that out… 
I knew they’d put me into shape.  
I knew I was kind of lost at that point,  
didn’t know what to do. 
I had no idea what I wanted to do  
with my life at that point. 
So, I figured I might as well see  
what I can do here.  
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My schooling experience has been probably one  
very different from everyone else in the cohort. 
I didn’t really enjoy my elementary school experience.  
From preschool to fourth grade, I went to a Catholic elementary. 
When I was entering fourth grade, I felt very vulnerable  
because that’s also the time my parents were getting divorced  
and that’s the first time that I really heard,  
“You’re never going to amount to anything,” and  
“You’re never going to succeed,” and I was also called “stupid.”   
So, it was just a hard time and I don’t think  
I ever really got over it until high school …  
that feeling of inadequacy when it comes to school.  
And because of that I also have a problem with authority.  
Once my home situation stabilized and I was with people  
who focused on school and on doing well in school, 
that’s when I really started to understand,  
“OK, this is where your effort goes now,” and so I made gains. 
I think that’s where I really started to see a shift in myself,  
in my effort toward school, in my progress as well. 
 
Experiments with Autonomy 
 
I wasn’t really ready to leave high school,  
leave my friends, leave my family.  
I just wasn’t ready for the next step of my life. 
I was kind of just like, alright,  
I’ll go to the U of I, I guess. 
So, I came here, and I was a little homesick at first. 
I actually went home. I stepped out. And I went back  
to the community college where I took child psych.  
And that was kind of when I started to become  
interested in teaching. I had just realized that,  
“OK, it’s time for college.” 
 
One day it clicked, and it was like, “I need to learn as much  
about people as I can.” Maybe it was when I came here,  
it’s sort of like a culture shock. You see so many people  
from so many walks of life and you think you know  
everything about a certain type of person, but you really don’t  
until you ask, or until you do some research and find out  
what they’re all about. I think part of my connection  
to wanting to get to know or educate myself on different  
cultures or different people was because of like an alienation  
kind of feeling, or feeling alone and uncomfortable  
in your surroundings. I’ve kind of always felt that way. 
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So, I’m a desk worker at the Y.  
I think just like talking with different people  
and asking questions, knowing their background,  
it’s interesting.  
There’s always some type of story and it usually  
relates to their cultures or where they’re from. 
At first, it’s usually awkward because you  
don’t want to be asking twenty questions  
and have them be like, “OK stop,”  
but definitely after you get to know them,  
it’s easier. For me as a worker,  
because I communicate with them, 
I can easily help them out and  
have a nice conversation with them.  
 
I feel like once you get older, your family  
doesn’t understand you as well as your friends  
do and you spend more time with your friends  
at that point.  
You’re more independent, you know,  
and your parents see you as their little baby,  
and they always will, so I feel like there’s bias,  
so I kind of steer away from my family.  
  
[Teaching] is something that I really enjoy.  
I think my mom understands that more so than my father.  
My father sees it more like a major,  
like a calculating decision, that you have to be very strategic  
about what you choose to do for the rest of your life,  
which is kind of funny because he’s a probation officer,  
so not only does he not make money, it’s not his passion.  
So, I think he wants me to end up with a better start  
than he had and I know my mom’s the same way.  
I think she supports what I want to do because she originally  
wanted to be a teacher, but raising me when she was like 20,  
she couldn’t go to college and pursue an education degree.  
I think she understands that passion especially considering  
she works as a nurse and she hates it.  
It’s gonna sound weird, but in general the male relatives  
in my family are not supportive of the choice that I have made,  
like they think in a way that I am too intelligent  
to be an elementary education teacher, whereas the women  
in my family understand more the call to… 
what I have chosen to do. 
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Originally, because my dad’s dream was to be a lawyer  
and he couldn’t fulfill that,  
I was going to fulfill his dream and go to law school.  
So, in high school, I had four jobs.  
He asked me, like, why? I just wanted to.  
They were volunteer jobs, they were jobs I got paid for,  
but he noticed that all my extracurricular activities  
had to do with kids.  
I would even babysit at home  
and he would be like, “What are you doing?”  
And I would say that’s what I liked to do. 
This was the only school I applied for elementary ed,  
which is really ironic because everyone around me  
didn’t know why I applied to the U of I.  
I did it because it was something I wanted to do  
and I didn’t even know how it all kind of worked out. 
I just told my mom,  
“I’m sorry, I’m going to stick with what I want,”  
And my dad was, at least at first, really upset,  
but after seeing what I’ve done,  
he’s totally for education. It was really weird. 
My dad’s side of the family is in China,  
so he kind of knew how serious I was about  
what I wanted to do and how brave I was in pursuing  
what I wanted to do because they didn’t have the  
finances to support me to study abroad. 
So, I worked and I paid for my own study abroad.  
He was like, you went through all of this, you worked  
all these shifts at night to do what you want to do,  
so he knew that this was something I knew for sure. 
I’m not just like, “Oh, I don’t know what I want to do  
so I want to teach.” It was for sure. 
I know I want to teach.  
And I think it’s how confident he was in that  
that he was like, if this is your choice and your life,  
then I respect that.  
He talked to me this summer when I came back from  
studying abroad in China and he really thought  
that there was no problem for me in education.  
Because if you want to make a difference or make an impact,  
you don’t have to be creating the law. 
You can be doing things differently. Does that make sense?  
Like you don’t have to be in certain professions  
to make a difference.  
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Reorienting Self-Identity through Re-Learning 
 
Socially, when I joined college, the international Asians  
and Asian Americans were very separate.  
I’d notice that in New Trier it’s mostly Asian Americans  
so I didn’t have any trouble just identifying with “Asian.”  
But when I entered the university,  
I realized I can’t call myself “Asian.”  
I have to call myself “Asian American.”  
And I joined Asian American organizations 
and stuff like that. … I mean, I do call my cohort,  
which are mostly white, I do call them my friends, too.  
But, I don’t hang out with them outside of class.  
I talk to them like, “when’s this assignment due,” 
when I work on a group project.  
 
Because I grew up in all-white schools, 
I feel like we were all, like, just assumed that was us. 
But I’m sure that we were all different somehow 
and that wasn’t represented.  
So, I feel like that in a classroom where everyone’s  
from [somewhere else, I can] talk about all the cultures  
and talk about traditions and build a community  
with the students ... just bring awareness to the kids.  
 
Everyone’s like, oh, education majors, they color,  
like my roommates think I color.  
I don’t really ever color.  
I went to a workshop and they had us all say our majors,  
and the business majors were like, “oh, she’s in  
education, that’s cute!” I don’t know if that’s offensive  
to you, but that’s offensive to me.  
Because I think I’m pretty professional. 
 
Because I didn’t have a good experience  
[in elementary school], I wanted to really try  
to make sure that at least some group of students  
weren’t going to get what I got.  
Because I was never going to treat my kids like that.  
And, yeah, I guess that’s really what it was,  
that I was reflecting back on my experience,  
and I was like, you know, I’m not too happy  
with how I was treated and how I was seen  
and understood, and I want to be  
an agent of change and make that a better situation  
for students in the future.  
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Trajectories of Re-Learning 
 
After I graduated,  
I didn’t have the teaching certificate,  
but I still wanted to see  
if I had the ability to teach.  
So, I applied to several high schools  
where I knew I could be hired  
with a provisional license. 
I got hired [at this] really small school  
and I didn’t know it was an all-white school  
before I started teaching there.  
I loved teaching, but students were not  
accepting me as a teacher 
because I was from a culture  
that was very different from theirs.  
And they barely had any interaction  
with any other Asian people before.  
Also, the faculty was 100% white.  
I was the first non-white teacher there.  
And those faculty members were not  
interested in knowing who I was,  
and they were not inviting me  
to some of the events they were planning.  
I kind of felt like I was left out  
of that whole school community.  
That made me think about whether  
I should I really continue this career. …  
I knew that it wasn’t the only school  
I could work in, that I could apply  
somewhere else, but when I was  
in that situation, I couldn’t look  
at anything else.  
I was just so stuck with the problem  
that I was faced with.  
So, I quit the school  
and I went on a study abroad to Spain  
And I stayed there for a year  
and I finished my degree –  
an MA in Spanish Linguistics. 
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It was a medical discharge.  
I developed anxiety panic disorder.  
My grandma died and then my uncle  
got murdered in about two weeks or so.  
And I kind of broke down because  
I was close to both of them. 
You can’t be on anxiety medication obviously  
and tell planes to work together,  
so they kind of gave me the medical after that. … 
Didn’t have [a plan], to be honest.  
Just kind of winged it. Came home.  
Thought I was going to do business  
before I left for the air force,  
so that’s what I was going to get into.  
I realized I hated it about a month into it. 
When I got loaded with business classes,  
I realized it was not something I wanted to do at all. 
Thinking about sitting at a desk killed me.  
Being an air traffic controller, you’re not just sitting  
at a desk. I mean, you’re constantly watching,  
your mind’s going everywhere,  
and I was intrigued all the time.  
So, I just started thinking and I realized  
it came down to going into the medical field  
or going into the teaching field. 
Actually, I talked to counselors about this.  
Both would utilize the same sort of skill set  
that air traffic control does, where you’re in one place  
but there’s a lot going on at one time. … 
I was really upset after I got out of the air force.  
I got a little depressed because  
I felt like I was doing something  
amazing with my life and I was giving back,  
so, I wanted to give back in some way.  
Those were the two careers that I thought  
(a) would utilize my skills and  
(b) I could give back somehow.  
And part of the reason I went into look at teaching  
was that I really looked back on my career now,  
when I was in elementary, and I realize I had  
horrible teachers. I can look back at high school  
and think about the teachers who let a student  
like me who is excelling now, and getting As  
at a major university, and doing really well …  
How did I slip through the cracks  
and not get pushed to excel? 
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Vocational Autonomy 
 
I like giving students a choice 
because I feel like when they leave school,  
it’s all about making their own choices.  
I feel that it’s important to empower them  
to think on their own, to think for themselves.  
I don’t want someone to tell me how to think,  
what to think, and what to believe in. 
I kind of want a set of skills for myself  
where I can be like, “I can look at this and  
analyze it based on my own values,  
my own beliefs,  
as well as different perspectives,  
and then figure out something from there.”  
So, I want my students to be able to do the same.  
Not just intake information,  
like “oh, Ms. Wang says orange is a good color,  
we should all color in orange.”  
 
I don’t see myself being super friendly. 
I know some teachers let you call them  
by their first name.   
I don’t think I would be comfortable with that.   
And I think part of that has to do with my culture  
because we would never call an adult  
by their first name.  
I think there has to be some sort of management  
and some sort of structure  
for the students to follow.  
After that, I think students  
should have the freedom  
to learn whatever they want … 
 
I’m kind of not like that. [laughter] 
I like to be more friendly.   
I don’t like the idea of kids sitting in desks. 
I do like them working in groups  
and them feeling special.   
I like to instill pride  
and a sense of accomplishment, 
and feeling good in my students. 
I’ll teach the standards,  
but I’ll do it in a creative way. 
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I’m usually very outspoken about how I feel  
and it’s hard for me to bite my tongue sometimes,  
but I think as a teacher who is not tenured,  
as my teacher is, she feels like, where can I go  
without stepping on toes, offending anyone. 
Bilingual is something I’m pretty sure I want to do,  
but sometimes I’m like I don’t know if I can do this  
a long time because you can do everything that  
you’re supposed to do but they still may not understand  
or get bad test scores because they’re so far behind,  
and on paper my teacher is looking like she’s doing a  
terrible job teaching because none of her kids are 
meeting [standards], but they’re progressing so much  
and it’s different than the schools where I grew up, for sure.  
 
Experiencing bilingual in general, it’s just frustrating to me.  
I think the lack of resources is hard, and at Forest Green,  
I was really frustrated.  
There’s a kid in my class who has autism as well,  
he’s a native Spanish speaker,  
and his parents don’t know any English. 
So, when it was time for an IEP meeting,  
my teacher wasn’t even planning on going.  
She told me that we were going to have a sub.  
The sub never showed up  
and so they had this IEP meeting  
with this special ed teacher  
who very barely knows Spanish, 
the two parents who are fluent in Spanish  
and only speak Spanish, and then an administrator  
without my teacher to advocate for her student.  
And to me that was so sad because he, up until that point,  
the first two weeks of school, had been sitting in the class  
and he doesn’t have the social skills or doesn’t feel  
comfortable to participate all the time.  
And so he’s sitting at his desk not doing anything  
for whole days.  
And then when his parents finally come, my teacher  
couldn’t go talk to them, so that was really frustrating to see  
because I think the school could be taking advantage  
of his parents and their [lack of] knowledge of the school.  
And they send a lot of papers home from the office  
and they’re in English, and I see my teacher take them  
and say, thanks, and throw them in the recycling bin  
because they’re not translated for the parents.  
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After we had our 9/11 discussion in Maxine’s class,  
I went in to my school and asked my teacher,  
you know, what they did on 9/11,  
and I thought it was especially  
interesting because the kids in fourth grade  
weren’t born yet, and all they know about 9/11  
was something that had been  
told to them by somebody else.  
And my class especially, all Spanish speakers,  
I think it would be an interesting perspective on the event.  
And so I was kind of excited  
to hear about what she did, 
and she said she didn’t do anything,  
she didn’t talk about it,  
she didn’t bring it up,  
and I was really disappointed because  
I think they could have handled it and it would have been  
really interesting to get them talking and thinking about it,  
and I think it’s her job as a teacher  
to take those kinds of events  
and explain really what happened so that  
the students can think critically about them on their own  
rather than taking what somebody else has said  
and what’s printed in a tabloid.  
She said she thought that, especially this class,  
they couldn’t.  
And I think she approached it in the wrong way.  
I think if she handled it in an appropriate way,  
which is possible for this class because I see that  
if you give them the opportunities to share,  
they are really insightful. 
 
I personally want to go into like ESL or bilingual education,  
so I think that if [my students] are from different countries  
I feel like they might have  
more of a global perspective in a way. 
I feel like, me, as a student,  
when I was in elementary school,  
I didn’t know what a global perspective was,  
I didn’t understand the multiple perspectives concept.  
Honestly, right now, this cohort has taught me  
more than I’ve ever been taught.  
So, I think that I will have to teach it to my students,  
but I feel that students from other countries  
might have the… know a little bit more. 
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Re-Learning on the Threshold of Adulthood 
 
It’s kind of bittersweet because I’m so excited  
to go out and have my own classroom. 
But you’re never really done with school. 
You always really go back and learn. 
 
I’m sure you’ve heard us say a million times,  
“I’m confused, what’s going on, what’s due next week,” 
and it’s kind of difficult to learn what we’re being  
taught and focus on doing this in our classrooms  
when we have so many assignments to fulfill, 
when we have so many due dates to remember.  
So, that’s really been a struggle because I’m not sure  
exactly how much I’m taking in and learning,  
and how much I’m going to be prepared  
when I graduate because of it.  
 
Right now, with classes, I just kind of am over them 
and want to move on to the actual teaching.  
That’s why I’m really excited for student teaching,  
being in the classroom everyday, working with kids,  
kind of doing what I want to do. I am worried about  
developing my own curriculum and how I’m going  
to fit everything that I need in. Kind of every teacher’s  
worry: finding time to actually sit down and do  
the curriculum that you want and not having  
school be the only thing in your life. 
 
I’m one of those people who, if I see a problem  
or see something that just needs improvement,  
I’m somebody who needs to take action right away.  
It’s partly the reason that I’ve been so frustrated  
this past week at the school I’m in.  
I’ve had a hard time stepping back and being  
a student teacher and not having the voice to say  
something about things I feel very strongly toward.  
 
I’m terrified I’m not going to get a job. 
Like, I’m not going to be good enough for a school to hire me. 
I think it’s a legitimate fear because I have no idea. 
It’s the plan: you go to school, you get a job, and then  
you pay off all the massive debt you just raked in. 
That’s a really scary concept: having no idea, like no backup plan. 
Seven endorsements that I’m graduating with, so,  
I figure someone has to give me a job. 
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The classroom that I’m in, students are really  
a well-behaved group and they’re really sweet.  
So, at first I was just there two days a week,  
so each week they were like, 
“Uh, the person’s there again,”  
but now they are now used to having me  
in their classroom and they start asking questions.  
They kind of test me if I can really speak Spanish,  
so they’re asking silly questions, like  
“How old are you?” in Spanish.  
So, I’m building closer relationships with students.  
 
The student who I think is gifted in my class  
is always interjecting, trying to make a scene.  
So, I pulled him aside and I asked him  
if he wanted a really hard math problem. 
And he was like, yeah, I do. 
And at the end of the day he came and said bye to me.  
I think it was just really meaningful to him. 
 
I think the big thing  
I’m working on is communication.  
So, I really like interpersonal relationships  
with my students.  
Recently I’ve been talking to a student. 
Her parents have been going through  
a divorce and it’s something  
that my cooperating teacher and I  
didn’t really know.  
So, it’s just recently been happening  
in her family and she’s like,  
“Ms. Wang, I don’t want to do this.  
I don’t want to do that. Nobody cares.”  
And it’s because she’s living  
in two different homes now.  
She goes to her dad’s and 
on certain days, her mom’s. 
She’s confused about all this stuff.  
So, I really believe in the notion  
of character development as well as building  
a trust relationship between teacher and student,  
between students as well,  
creating a sort of global community.  
I don’t know if that’s really a philosophy. 
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At first glance,  
I noticed that schools look nice,  
but once you’re actually on the inside,  
I see something different.  
I think that people won’t notice  
if they just go for like a day  
long visit or something.  
It takes time to actually realize these things,  
so I’m scared, you know, financially, about  
responsibilities, problems I might face…  
I mean, just going out in the real world in general,  
‘cause you know, education is all we’ve known  
up to this point. 
We’ve been in the school system forever 
and to be at the last year of it, for most of us,  
unless you go for a masters,  
but that’s a completely different experience …  
uh, yeah, the real world… 
pretty much we’re frightened at this point. 
But I am excited to finally be on my own two feet  
a lot more than I am now, and to actually start  
my own life, my own stories,  
on a more independent level, I guess. 
 
I have a plan … that I want to eventually move up  
in the education system and help change it.  
That is really my end goal.  
I don’t want to be famous,  
the name that everybody knows, 
but I do want to help change our system,  
which is part of the reason that I’m in this  
global perspectives cohort.  
I truly think that countries can learn from each other  
just through the education systems. 
Last year, I kind of had a crisis, in my mind: 
oh my gosh, I can’t be in a classroom,  
it’s scary seeing the problems that go on.  
So, I had a little bit of a freak out  
and told my dad, I can’t be in the classroom,  
I just have to go straight into administration.  
And we talked about it and I kind of took  
a step back and said, well,  
how can I be an administrator  
and even remotely help change the system  
if I’ve never experienced it?  
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Starting my life again …  
That’s one of the things  
I look forward to  
and am most excited about. 
Being able to have more time with my wife  
and hang out and really starting a family.  
I think I’m excited that I’ll finally  
be able to reach that. 
Also, just, I don’t want to stop. 
I want to become an administrator,  
so knowing that grad school’s in my future,  
once I accomplish this …  
It’s kind of one of those things  
I saw way back when and thought  
I never could… 
I remember as a high school student  
thinking I’m never going to be able to graduate,  
never go to the U of I, and now I’m like… 
I’m here, this is happening next semester,  
so get ready. 
 
Part Two: The Professor 
 
Invitation to Re-Learn 
 
A couple of [colleagues] were interested  
just because [global perspectives] seemed interesting,  
even though they didn’t feel like  
they knew much about it.   
One of the things we said we were going to do,  
but we haven’t done, is to read about what it means  
to globalize education.   
I mean, what does that really mean …  
what is “global education” about?   
And we just haven’t had time.   
So, I’m sort of sorry about that.   
We get wrapped up in what’s going  
to happen in the courses, what we’re going to do,  
or then we don’t have time to really think about it. 
I don’t think that at this point we even have a shared  
understanding of what it means to integrate “global”  
into our program.   
People are trying to do it  
in all different kinds of ways. 
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A Global Self-Identity 
 
I would be a different person  
but for the experiences I’ve had.   
For whatever reason,  
I’ve just found myself  
in lots of different places in the world. 
And those kinds of experiences  
piqued my interest  
in what it means to live in any culture 
and how anyone  
understands another culture.   
I live in a cross-cultural relationship –  
my husband is British –  
You wouldn’t think that’s a big deal,  
but actually it is!   
I’ve just always found the kind of learning  
that I experience from cultural differences  
to be very provocative.  
And it’s made me –  
rethink myself  
and how I live and what I value,  
and why I value those things,  
in ways that would not have been questioned  
if I hadn’t had those kinds  
of cross-cultural experiences.   
And our family, the bigger it gets,  
the more international it gets.   
One son is married to a girl from Turkey,  
another is married to an African American,  
another to an Argentine. 
It’s all very interesting.   
When you watch those children  
in those families  
deal with that and learn from that,  
and struggle with that …  
I don’t know, [global learning’s]  
everywhere – at least for me.   
I can’t think about things  
without bringing  
those experiences  
into what I do.   
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Autonomy as Inquiry 
 
Theoretically, it starts with Dewey.   
I don’t talk about Dewey,  
but I’m very much a progressive educator 
and I want them making decisions,  
following their own interests,  
being committed to some kinds of goals,  
purposes, and the assignments are set up  
to give them a lot of autonomy within  
a particular structure,  
so everything is laid out very clearly  
in terms of what they have to do,  
But there is a lot of flexibility  
in the midst of that …  
Of course, there are constraints,  
but I’m really concerned  
that they own their own purposes.   
And then, inquiry, whatever it demands.   
That will lead them to more questions  
and a feeling that they’ve learned  
something that they wanted to learn  
and not something that they had to learn.   
 
You know, you have to expect that students  
are doing very different things  
with what you do in class.   
I don’t expect everybody ever  
to come away from a class  
with the same thing.   
I think learning is very personal and interpretive.   
I mean, I listen to them talk,  
I read their writing,  
and I talk to them individually. 
All of that gives me a sense that quite a few of them  
are deeply invested in what they’re doing.   
But not all of them. 
For some of them this is just too hard. … 
Taking a risk … to be that personal, to be that open,  
to talk about things that …  
I mean, some of them come from  
very conservative political families  
where there’s a right and a wrong  
and there’s no multiple perspectives. 
I’m just all the time trying to get  
multiple perspectives out there.   
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Experiments in Re-Learning 
 
We certainly haven’t written [any aims] down.   
I think it was a vague sense of globalizing the curriculum  
in order to encourage students to think globally instead of locally.   
And, in particular, with younger children,  
to try and connect the local to the global.   
So, it’s not just out there, but it’s always connected  
to something in their own community  
or in their own lives.   
It wasn’t just studying cultures and other countries, but more 
about what we do or what we know that’s connected  
to global perspectives, or to other cultures, or whatever …  
That that link between the global and the local  
should always be there.   
And one of the things that I’m seeing  
as I’m talking to students  
about their final integrated unit is that  
they’re doing a lot of “out there.”  
“Oh, we’ll look at China”  
or “we’ll look at foods across the world,”  
or whatever, and they’re not  
getting the connection.  
 
I seem to always be finding myself  
in these kinds of new situations. 
Maybe I create them, I don’t know.  
I like them.  
I like things that are not predictable  
and having to think and work with students  
rather than just impose something on them,  
so … I don’t know, several times in my career now,  
I have started with new programs 
and they’re always full of these  
same kinds of growing pains,  
and I find them interesting and I feel like you learn a lot,  
and you build relationships with your colleagues  
and with students in different kinds of ways  
then when you’re just teaching in classes. 
So, I guess I sort of expected the growing pains 
and there hasn’t been anything  
that’s seemed overwhelming.  
I think students have been great. 
I know they feel like guinea pigs, but that’s good.   
And they seem to be very willing to be guinea pigs. 
“Do you mind if I give you another survey?” Oh nah! 
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The Fragility of Experiments 
 
No, I don’t think [this pilot is sustainable].   
I don’t know.  
I mean, I have a sense that if I retired,  
and just left, it would go away.   
And that’s not to say I’m wonderful or anything,  
but it always –  
it seems to be especially with new things –  
takes somebody or some group  
to make that work, and there has to be  
some commitment behind that.   
I’ve been very surprised and disappointed  
in the support that we’ve gotten.   
I expected money from research,  
I expected that people would want to know  
what’s happening and to evaluate it,  
and to be able to tout that things  
are working well … 
 
I think we all learn  
from [short-lived experiments].   
Faculty, as a group,  
and the doc students.  
It’s interesting for them  
to see how something  
like this evolved and 
to have participated in it.  
You know,  
they’re going to be professors in the future,  
so I like them to feel comfortable  
with taking some risks,  
trying new things  
and seeing that it works,  
that it has value. 
 
Discussion 
 
In order for an example to bridge the gap of re-learning and perpetuate the cycle of global 
learning, it must give us a global experience, and through its construction, afford us plenty of 
opportunities to reflect on what is (or is not) shown or said. In this way, we are pulled out of our 
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habitual modes of experience and forced to reconsider our prior assumptions. I have tried to use 
the data collected in this research study and my analysis of it to do just that. 
As a reference point for the reader, I offer key issues and themes that emerged for me as I 
coded the data. I present these issues and themes in the table below but emphasize that mine is 
but one interpretation of the poems. The reader can lay their interpretations alongside my 
interpretations and notice similarities and differences, which is an important part of the example 
because the interpretations are how we learn based on our own experiences. Following the table, 
I briefly discuss three key issues that I believe arise from the poems and their relation to my 
account of global learning. 
Table 1. Global Teacher Example – Issues/Themes 
STUDENTS PROFESSOR 
School and Constructing Identity: racial/ethnic 
diversity in school, class background, role as cultural 
interpreter 
Invitation to Re-Learn: no consensus on “global” 
The Roots of a Vocation: caring teacher/student 
relationship, feeling safe vs. unsafe, desire to be a 
teacher, inspirational teacher role models, 
bad/uninspired school experience 
A Global Self Identity: cross-cultural experiences of 
family and other countries 
Experiments in Autonomy: inability to make choices, 
reaching out to other cultures, influence of 
family/friends, justifying the education choice, parental 
lack of understanding and/or eventual acceptance 
Autonomy as Inquiry: philosophy of inquiry from 
John Dewey, student investment in inquiry or lack 
thereof 
Reorienting Self Identity through Re-Learning: 
evolving racial identity in college, dispensing with a 
previously hurtful/minimizing identity, exerting identity 
as a teacher 
Experiments in Re-Learning: no written aims for 
students, misunderstanding global/local, always trying 
new programs, researching practice 
Trajectories of Re-Learning dealing with racial 
discrimination, lack of direction, being “pulled up 
short” 
The Fragility of Experiments: institutional climate, 
faculty-driven innovations, nature of short-lived 
experiments, mentoring future faculty members 
Vocational Autonomy: articulating a teaching 
philosophy, making choices, family relationships, 
advocacy, professional dilemmas with bilingual ed, 
ideals vs. “reality” of teaching, different teaching 
styles 
 
Re-Learning on the Threshold of Adulthood: 
finding a job, having own classroom, forming 
professional network, relationships with students, 
developing philosophy with techniques, the “real 
world,” pursuing future opportunities 
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In my interviews with sixteen students and one professor, I recognized and wanted to 
honor the great diversity of experiences and thought processes that characterize cosmopolitan 
moral education for adults. While my interviews were ostensibly about the experiences of 
participants in the “global perspectives” teacher education cohort, my open-ended questions 
probed notions of autonomy and self-identity as they related to the teaching vocation, as well as 
how the inquiry process of the global perspectives cohort related to their self-conceptions and 
learning in and out of class. I was able to discern particular “moments” in the interview data 
where participant reflections converged or diverged in interesting ways, signified by the titles 
given to the students’ and professor’s poems. To better allow for the co-construction of meaning 
within the example, I purposefully arranged the poetic stanzas in an intuitive and, at times, 
contrasting fashion to maximize the number of potential interpretations arising from within and 
between the poems. The three issues I believe are key to the poems are The Problem of Adult 
Learning, coming to the cohort through re-learning, and the choice of vocation through 
autonomy and self-identity. 
The first major issue illustrated in these poems is the Problem of Adult Learning 
discussed in Chapter Two. The poems in Part One from the students stand in stark contrast to 
Maxine’s poems in Part Two. Based on her life experience, Maxine is able to handle ambiguity, 
risk, and the possibility of failure. In fact, in “Experiments in Re-Learning,” Maxine states, “I 
seem to always be finding myself in these kinds of new situations. … I like things that are not 
predictable.” Her experiences with previous encounters with experimental learning and “trying 
new things” have enabled her to gain a confidence the students have not yet formed. Because of 
their stage in development, the young adult learners are neither secure in their understanding of 
self nor secure with the unknown. In “Re-Learning on the Threshold of Adulthood,” the students 
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express this confusion and fear of the unknown: “I’m terrified I’m not going to get a job,” “Right 
now, with classes, I just kind of am over them,” “I’m confused, what’s going on, what’s due next 
week.” They need the reinforcement of the example to enable them to fashion a bridge in the gap 
between their life experience and the learning goals they are trying to achieve. One of the best 
examples the students have in front of them every week is Maxine. She models for them how to 
be a global learner and not to be afraid of the ambiguity and risk of failure that accompanies it. 
Through her as a model, it is possible for the students to move one step closer to becoming 
global learners in the sense articulated in my account. 
The second major issue is that, though global learners all experience these stages, they 
may come to this process of global learning from very different places. For example, in “School 
and Constructing Identity,” “The Roots of Vocation,” and “Experiments with Autonomy,” we 
learn that some students identify their racial and ethnic backgrounds, there is a disparity in the 
SES of their families, that they felt love or hatred of their K-12 school experience, and about the 
mentorship and support by teachers or family members in their career choices. While their 
backgrounds and previous experiences are diverse, what brings them all to the same trajectory of 
global learning in the form of this cohort are the same kind of transformative experiences that 
caused them to re-learn and strengthen their self-identity. For example, in “Roots of a Vocation,” 
we have their individual stories about coming to teacher education and the decision to become a 
teacher. Each path was different, but each had an experience that forced them to modify their 
self-identity in light of their newfound vocation. Those individualized experiences are what 
placed them on parallel paths to this cohort, where they could aid each other in their re-learning 
processes by sharing their unique experiences and motivations for becoming a teacher.  
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A third major issue in these poems is that the choice of teaching as a vocation was 
intimately tied to these students’ autonomous self-identity. In the poem, “Reorienting Self-
Identity through Re-Learning,” we learn that one student shifted her identify from Asian to Asian 
American in college, and one student grew up in an all-white school and has since learned the 
importance of cultural difference. In “Experiments with Autonomy,” one student defies her 
father’s wishes and chooses teaching over the law. In many cases, the students were not sure 
what they wanted to do in their adult lives; they lacked a sense of vocation and floundered for a 
few years, whether by attending community college, joining the military, or living and studying 
abroad (see also “Trajectories of Re-Learning”). They developed a sense of self-identity that led 
them to teaching as a vocation. In many cases, this self-knowledge and sense of vocation came 
after they decided who they were, and thus were able to make an independent, autonomous 
decision.  
Making an autonomous decision and achieving a sense of vocation by no means indicates 
that they are “ready” to teach. They will have many “what do I do if…?” questions. But, as they 
exited the first semester in the cohort, it is clear in “Re-Learning on the Threshold of Adulthood” 
that they are ready to test out their newfound understandings and strengthened sense of vocation. 
Many of them are constantly thinking about the ongoing, lifelong process of re-learning, in 
particular, as they have come to new understandings of themselves, their vocation, and their 
students through the teachings of the global perspectives cohort. In this way, the Global 
Perspectives Collaborative Pilot exemplifies my account of global learning because the students 
were challenged to rethink themselves into an understanding of diversity in the classroom.  
These three issues, the Problem of Adult Learning, coming to the cohort through re-
learning, and the choice of vocation through autonomy and self-identity, serve to illustrate my 
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account of global learning. These issues, raised through the empirical research, shaped the 
philosophical component of my study. Thus, these poems serve as a meta-example of the 
example I put forward in Chapter Four. Perhaps these poems enable the reader to re-learn and 
better understand his or her own sense of identity as a global learner. Perhaps not. Either way, 
these three issues are but one interpretation as the example of global learning is intended to have 
as many interpretations as there are those who engage in it. 
Global Learning: A Recapitulation 
This poetic exploration of global teacher education serves to illuminate, on the one hand, 
my ethical account of cosmopolitan moral education for adults in Chapter Three, and on the 
other hand, my aesthetic account of the global example in Chapter Four. What is critical for adult 
learners, Patrick Frierson suggests, following Kant, is to be advantageously and 
disadvantageously placed regarding moral education – in other words, being in the presence of a 
moral community. Adults are differently able to affect a “moral revolution” based on these 
circumstances.278 The Global Perspectives Collaborative Pilot is one such moral community.  
Furthermore, I have contended that the example morally educates primarily through the 
creation of non-narrative form and only secondarily through the selection of content or principles 
embedded by the author. Thinking non-narratively with the form of the example is an important 
skill because it helps the example’s recipient to avoid the artificial consistency of narrative 
thinking and act as a co-constructor of meaning, experiencing the example with greater 
autonomy and potential for re-learning. This approach to example construction, I argue, is 
conducive to Kant’s account of the moral and aesthetic example. The choice I made to transform 
interview data into poetic form is just one possible approach for example construction through a 
                                                
278 Patrick Frierson, Freedom and Anthropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003): 133-4. 
 163 
 
non-narrative lens – another might be the creation of a video essay. Alas, creating such an 
example is tempting, but will have to be saved for a future study.  
In the prescient words of Bok, the educational and institutional separation of professional 
schools of education from schools of liberal arts and sciences “seems destined to remain one of 
the major unrealized opportunities of the contemporary university.”279 A major consequence of 
this separation is that preservice teacher education students, and the dedicated instructors who 
educate them, are often overlooked in university-wide efforts to promote global learning because 
their education programs are looked down upon as “havens of superficial learning for students of 
inferior ability”280 rather than as bases of liberal, humanistic inquiry. The effort to create a global 
teacher education should not be understood as the appropriation of an educational fad, to try and 
“fit in” with the rest of the university’s globalizing agenda. In fact, the idea of a “global 
perspective” in teacher education is part and parcel of the very philosophical vocation of the 
educator.  
As I discussed in Chapter One, the awakening of the “inner pedagogue” is central to adult 
moral education and the discovery of our vocation as adult learners. This idea has even more 
import for educators. As future elementary teachers who educate our children to develop primary 
notions of autonomy, self-identity, and vocation, we place our trust, as a society, in these 
teachers’ intellectual and moral dispositions. These dispositions derive from a teacher’s self-
understanding of who she is and what she believes. As the great adult educator Buber observed 
(pardoning the gendered pronouns), “For educating characters you do not need a moral genius, 
but you do need a man who is wholly alive and able to communicate himself directly to his 
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fellow human beings.”281 In this spirit, I wanted to fully embody these preservice teacher 
education students’ and professor’s voices by underlining the varied and probing self-reflection 
they underwent during these interviews. In the final concluding chapter, I consider future 
directions for my account of cosmopolitan moral education for adults and the global learning 
example in the institutional structure of the university. 
  
                                                
281 Martin Buber, “The Education of Character,” in Between Man and Man (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 
1965): 105. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
CONCLUSION 
FROM THE EXAMPLE TO THE INSTITUTION 
In my account of cosmopolitan moral education for adults, I address global learning at 
the individual and interpersonal level, which involves a continuous process of re-learning 
through autonomy, self-identity, and vocation. The moral and aesthetic example is the plank 
upon which my account of global learning at the individual and interpersonal level stands. 
However, global learning must also be addressed at the institutional level, which is beyond the 
scope of this study, but is important for future applications of my account. In this concluding 
chapter, I will discuss some possible institutional applications of my account that future 
researchers and educational practitioners might consider. 
At the institutional level, a morally cosmopolitan282 ethic is the plank upon which the 
global learning ideas here developed become realistic program options. The example and the 
institution are connected by a common philosophical bridge. They are both outer manifestations 
of the inner moral law, and thus, given adequate time, investment, and resources, serve to create 
a Kantian orientation for global learning. External conditions must be reconceived to sustain the 
internal and interpersonal relations that we desire. As Brighouse and McPherson observe, 
practical and feasible policy approaches are needed to ensure that higher education institutions 
make choices in accordance with morality and justice.283 Moreover, Brighouse recommends 
applying a “feasibility constraint” in developing adequate philosophical accounts (in his case, of 
justice) that are aware of current conditions and opportunities for improvement. According to 
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(Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 2015. 
 166 
 
Brighouse, “no principle can be a true principle if even in favorable conditions it is impossible to 
fully implement.”284  
What institutions call global learning need to take into consideration diverse adult 
learners’ positional interests in what they wish to learn. As Kadish argues, participants in higher 
education are strongly motivated to realize their positional interests of effectiveness, self-
formation, and coherence.285 Institutions must honor students’ interest for effectiveness, as 
societal participation through meaningful work, and self-formation, as autonomous decision-
making over life choices, enabling students to pursue these interests as a coherent whole. 
Adhering to global learners’ positional interests may force institutions to deviate from 
“preferred” courses of action, particularly if an institution heavily favors either liberal or 
vocational education. According to a recent AAC&U publication, research interviews conducted 
with twenty-four of the institutions participating in the Shared Futures Initiative revealed that 
there are very distinct “models” of global learning for diverse institutions to follow, where the 
“progression of exemplary programs reveals commonalities that are widely useful for institutions 
interested in integrating global learning into their own curricula.”286 Now that research has 
shown that no one-size-fits-all approach to global learning is feasible, the next step is to make 
sure that diverse institutions don’t neglect the perspectives of the actual global learners on their 
campuses.  
In this concluding chapter, I argue that institutions of global learning ought to adopt a 
morally cosmopolitan ethic in developing policies and practices in mediating between what is 
good for the institution, good for the learner, and good for the global community. Specifically, 
institutional arrangements should afford curricular, co-curricular, pedagogical, and student 
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service changes in line with cosmopolitan moral education for adults. To support these aims, I 
believe there are at least four approaches to practice that begin at the institutional level, namely: 
fostering interhuman relations, ensuring cosmopolitan right, sustaining educational experiments, 
and expanding example creation and circulation. In the sections below, I will briefly discuss 
these four approaches and draw upon examples from my own experience. 
Fostering Interhuman287 Relations 
As Jaspers observes about the interdependence of the institution and the individual in the 
university,288 a university functions not merely to house the disparate functions and activities of 
stakeholders under one big tent. An institution sets a normative standard – for other institutions, 
its members, and the public at large – every time it decides on a policy that influences how 
community members carry out their work and relate to each other in higher education. Perhaps 
without realizing it, a global higher education institution models the “best” way to understand 
and carry out internationalization, global education, and global learning, and how to resolve 
conflicts between these issues and other important educational aims. What does it mean to be an 
institutional model for others? As I alluded to in my discussion of isomorphism and interhuman 
problems in Chapter Two, there are at least two questions here. First, what is one modeling 
exactly – who one wishes to be or who one actually is? Moreover, how is the recipient 
interpreting the model – according to the model creator’s preferred interpretation or some other 
way entirely? How institutions address these questions – as both creators and recipients of global 
learning models – will determine whether global higher education can truly develop an ethical 
foundation. 
                                                
287 Rather than calling it “interpersonal,” I use Buber’s notion of the interhuman domain because in my view it better 
encompasses relations among diverse actors in global higher education and underlines the fundamental moral import 
of these relations. See Martin Buber, “Elements of the Interhuman,” in The Knowledge of Man: A Philosophy of the 
Interhuman, edited by Maurice Friedman (New York, NY: Harper & Row), 1965. 
288 Karl Jaspers, The Idea of the University (London: Peter Owen), 1959.  
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One key change institutions can implement is to begin modeling an ethic of “being” 
rather than “seeming,” which will help to increase the likelihood for interhuman encounters on 
university campuses. Jaspers describes communication as the lifeblood of the university and its 
breakdown as the erosion of its educational mission.289 Akin to what Jaspers refers to as 
“communication,” Bok’s key principle is that of involvement.290 Ever since Kant’s discussion of 
resolving institutional conflicts between the “lower” philosophy faculty and the “higher” 
professional faculties, the philosophy of higher education has pointed to the lack of 
communication and understanding between different units of the university.291 These problems 
have often been interpreted as resulting from overspecialization in faculty members’ respective 
disciplines and the favoring of departmental and disciplinary interests over the interests of the 
institution and student learning.  
More recently, William Bowen has also considered which higher education purposes are 
essential and worth maintaining despite the effects of globalization and the digital age.292 Bowen 
argues that universities should: (1) emphasize and re-emphasize the great value of “minds 
rubbing against minds,” the importance of great teachers and forming relationships; (2) preserve 
an unswerving commitment to freedom of thought; and (3) focus on delineating values and 
educating character as much as acquiring knowledge. Crucially, Bowen’s three purposes 
emphasize the interhuman character of higher education while minimizing the foundational 
importance of research and knowledge production.  
Bowen also underlines the problem of decentralization in the modern university. 
Decentralization creates an institutional structure that makes collaboration extremely taxing and 
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difficult to sustain, disperses communication about educational values, and stands in the way of 
best practices being shared around campus. Large research university campuses with a very 
decentralized structure – the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign being one prominent 
example – often duplicate services and create entrenched silos among units on campus. Bowen 
points to the importance of overcoming this problem through collaboration and productive 
consideration of stakeholders’ varying interests.  
Everyone in the university community understood broadly, including staff and trustees, 
bring diverse experiences as global learners that should be valued. These experiences equip them 
to serve as deliberators on how students can engage with global learning and prepare for 
adulthood. These intercultural, intergenerational, and interdisciplinary conversations must 
produce a coherent human image of global learning where all members of the community can 
recognize themselves as global learners. To reduce barriers among global learners on a campus, 
my account of global learning seeks to increase opportunities for collaborative learning about 
global issues that promote student autonomy, authentic self-identity, and re-learning.  
In this spirit, one positive development in the University of Illinois College of Education 
was the creation of an international graduate student speaker series called “Global Perspectives: 
Understanding Educational Diversity Around the World” in spring 2014.293 By providing an 
avenue for the university community to learn about education systems in different countries, the 
speaker series provided a platform for students in the Global Studies in Education program to 
develop their autonomous self-identity as knowledgeable experts and interpreters of their own 
educational experience. As a regularly attending audience member, I was interested to witness a 
                                                
293 For a brief mention about one session of the speaker series, see David Unger, “Global Perspectives: 
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wide array of presentational styles, content choices – and of interest to a graduate student in 
philosophy of education – diverse understandings of cultural aims within each educational 
context. These differences really stuck with me because it is these small, localized differences 
that often get ignored or swept under the rug in this era of global higher education. In light of my 
account of global learning, I believe there are untapped possibilities for this speaker series and 
similar efforts like it that increase ways for the audience to become involved and challenged, 
such as opportunities to collaborate with the speakers on projects to improve educational 
opportunities and experience in the speakers’ countries.  
Global learning events should receive greater publicity that explicitly highlights their 
connection to the moral cosmopolitan ethos modeled by the university and embodied in relations 
on campus. The typical audience at these kinds of events represents a mixture of knowledgeable 
insiders, undergraduates “required” to attend for a course, and the participants themselves. There 
is also a smattering of curious onlookers drawn by the topic. The speaker series was originally 
constructed for graduate scholars who loved the minutiae of global education policy and often 
brought extensive experience in their countries’ educational bureaucracies. Most organizers of 
these events conceive the audience role as static, a passive recipient of knowledge. However, 
listening, it should be stressed, is very hard work. It does not come naturally. Listening requires a 
kind of disposition to seek out engagements with unfamiliar voices and ideas and an open-
mindedness to participate as a co-constructor of meaning. Shared cultural foundations are seldom 
questioned – that is why we call them foundations. Listening, however, requires the listener to 
bring their cultural foundations and presuppositions to conscious awareness to make sense of 
new information.  
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As a listener, the most powerful moments of learning for me were the realization of 
profound contextual differences between countries. I did not know, for instance, that school 
children in rural Philippine villages need to cross rivers on drawbridges or charter boats to reach 
their primary school, nor was I aware of the true extent to which physical harm is a constant 
threat in bombed out schools in Palestine. These examples helped me morally imagine the global 
experience of others and connect it to my own life and work at the university. Even more, the 
personal manner, intensity, and reflections exhibited by the presenters helped make the 
contextual differences personal and harder to ignore. Much more could be explored in bringing 
these re-learning experiences to a wider audience of global learners of all sorts. 
Ensuring Cosmopolitan Right 
By focusing primarily on extra-educational aims to motivate the internationalization of 
higher education, such as economic and reputational considerations, institutions recruit and 
accept many more students than they are able to serve adequately. This is most patently observed 
in the plight of international students, visiting scholars, and faculty members. “Under-the-radar” 
sites of internationalization – such as international student housing, the university and city bus 
service, local restaurants on the high street, and writing centers – have assumed direct or indirect 
responsibility for providing international visitors with one of their first encounters with the 
academic, social, and political values of American campus life. All perform an invaluable 
function for making international students and others feel welcome in the country and on 
campus. For international students, these aspects of life are not separate, but in fact intertwined. 
However, the smiling, brochure or website-friendly image of diversity hides the fact that 
international students and other minority students often do not feel welcome, but ostracized, for 
being who they are. Flusser aptly describes the habitual existence of the “settled inhabitant” as a 
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“fluffy blanket” that is threatened by the unsettling presence of the outsider who unmasks the 
inhabitant’s idealized reality as banal.294 In writing about the creative function of exile and the 
experience of the expellee, Flusser’s words ring true for the experience of international students, 
scholars, and faculty members as well: 
Only the immigrant to America is truly American … He spreads an American aura about 
him by his very move into exile. He becomes the epicenter of an earthquake that is 
experienced as toppling of the usual course of things by long-established inhabitants. But 
from his perspective things look virtually the opposite: he tries with all his might to make 
the unusual (that is, almost everything) livable. This mutual misunderstanding can lead to 
a creative dialogue between the expellee and the settled inhabitant.295 
 
Cosmopolitan moral education for adults commits us to ensuring that diverse global learners on 
campus, whether they hail from a different country (international students, scholars, and faculty) 
or from this country (minority students, first generation college students, returning adult 
students, Generation 1.5 bilingual students, etc.), have an equal right to engage with all aspects 
of campus and community life as they see fit to facilitate their autonomous self-development.  
Central to this institutional commitment is what Kant calls cosmopolitan right, or the 
right to hospitality accorded to all “newcomers.” According to Kant, cosmopolitan right, 
means the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on 
the land of another. … What he can claim is not the right of a guest … but the right to 
visit; this right, to present oneself for society, belongs to all human beings by virtue of the 
right of possession in common of the earth’s surface on which, as a sphere, they cannot 
disperse infinitely but must finally put up being near one another; but originally no one 
had more right than another to be on a place on the earth …296 
 
To elaborate on this theme of cosmopolitan right, I turn to one of the major sites of 
internationalization on the college campus, one with which I have direct experience: The 
Writer’s Workshop, University of Illinois’ writing center. As a graduate writing consultant, 
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much of my time was spent forming prolonged tutoring relationships with these individuals, 
assisting not only with academic writing conventions, methods of argumentation, source 
integration, and effective communication with professors and classmates, but with socializing 
students to U.S.-specific institutional practices. Most tutors and tutees did not recognize this 
process to be an instance of global learning. However, as writing center practice is a form of 
applied ethics,297 the question of what ethical responsibility, if any, a writing center has toward 
its internationally diverse writers is an important one to ask in light of my account. More 
specifically, regarding cosmopolitan right, how can writing centers demonstrate an attitude of 
intercultural respect toward all writers through writing center policy and tutor-writer 
interactions? 
 Writing centers can demonstrate intercultural respect in at least two major ways. 
University admissions policies ostensibly welcome international students and scholars into the 
campus community but do not adequately attend to their social needs. Firstly, in response to 
these changing academic and institutional trends, writing centers should work to reinforce and 
expand their mission to support these writers by advocating for them with faculty and other 
service units on campus. For example, writing center policies can create an ethical safe space 
that upholds writers’ agency in discussing issues of academic and campus culture without fear of 
intrusive monitoring or assessment, including any practice of “reporting” back to professors 
about writers’ appointments and progress. Secondly, the writing center is uniquely positioned to 
maintain prolonged engagement with individual students over individual terms extending to 
years. Thus, a unique opportunity is afforded for students to develop not only as better writers, 
but as deeper, more flexible thinkers, gained through sustained interpersonal and intercultural 
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relationships. Intercultural respect must be cultivated through a center-wide ethos – it does not 
happen overnight. To this end, tutors require ongoing professional development to experience 
responding to different cultural and institutional approaches to writing, and the writing center 
needs to perform greater outreach into the campus community and support international students 
with creative and accessible programming. 
Sustaining Educational Experiments 
As Maxine, the professor of social studies methods in the Global Perspectives 
Collaborative Pilot, described in her interview reflections, “No, I don’t think [this pilot is 
sustainable] …it always seems to be especially with new things [that it] takes somebody or some 
group to make that work, and there has to be some commitment behind that.” Educational 
experiments like the global perspectives pilot are often faced with a mixture of institutional 
enthusiasm for the attention they generate as “best practices,” with a skepticism or general 
apathy regarding the minutiae of their operation and continued sustainability, factors Maxine 
noted in her own experience “always … finding [herself] in these kinds of new situations.” She 
goes on to wonder: “Maybe I create them, I don’t know. I like them. I like things that are not 
predictable.” Faculty-driven educational experiments seem to require certain character traits of 
the persons who are drawn to carrying them out, namely an openness to risk, a determination to 
affect positive change, and a realistic awareness that any change might be gone tomorrow. Yet, 
still, they try out new things because of the intrinsic worth of the educational experiment, both 
educationally and morally.  
Taking a stand for educational experiments is part of the vocation of the teacher. As a 
philosopher and lifelong professor deeply committed to educational issues, both theoretical and 
practical, Kant became a public advocate for an experimental school, the Philanthropinum, 
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founded by German educational reformer Johann Bernhard Basedow, which stressed a 
cosmopolitan orientation and progressive, experience-based curriculum and pedagogy.298 In 
elaborating on his public defense of the school, Kant wrote:  
It is futile to expect this salvation of the human species from a gradual improvement of 
the schools. They must be transformed if something good is to come out of them because 
they are defective in their original organization, and even the teachers must acquire a new 
Bildung. Not a slow reform, but a swift revolution can bring this about.299 
 
Even though the Philanthropinum eventually closed due to mismanagement, a fact Kant himself 
lamented, the necessity of the experiment remains. As Kant mentions, when it comes to changing 
the calcified disposition of an entire practice, only a fundamental change of the grounding of the 
practice will succeed.  
The inherent fragility of morally cosmopolitan experiments that seek to upend current 
assumptions about educational practice should be mitigated by institutions taking normative 
stances on what students should learn, despite perceived risks and failure as a result. In the case 
of the Global Perspectives Collaborative Pilot, Maxine lamented that the College of Education’s 
focus was primarily upon filling classrooms, and thus approved themes based on whether they 
were thought to be appealing to potential student-customers. She discussed feeling disappointed 
about not receiving adequate resources and support to carry out the pilot, and that all decision-
making responsibility fell on her shoulders as the only research faculty in the pilot, otherwise 
staffed with clinical faculty members. Institutions need to model the openness to risk and 
willingness to fail. As Solomon and Solomon observed, “the single most important fact about an 
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education [is] how much searching and reflection, how many false starts and wrong roads, how 
much ‘waste’ an education often requires.”300 
There is a positive sense of intellectual entrepreneurship that evokes the virtues of 
experimentalism in educational reform. 301 According to Liora Bresler, academic entrepreneurs 
generally possess the following characteristics: 
• Ability to carry the project to fruition 
• Internal locus of control 
• Feeling fulfilled in the entrepreneurial process, making a difference 
• Take risks, tolerance of “failures,” small, and sometimes big, learn from mistakes, 
persist 
• Not always the “best” in the traditional sense (and don’t strive to be) 
• Ability to negotiate a system 
• Animators 
• Project bigger than ego302 
 
Many of these qualities describe how Maxine was able to carry out the Global Perspectives 
Collaborative Pilot without many resources from the wider institution. These qualities possessed 
by academic entrepreneurs speak to the autonomous self-development and re-learning of my 
account. They enable educators to think outside of current curricular and pedagogical norms. 
Moreover, they are better able to identify a problem, sense an opportunity, and explore what is 
possible.  
Morally cosmopolitan educational experiments are essential to the global learning of 
students, faculty, staff, and academic leaders who are involved, changing them in the process. 
Thus, all of these global learners should have a say in adjudicating and developing educational 
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experiments. Global higher education institutions should promote more of them by devoting 
resources to sustaining them. 
Expanding Example Creation and Circulation 
To diversify global learning’s reach, we first need to ensure there is a shared normative 
focus that connects global learning efforts. To begin to explore this shared normative focus, I 
have argued that we ought to come together on certain moral values – like autonomy, self-
identity, the importance of vocation, and re-learning – but be aware that these values are 
expressed differently in different practices, by different people. As a final approach to practice 
that derives directly from my account, I suggest that a broader-based approach to creating and 
circulating appropriately conceived global learning examples, both within and beyond the 
institution, will serve to make global learning more palpable and relatable for diverse global 
learners.  
In a separate article, I discuss the importance of what I call “case examples” for global 
learning in preservice teacher education. 303 These case examples may either be already existing 
examples that ought to be circulated to help others, or newly-created examples for teachers to 
utilize with their students. Either way,  
adequately performed [examples] provide appropriate models of knowledge complexity 
for preservice teachers’ development of global perspectives in their learning and 
application to pedagogical issues. … [These examples] enable preservice teachers to both 
reinterpret a particular experience of learning and the conditions that led to it, while at 
the same time, undergo a new experience in the creation and adjudication of the case 
example.304 
 
These examples are grounded in the aesthetic values I argue for here, including non-narrativity 
and radical openness to interpretation.  
                                                
303 Mark Keitges, “Expanding Global Learning through Case Experiences: Technological Ruminations on Dewey’s 
Experience and Education,” The Journal of School & Society 2:1 (2015): 6-12. Emphasis in original. 
304 Ibid., 7. 
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For global learners to better create and circulate examples, they first need to have 
adequate reflective experience with examples that model the virtues of non-narrativity and 
radical openness to interpretation. With this experience, global learners will be able to develop a 
more considered approach to what constitutes an example of global learning and be better able to 
identify them in the future. Moreover, they will have appropriate models for how to exemplify 
their own global experience through non-narrative forms. 
Final Thoughts 
This study has been guided by the following conviction. Adult learners come from 
various places and have diverse experiences. Educators can never know exactly what motivates 
them, based on who we think they are, who they say they are, or what they say they are looking 
for. What adults want once they are cut off from feeling like they have an endless safety net are 
opportunities to express themselves in relationships with others. None of us can escape the 
human need to learn about ourselves; nor can we escape the human need to feel we are of 
service, accomplishing something for others. 
Statements such as these might strike some as idealistic remnants of pre-9/11 thinking, or 
at least pre-9/12 thinking (when a nation’s, and indeed world’s, hearts had been thrown open – 
before a disquieting undercurrent of bloodlust took over in the United States): a belief in the 
possibilities of human connection, that we can somehow find the better angels of our nature. 
Now, it is undeniable that we have all been unsettled from our prior modes of living and thinking 
and have been for quite some time. Rather than dialoguing along the lines of our shared plight 
and humanity, we continue to pit the ostensibly “settled” against the ostensibly “unsettled” in 
every context and situation. We actively militate against being surprised, challenged, and 
admitting our views are mistaken. At a time in our world that is rabidly nationalistic and anti-
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cosmopolitan, arguments such as the one made in this dissertation cannot be taken for granted 
but must be regularly made and defended. Global learning, in the present context, is a real threat 
to what some have deemed essential to our “way of life” and shared values. How should higher 
education respond? As I have suggested in this study, educators can respond by helping young 
people re-envision the world as a shared moral enterprise through global learning. 
Consider the vast array of learning experiences: a college student in formal higher 
learning, an employee learning about the responsibilities of a professional field, and an adult and 
citizen learning in unstructured, informal settings about an endless variety of subjects. Global 
learning describes each of these events of adult learning. What is involved in his global learning 
and why is it important? What characterizes the fragility of her experience, and her memories of 
those experiences, for future learning?  
These questions add up to an understanding of an adult learner’s total well-being – not as 
some objective measure that can be incrementally raised through policy changes, but as a 
consideration of how an adult learner’s autonomous decision-making contributes to living a 
flourishing life from his or her perspective. Global learning, adequately conceived and 
performed, is learning to always be prepared for re-learning, no matter what control we may lose 
in the process – realizing, finally, that, “to be unsettled, one first has to be settled.”305 By this we 
are all connected. 
 
 
 
  
                                                
305 Vilem Flusser, “To Be Unsettled, One First Has to Be Settled,” The Freedom of the Migrant: Objections to 
Nationalism (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2003): 25. 
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APPENDIX B: RESEARCH PARTICIPANT INVITATION EMAIL 
 
 
DOCTORAL RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
Realizing Autonomy through Global Learning: 
A Case Study of Globally-Oriented Teacher Education 
 
What does being a global teacher mean to you?  What values drive you to be a globally-oriented 
teacher?  How does the exploration of global perspectives in teaching and learning help you to 
better understand yourself and the world, express your individuality, and become a stronger 
teacher—in short, develop your capacity for autonomy?   
This doctoral research project addresses these questions by focusing on the social studies 
methods course for the global-themed Cohort 4, which runs from Fall 2014 to Spring 2015.  I am 
a current PhD candidate in the Department of Education Policy, Organization, and Leadership.  
My research centers on the internationalization of higher education.  As a former English/ELL 
and civics teacher, both in the U.S. and abroad, I am interested in learning from the perspectives 
of pre-service teachers in Cohort 4 and representing them in a major case study for my 
dissertation on global learning.   
Central to this study will be the conducting of interviews with current students enrolled in Cohort 
4 during Fall 2014 and Spring 2015.  I would like to learn about your perspectives and 
experiences with global learning, including your motivations in pursuing a global theme for your 
pre-service training, and your professional goals for the future.  Interviews will be scheduled 
around your availability.   
If you are interested in being interviewed for this doctoral research project, I invite you to read 
the attached consent form and sign the consent statement.  You may contact me at 
keitges2@illinois.edu for any questions or concerns.   
I hope that you will consider participating in this important research study.   
 
Best regards, 
 
Mark Keitges 
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APPENDIX C: RESEARCH DESCRIPTION SCRIPT 
 
“Hello all.  My name is Mark Keitges, and I am a PhD candidate in the Philosophy of Education.  
I am starting work on my dissertation on the subject of global learning in higher education.  I am 
interested in how students understand ideas of autonomy and cosmopolitanism as they relate to 
being a teacher.  As you may know, autonomy represents the ideal of self-governance.  
Cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, is the idea of being a “citizen of the world” or “global 
citizen.”  I would like to write a case study on Cohort 4 in the teacher education program.  I hope 
to conduct interviews with those of you willing to talk about your perspectives and experiences.   
One of the things that I’m going to be doing is sitting in on _______’s class because I want to be 
able to know what you’re doing in class—because my questions will relate to things you’re 
doing in class.  But I want to be really clear that I am not a TA and I am in no way responsible 
for your grade in this class—nor will I look at any assignments, unless you show them to me. 
Whether or not you decide to participate in this study and help me with my dissertation is 
entirely voluntary and will not have any impact at all on how you are graded in this class, or any 
of your other classes.   
I really want to learn about you—and your learning this year.  If talking about these things 
appeals to you, I would love to have you be a part of my research.  Just to give you an idea—
You could talk to me one time, or more than one time, depending on your interest.  If you talk to 
me in the Fall, I might ask you if you want to talk to me in the Spring, too, but you are welcome 
to say no.   
 I will now pass out a brief summary of my research with a consent form.  Feel free to read it 
now, or hold on to it, and sign the consent statement if you agree to participate in the research.  If 
you would like a copy of these papers, please let me know by writing your email below your 
signature on the consent form. 
I look forward to getting to know you through this course, and hopefully, working with you on 
this research project.   
Thanks a lot!” 
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APPENDIX D: STUDENT INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Self 
1. Tell me a little about where you grew up and what kind of school you went to. 
2. What were you like as an elementary/middle school student?  As a high school student? 
3. How have you changed since coming to college? 
4. Why did you want to be in the global cohort?  Or, how did you feel when you found out 
you’d been placed in the global cohort?  (which could apply to both groups) 
5. Could you tell me a little bit about your background? 
6. Where have you lived in your life?  Any follow-up:  
a. Travel abroad and/or people who have always lived in no-where Illinois. 
7. What made you want to become a teacher?  
8. What kind of teacher do you want to be? 
Practice 
9. What are the most important qualities of a teacher?  An elementary teacher?  What 
should be the most important goal of good teaching, in your opinion? 
10. What, in your own words, is “inquiry-based” teaching? 
11. As you understand it now, what do you think is the “purpose” of the Global Perspectives 
cohort?   
12. What most interests you/concerns you about the social studies course?  The Global 
perspectives cohort in general? 
a. Do you consider yourself a global citizen?  A global learner?  Why or why not? 
Do you think that should be an important goal for students? 
13. What do you most hope to gain as a teacher from being in this cohort/taking this social 
studies course? 
14. Tell me about your school placement this semester.   
15. Why did you decide to become a teacher?  What role did your parents play in that 
decision?   
a. When you make/made a big decision like choosing a major or (at the end of the 
year) taking a job, who do you talk to about it?  How much does that person’s 
opinion impact your decision?   
b. What parts of your life do you feel like you have complete control over?  What 
parts of your life do you feel like your parents/guardians still have control over? 
c. What worries/excites you most about graduating, getting a job and becoming “an 
adult”? 
16. OPTIONAL: “Autonomy is often described as living a self-directed life.”  Based on this 
general definition, or your own definition, how do you personally have autonomy in your 
life?  How do you think K-8 students have autonomy? 
17. Do you have any friends on campus who are international students?  When you were a 
freshmen did you have any friends who were international students? 
18. OPTIONAL: What do you notice the university doing that is focused on 
internationalization?  Can you give some examples? 
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APPENDIX E: FACULTY INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Institutional Level 
1. When you think about global learning or global education, in what context(s) do you 
think about it occurring? 
2. How do you think “global learning” or “global education” are defined in higher education 
today?  How do you understand it?  You may think about this question as you understand 
it in pre-service teacher education, higher education, or with education in general.   
3. How was “global perspectives” selected as the first theme for the new themed cohort?  
What were reasons given in its favor?  Were their reasons given against it being selected?   
4. What do you believe the higher-level aims, objectives, and purposes of the Global 
Perspectives to be?   
5. The Global Perspectives cohort is a pilot that is, by nature, an experiment and an 
innovation.  How will you assess whether the pilot of this cohort is successful?  
6. Given the current situation in the College of Education, or your Department, can this 
pilot’s innovations be sustained?  In other words, is it scalable?  Why or why not? 
 
Student/Class Level 
1. A major theme of your course is Inquiry.  How do you understand this concept relating to 
your course, your students’ developing pedagogical skills, and global perspectives in 
general? 
2. In interviews, several students have expressed concern about the amount of challenging 
work across the courses early on, and a feeling of confusion regarding the cohort’s 
inquiry approach.  What is your reaction to these concerns?  Follow-up: What steps do 
you plan to take? 
3. Inquiry-based learning is a potentially risky process of self-sharing and revelation.  This, 
of course, may be a good thing.  To what extent do you think difficult, challenging 
conversations are being had by the cohort in your class?  Are risks in inquiry being 
acknowledged and/or rewarded?  How? 
4. In interviews, several students mentioned that they had thought that learning about 
global, meaning world-wide, educational systems and practices would be a major 
component of the course.  How would you respond to these comments?   
5. To what extent do you think students feel connected to, or involved in, the Global 
Perspectives cohort’s higher level aims and purposes?   
6. To what extent were students consulted on, or involved in, the design and implementation 
of the themed pilot—both in the preliminary stages and currently?   
7. There seems to be a lot of diversity in this particular cohort.  Was that a conscious 
decision on someone’s part and if so, why?  Do you think that purposefully creating a 
“diverse” cohort was an important element of this themed pilot?   
8. Do you believe that a community is being created within the cohort/within the social 
studies class?  How do you know? 
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9. The whether students are developing a sense of vocation/duties regarding being a teacher 
question 
10. Please think of an experience in class this semester that challenged or troubled you, and 
describe it.  Why did it affect you in that way?  What did you do? 
11. The first semester of the Global Perspectives cohort is almost over.  What have you 
noticed that either confirmed your expectations or surprised you?  If you could do the 
first semester again, what would you do differently? 
 
 
